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ABSTRACT
In past centuries, images o f utopia have tended to re f le c t  the 
hopes and asp irations o f th e i r  w r i te rs ,  however fo r lo rn  those hopes 
might be, but in the present century, i t  is  common fo r  v is ions of 
utopia to re f le c t  the fears o f contemporary socie ty. The a n t i -  
utopian w r ite rs  o f  the twentieth century hold tha t the p e rfec t ly  
regulated society can only be imposed upon mankind through oppres­
sion, since perfection cannot ex is t in  nature. Man l ives  in  a world 
o f contingency and choice, and attempts to render the l i f e  o f  men 
wholly predictable can only re su lt  in the deformation o f humanity, 
through the ex tin c t ion  o f human mora lity  and c re a t iv i ty .  Moreover, 
the anti-Utopians assert, there can be no f i n a l ,  incon trove rt ib le  
d e f in i t io n  o f  perfection . The tru th  of the ru le rs  o f the perfect 
state is  no more than dogma. Utopian happiness consists merely in 
to ta l submission to th is  dogma, in abandonment o f autonomy and absorp­
t ion  in to  a corporate id e n t i ty .  The c it izen  o f utopia l ive s  in  'a 
perpetual childhood o f p re s c r ip t io n ',  and i f  he is  happy, his happi­
ness is  the happiness o f a c h i ld ,  who is  spared the burden o f  uncer­
ta in ty  and choice and re s p o n s ib i l i ty .
Of the anti-Utopians under review, Zamyatin, Orwell and Huxley, 
Zamyatin's is  the least ambiguous in te rp re ta t io n  o f the an ti-u top ian 
the s is , since Zamyatin is  the most profouldy in d iv id u a l is t ic  o f the 
three w r ite rs . Orwell's to ta l  state d i f fe rs  from the others, in  that 
i t  is intended as an expression o f pure power, and not as an instrument 
fo r  procuring corporate happiness. In Huxley's work the ambiguity is
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pronounced, since he o ffe rs  both an an ti-u top ia  and a u topia, which 
in  part r e f le c t ,  and in part con trad ic t,  one another. But despite 
d ifferences in in te rp re ta t io n ,  a l l  three w rite rs  consider th a t autono­
mous man, whether a credib le or an incred ib le  f ig u re ,  has no place in 
utopia.
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In troduction - The Changing Shape of Utopia
In th is  foreword to my thesis I am concerned not w ith utopias 
which have, however im perfectly , been in s t i tu te d  in the physical 
world, but w ith the va r ie ty  of utopian theories which has emerged 
throughout h is to ry . I shall s ta r t  with a general discussion o f utop­
ianism, and shall then propose a set o f c r i t e r ia  from which a taxo­
nomic framework can be derived. I shall suggest tha t the be lie fs  
t ra d i t io n a l ly  associated with the various forms o f utopianism have 
become weakened in the present century. F in a l ly  I shall idiscuss the 
nature o f modern conceptions o f utopia, p a r t ic u la r ly  as envisaged by 
the utopian s a t i r is t s .
(a) T rad it iona l v isions o f utopia
To presume to dream on behalf o f a l l  mankind is  an act o f supreme 
confidence. The utopian advances a theory o f society which is  intended 
to solve the problems, and s a t is fy  the wants, o f the whole o f humanity, 
however much those wants might need to be p u r i f ie d  and redefined. This 
is  not to suggest tha t the utopian is necessarily an op tim is t:  few
Utopians have believed tha t mankind would choose to fo llow  the pre­
scribed path to perfection. The utopia, no less than the a n t i-u to p ia ,  
may be an expression o f condemnation of the present, an admonition 
tha t society is  set upon a course which may lead to d isas te r. The 
element o f moral and social c r i t ic is m  in both P la to 's  Republic and 
More's Utopia is  re ad ily  d iscern ib le . Yet the utopian, however 
profound his pessimism may be, retains a confidence which the a n t i -  
utopian does not: he assumes the existence o f a transcendant ideal
-  5 -
o f human perfec t ion , to which man may aspire i f  he w i l l  but fo llow  
ce r ta in ,  ra t io n a l ly  derived ru les , which re f le c t  a fundamental t ru th  
about man's place in the natural order. That is ,  the utopian con­
tends tha t the b e l ie f  in human p e r fe c t ib i l ism  is  rooted in  both reason 
and nature. I t  is  the re jec t ion  o f th is  contention which has found 
expression in the utopian sa t ire s ,  the ' anti-dreams', o f th is  
century.
In order to derive an explanation fo r  th is  re je c t io n ,  I shall 
examine the major s tra ins o f thought which have underpinned utopian 
theories in the past. I shall propose f iv e  basic p r inc ip les  upon 
which utopianism has t r a d i t io n a l ly  been founded. These pr inc ip les  
are not necessarily mutually consistent. They may contain, exclude 
or overlap one another. But they may be found e ith e r  s ing ly  or in 
combination underlying a l l  the utopian models o f e a r l ie r  centuries.
The f iv e  categories I have iso lated are:
1. B e l ie f  in  man's a b i l i t y  to aspire to the Good through Reason
2. B e l ie f  in the existence o f a divine plan, under which humanity 
w i l l  be drawn towards perfection
3. Belie fe  in the existence o f  a ra tiona l law o f progress governing 
h is to ry
4. B e l ie f  in the power o f  the sciences to harness nature fo r  man's 
material bene f it ,  thus l ib e ra t in g  him to pursue perfection
5. B e l ie f  in the capacity o f the social sciences to provide pre­
cise answers to a l l  human problems.
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1. B e lie f in man's a b i l i t y  to aspire to the Good through Reason: 
fo r  P lato, the co ro l la ry  o f th is  b e l ie f  is  the theory tha t the wise 
should ru le in the cause o f Truth and V irtue . P lato, fo llow ing 
Socrates, held tha t no man errs w i l l in g ly .  Once a man has perceived 
Truth, he w i l l  na tu ra l ly  choose to fo llow  V irtue . From th is  i t  follows 
tha t those who have wisdom to perceive c o r re c t ly  should be the ru le rs  
o f society. Plato envisaged a society founded upon a p r in c ip le  o f 
threefo ld  s t r a t i f i c a t io n ,  b u i l t  a f te r  Nature, to re f le c t  the t r ip a r ­
t i t e  d iv is ion  o f the human soul. I t  is  the task o f the philosopher to 
bind his society to the u ltimate Truth. Those who have not the mental 
capacity to perceive Truth fo r  themselves are to be conditioned in to  
the habit o f  v irtuous action by the Guardians. For P lato, the v ir tu e  
o f the common c i t iz e n  is  d i f fe re n t  from tha t o f the philosopher. I t  
consists, we are to ld  in the Gorgias, in acting appropria te ly in a l l  
circumstances, since a l l  l i f e  depends upon intercommunication and 
re c ip ro c ity ,  which is  the basis o f a l l  human attachments. The ordinary 
c i t iz e n ,  then, is  unaware o f the e th ica l imperatives which d ire c t  and 
modify his actions, yet he is  induced, by fe l ic i to u s  social arrange­
ments, to hold r ig h t  opinions, and to contribu te to the harmony o f 
the state. In th is  way, he a tta ins  happiness, since, Plato asserts, 
happiness and v ir tu e  are inseparably linked.
Plato did not, o f course, believe in any h is to r ic a l  law o f 
progress which would draw men in e v ita b ly  to the Good State. No such 
theory could be accommodated w ith in  the Greek conception o f cyc l ica l 
time. Nonetheless, the Platonic concept tha t no man errs w i l l in g ly
-  7 -
informs a strongly progressive theory o f human p e r fe c t ib i l is m  which 
arose during the Enlightenment.
The utopianism o f such w rite rs  as Godwin, Owen and Fourier is 
founded upon a b e l ie f  tha t Reason w i l l  in e v ita b ly  lead man towards 
t ru th  and v i r tu e ,  although, i t  should be added, Fourie r 's  conception 
o f Reason is  id io syn c ra t ic ,  in tha t he equated i t  w ith in s t in c t .
The utopianism o f Godwin and Owen was founded upon a form of 
ra tiona lism  and naturalism prevalent during the Enlightenment, which 
postulates tha t man is  fundamentally good, and i f  removed from a cor­
rupt environment w i l l  understand and act upon e th ica l precepts through 
his powers o f reason. As Barbara Goodwin comments, th is  'Reason' 
is  not to be construed as representing merely the human capacity fo r  
ra tiona l thought; i t  also en ta i ls  man's s u s c e p t ib i l i ty  to t ru th ,  
and his a b i l i t y  to accrete and process knowledge. 'Two kinds o f ra t io n ­
a l i t y  seem to be involved in a l l  in ten tiona l a c t io n ' ,  she w rites . 
'F i r s t l y ,  that mental reasoning process which centres on the a b i l i t y  
to  manipulate language and lo g ic .  Secondly, there is  what w i l l  here
be referred to as purposive ra t io n a l i t y  ..........  Godwin's d e f in i t io n
o f rational action illuminates the special qualities which the Utopians
a tt r ib u te d  to purposive reason ...........  He would maintain tha t perfected
purposive ra t io n a l i t y  re f le c ts  an ex is t ing  order in the external world 
which is em pir ica lly  knowable'.^ The utopian, then, assumes a neces­
sary structure which re la tes objects in the social and natural worlds, 
and constructs his b e l ie f  system upon the absolute tru ths  which are 
revealed to him through his conception o f th is  s truc tu re .
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2. B e lie f in  the existence o f a div ine plan, under which humanity 
w i l l  be drawn towards pe rfec t io n : th is  premiss underlies a s p e c i f i ­
c a l ly  Christian varian t of utopianism, although, of course, such a 
b e l ie f  is no part o f orthodox C h r is t ia n i ty ,  where the doctrine o f 
man's o r ig ina l sin precludes a b e l ie f  in  ea rth ly  perfection . Utopia­
nism can here be seen as cons titu t ing  a d ire c t  response to d iv ine 
in junctions. The rules fo r  a tta in ing  perfection are held to be la id  
down in holy w r i t ,  and man has only to fo llow  them to achieve God's 
purpose.
One o f the most in f lu e n t ia l  o f the heretica l Utopians was 
Joachim of Fiore, a tw e lf th  century monk. Joachim envisaged the course 
o f h is to ry  as fa l l in g  in to  three stages, re f le c t in g  the separate parts 
o f the Divine T r in i t y .  The f i r s t  age was the Age o f the Father: 
th is  was the kingdom of law, where man was re lated to God through 
fear. The second age was the Age of the Son: th is  was the kingdom
of grace, where man was re lated to God through fa i th .  In the th i rd  
age, which was yet to come, men would f i n a l l y  become 'fr ie n d s  to God', 
being re lated to him through love. This f in a l  age was to be the Age 
o f the Holy Ghost, the kingdom of grace abounding. Thus Joachim 
looked forward not to the Second Coming o f C h r is t ,  but to a Third 
Coming o f God, th is  time in  the form o f the Holy Ghost.
Joachim's v is ion of h is to ry  was important because i t  allowed 
men to focus th e i r  a tten tion  not on the te r ro rs  o f the Last Judgment, 
but on the prospect o f an earth ly  paradise, on the advent o f a period 
o f te r re s t r ia l  h is to ry  in which freedom and love would re ign. The 
Church was dominated by corrupt men, but mankind as a whole was pro­
gressing towards an age where the e th ica l and s p i r i tu a l  ideals o f 
Christian man would f in a l l y  be realized.
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Joachim's conception o f the nature o f h is to ry  should not be
confused with evolutionary theories o f h is to r ic a l  progress. Joachim
believed tha t the th i rd  stage of h is to ry ,  the Age o f the Holy Ghost,
would necessarily be born o f a b i t t e r  c o n f l ic t  between the old and
the new, between the in iq u i ty  and corruption o f the ru le rs  o f  the
Church and the enlightened zeal of those who sought to reform i t .  The
commitment of the S p ir i tu a l Franciscans, who took upon themselves the
rô le of reformers, was ' to  a practice o f what they conceived as the
absolute perfection here and now. They believed tha t th e i r  own
struggle to preserve the Rule and Testament o f St. Francis in every
sy llab le  was part o f a cosmic c o n f l ic t ,  tha t the c r is is  o f e v i l  must
r ise  in a crescendo before the Church could pass over Jordan and th a t
th e i r  rô le was to safeguard the s p ir i tu a l  treasure o f the fu tu re .
Theirs was not the optimism o f an evolutionary view o f h is to ry ,  but
a cataclysmic: step by step the s itu a t io n  must worsen u n t i l  the
seventh t r ib u la t io n ;  then the tremendous miracle of the reformacio
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would happen', Marjorie Reeves w rites . On Joachim's in te rp re ta ­
t io n  o f h is to ry , then, the 'kingdom of grace abounding', the Golden 
Age to come, was a new b i r th ,  which could be preceded only by degen­
eration and destruction.
Myron P. Gilmore distinguishes two d is t in c t  reform movements 
which emerged in Europe a f te r  the Middle Ages. The f i r s t ,  he s ta tes, 
was inspired by Franciscan and Dominican mysticism, and from the 
'apocalyptic hopes o f those heretics and prophets who had appeared 
outside the orthodoxy of the la te  mediaeval church'. This apoca­
ly p t ic  movement had taken as i t s  in sp ira t io n  the Book o f Revelation,
“ 1 0 “
and other texts from the New Testament, There was a widespread con­
v ic t io n  that the world was moving in to  i t s  f in a l  stage before the 
Second Coming, and tha t man’ s duty was to perfect himself as best he 
could fo r  the world to come. In accordance w ith the teaching o f Odo 
o f Cluny and others, enclosed communities were set up, governed by 
p r inc ip les  o f poverty, asceticism and hu m il i ty .  These communities 
were intended to provide s p i r i tu a l  preparation fo r  the ce le s t ia l 
paradise which was imminent. The second reform movement which 
Gilmore distinguishes is of a very d i f fe re n t  nature to the apocalyptic 
reform movement. I t  took as i t s  in sp ira t io n  the new Greek and Hebrew 
learning, which centred upon man's ra t iona l fa c u l t ie s ,  and emphasized 
the importance to society o f an in te l le c tu a l a r is tocracy. I t  was 
ra t io n a l is t  and non-heretica l. Neo-platonism, Gilmore states,
'was to the humanists what A r is to te lian ism  had been to the Thomists'.
I t  emphasized nature, ra ther than grace, and eth ics ra ther than contem­
p la t ion . The Christian humanists held tha t ’ the nature o f man, 
fundamentally good although corrupted by o r ig in a l s in ,  was capable of
improvement by an in te l le c tu a l d is c ip l in e  .......... In the minds of many
of the humanists a new program of education was not only necessary; 
i t  was a l l  tha t was necessary ..........  This was perhaps the f i r s t  s ig n i­
f ic a n t  appearance of a hope which has recurred again and again in 
western thought and has remained one of the outstanding characte ris ­
t ic s  of the evolution o f European c iv i l i z a t io n .  I t  appeared in 
the sixteenth century, in the Age o f Enlightenment, and again among 
those l ib e ra l  u t i l i t a r ia n s  and devotees o f progress in  the nine-
3
teenth century who were the heirs o f the Enlightenment'.
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Among the sixteenth century Chris tian humanists was S ir  
Thomas More, who Gilmore w r ite s ,  expressed the ra t iona l humanist 
pos it ion with great c la r i t y :  'There are some who through knowledge
of things natural (tha t is  ra t io n a l)  construct a ladder by which to
r ise  to the contemplation o f things supernatural; they bu ild  a path 
to Theology through Philosophy and the Liberal A r ts ' . ^  More's 
Utopia is  the embodiment o f his ideals. I t  is  based broadly on a 
monastic framework, and is  guided by p r inc ip les  o f p ie ty , scholarship,
modesty, s im p l ic i ty  and re s t ra in t .
3. B e lie f in the existence of a ra tiona l law o f progress govern­
ing h is to ry : the conviction tha t progress was an a l l-p o w e r fu l,
omnipresent motive force in h is to ry  was emphatically expressed by 
Turgot in 1750, and was held to be based on empirical evidence. Man 
had only to look at h is to ry  to see how humanity had emerged from 
barbarism in to  the l i g h t ,  and so must con tinua lly  progress to ever 
greater heights. Louis Sebastien M ercier's L'An 2440, w r i t te n  in 
1771, was the f i r s t  utopia to celebrate th is  newfound optimism.
Mercier prophesied progress towards a b l is s fu l  world order, where 
peace, harmony and tolerance would re ign.
B e lie f in  the in e v i t a b i l i t y  o f human progress also informed 
the work o f Owen, Fourier, Godwin, St. Simon, Condorçet and others.
I t  was la rge ly  inspired by the rapid pace o f contemporary progress in 
the f ie ld  of science and technology.
Another, and u lt im a te ly  more potent, theory o f h is to r ic a l
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necessity was, o f course, tha t advanced by Marx in the nineteenth 
century. Although Marx opposed utopianism, denouncing the grand 
designs o f Owen, St, Simon and Fourier and th e i r  fe llows as mere p o l i ­
t ic a l  escapism, he nonetheless conceded tha t they seemed to have 
stumbled upon some important tru ths  about socie ty. However, Marx 
held that the method o f the Utopians was tha t o f the v is iona ry , 
rather than of the s c ie n t is t .  Marx claimed to o f fe r  a s c ie n t i f i c a l l y  
precise theory, d is t i l l e d  from a painstaking study o f the complex 
in te rp lay  of socio-economic forces throughout the course o f  h is to ry . 
His theory, he maintained, would demonstrate to mankind how best i t  
might e xp lo it  those forces, and hasten the so lu tion o f the c o n f l ic t .  
Marx is  not to be regarded as being himself a utopian. He was 
impatient of utopian th in k ing , and while he predicts inev itab le  pro­
gress towards a f in a l  stage when a l l  men w i l l  be equal and fre e , he 
does not o f fe r  any de ta iled descriptions o f the shape o f the society 
which w i l l  fo llow  the w ithering away o f the s ta te . Nonetheless, 
his theory o f  h is to r ic a l  necessity has been ava ilab le  to others as a 
buttress fo r  utopian asp ira tions.
A th i rd  varian t o f the b e l ie f  in  h is to r ic a l  progression, which 
also emerged during the nineteenth century, was tha t insp ired by the 
work o f Charles Darwin. Darwin's theory o f natural se lection was 
taken over and d is to rted  by social s c ie n t is ts  and po lem ic is ts , and 
made to support conclusions quite unintended by Darwin h imself.
Under the influence o f Herbert Spencer, a theory was developed which 
equated organic evolution with progress. To the Social Darwinists, 
evolutionary theory seemed to ind ica te  beyond doubt tha t ce r ta in
-  13 -
groups and races were approaching ever nearer to pe rfec tion , while 
others were in decline. The utopian William D e lis le  Hay envisaged 
a society in which the ' r is in g  race' (the B r i t is h )  would come to 
elim inate a l l  the 'lower races' o f mankind, and thus give force to 
the Darwinist (or ra ther, Spencerian) p r in c ip le  tha t only the f i t t e s t  
should survive.
4. B e lie f in the power of the sciences to harness nature fo r  
man's material be ne f it ,  thus l ib e ra t in g  him to pursue p e r fe c t io n : 
the f i r s t  o f the utopias founded upon th is  b e l ie f  were those o f 
Bacon and Campanella, in the 1620s. The same b e l ie f  permeated the 
utopian w rit ings  o f the Enlightenment, when the pace o f s c ie n t i f i c  
progress gave r ise  to a growing sense o f confidence in  the ever- 
expanding power and ingenuity o f the human mind. There appeared to 
be no l im i t  to man's a b i l i t y  to conquer nature, and thus to escape 
the constra ints o f material necessity. The l ib e ra t in g  power o f s c i ­
e n t i f i c  knowledge and technological expertise was a recurrent theme 
in utopian w r i t in g  u n t i l  the time o f H.G. Wells.
5, B e lie f in the capacity o f the social sciences to provide precise 
answers to a l l  human problems: during the Enlightenment, a growing
conviction arose that man had only to observe the advances made in
the f ie ld  o f science and technology to recognise that s im ila r  progress 
could be achieved in the social sphere, i f  only the same precis ion 
and expertise were to be employed. St. Simon and others held tha t the
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applica tion  of the calculus w ith in  the f ie ld  o f  human re la t ions  
would u lt im a te ly  secure fo r  man exact so lu tions to a l l  social pro­
blems. Condor^et wrote, in  The Progress o f the Human Mind, ’ I t  is  
easy to  see how imperfect is  the present analysis o f man’ s moral and 
in te l le c tu a l fa c u l t ie s ;  how much fu r th e r  the knowledge o f his duties, 
which presumes a knowledge of the influence o f his actions upon the 
welfare o f  his fe llow  men and upon the society to which he belongs, 
can s t i l l  be increased through a more profound, more accurate, more 
considered observation o f tha t in fluence; how many questions have 
to be solved, how many social re la tions to be examined, before we can 
have precise knowledge o f the ind iv idua l r ig h ts  o f man and the r igh ts
tha t the state confers upon each in regard to a l l  ........  Do we not see
the necessity o f acquiring a precision tha t these elementary tru ths
cannot possess so long as they are absolutely general? ........  Are
we yet in possession of any precise rules fo r  se lec t ing , out o f the 
almost in f in i t e  va r ie ty  o f possible systems in which the general p r in ­
c ip les o f equa lity  and natural r igh ts  are respected, those which 
w i l l  best secure the preservation of these r ig h ts ,  which w i l l  a ffo rd  
the frees t scope fo r  th e ir  exercise and th e i r  enjoyment, and which 
w i l l  moreover insure the le isure  and welfare o f in d iv id u a ls , and the 
strength, prosperity and peace of nations? The app lica tion  o f  the 
calculus o f combinations and p ro b a b i l i t ie s  to these sciences promises 
ever greater improvement, since i t  is the only way of achieving 
resu lts  of an almost mathematical exactitude, and o f assessing the
degree o f th e i r  p ro b a b il i ty  or l ike l ihood  ........  Without the calcu lus,
these sciences would always remain crude and l im ited  fo r  want o f
5
instruments'.
-  15  -
Condorçet fu r th e r maintained that the in troduction  o f a new, 
un iversa l, s c ie n t i f i c a l ly  precise language, would be o f immeasurable 
benefit to mankind. Through the use o f th is  new language i t  would 
be possible to subject moral concepts to precise sc ru tiny , and thus 
to a tta in  certa in t ru th ,  Condorçet sought an i n f a l l i b i l i t y  h ithe rto  
found only in mathematics, as did Condillac. 'True science' was thus 
to take over the ro le  formerly ascribed to ' t ru e  re l ig io n '  as a sure 
guide to human perfection. Man, fo r  Condorçet, as fo r  many o f his 
utopian contempories, was conceived as being n a tu ra l ly  good, and 
moreover constantly growing in  mental, and therefore moral, capacity. 
Once he had achieved certa in knowledge o f the s tra teg ies which society 
should adopt, he would assuredly gain perfection .
(b) The undermining of utopian be lie fs  in the twentieth century
As I have argued, a dominant theme in the utopian forms of 
e a r l ie r  centuries was a b e l ie f  in a transcendent good, which was 
accessible to man through Reason. Moreover, from the time o f the 
Enlightenment onward, there was an accompanying b e l ie f  tha t man 
was in e v ita b ly  progressing towards perfec t ion , both mentally and 
s p i r i t u a l l y .  Man was indeed Lord o f his Universe. However, by the 
end o f the nineteenth century, man's confidence in his unique and 
natural a b i l i t y  to a tta in  perfection was already under considerable 
pressure.
Paradoxically, i t  was man's accumulation o f knowledge, both 
o f the natural world and of socie ty, a fa c to r  which had e a r l ie r  served 
as a buttress fo r  theories of perpetual ra tiona l and moral progress, 
which gradually came to undermine his confidence in his power to 
achieve perfection.
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As Stephen Gould w r ite s ,  'Each o f the major sciences has con­
tr ib u te d  an essential ingredient to our long re tre a t from an i n i t i a l  
b e l ie f  in our own cosmic importance. Astronomy defined our home as 
a small planet tucked away in one corner o f an average galaxy among 
m il l io n s ;  biology took away our status as paragons created in  the 
image o f God; geology gave us the immensity o f time, and taught us 
how l i t t l e  o f i t  our own species has occupied'.^ Gould's contention 
is  tha t since the days of Copernicus and Newton, man's anthropocentric 
v is ion o f the universe has come to bear less re la t io n  to accepted 
t ru th ,  although the process o f  re jec t ion  o f th is  v is ion  has been slow 
and p a in fu l .
Moreover, in the twentieth century, man's old pursu it o f cer­
ta in ty  and constancy has encountered an unforseen check. The theories 
o f Einstein have overturned h ith e rto  incontestable tru th s .  Time can 
no longer be regarded as being susceptible to  unambiguous measure­
ment at any time throughout the universe, so tha t any given po int is  
everywhere the same. R e la t iv i ty  theory shows tha t time is  modified 
by changes in the g rav ita t io na l f i e ld ;  space is  modified by the objects 
i t  contains. The neat, mechanical model o f the universe offered by 
Newtonian physics has been superseded. A l l  is  f lu x  and change. I r o n i ­
c a l ly ,  Einstein himself was unw il l ing  to accept a l l  the im plica tions 
o f his theories. Although he contributed much to the theory o f quantum 
mechanics, 'he spent the closing decades o f his l i f e  t ry in g  to show 
tha t the uncomfortable consequencies o f the theory tha t he had helped 
to create were not inescapable',^ I t  was the 'ph i lo sop h ica lly  fuzzy' 
nature of quantum mechanics, i t s  p ro b a b i l is t ic  component, which Einstein
-  17  -
found unacceptable. We can e ith e r  ca lcu la te the ve lo c ity  o f  an 
electron in i ts  path round the proton, or we can p lo t  i t s  pos it ion  
at a given moment, but we cannot do both. This element of untidiness 
and uncerta inty was offensive to E inste in .
In the f ie ld  of human psychology, too, theore tica l develop­
ments over the past century have served to undermine man's fa i th  in 
his a b i l i t y  to f ind  precise answers to the problems o f l i f e .  Freudian 
theory has ca lled in to  question man's b e l ie f  in  his own ra t io n a l i t y ,  
ra is ing  instead the spectre o f the dark arcana o f the subconscious 
mind. Moreover, Freudian theory casts doubts on man's a b i l i t y  to 
found a perfect c iv i l i s a t io n ,  rooted in nature, and dedicated to the 
achievement of harmony and f e l i c i t y .  Man's social re la t ionsh ips ,
Freud contends, are imbued with 'c u l tu ra l  f r u s t r a t io n ' ,  since c i v i ­
l i s a t io n  is  founded upon renunciation o f in s t in c t ,  and therefore 
en ta i ls  the generation o f pain and g u i l t .
Modern conceptions o f the world, i t  seems, hinder the utopian 
in his quest fo r  ce r ta in ty ,  immutability  and absolute Truth. Science, 
the great l ib e ra to r ,  has not invested humanity with the omniscience i t  
sought, nor is i t  l i k e ly  to do so. I t  has, o f  course, enabled man 
to harness the environment to an extent which would have astounded 
the optim ists o f the Enlightenment. But absolute mastery over nature 
has eluded man: instead, man has had to learn from the less fo r tu ­
nate resu lts  o f his e a r l ie r  hubris, tha t he, l ik e  any other creature, 
is  dependent upon the physical resources o f his f ra g i le  world. More­
over, technology has shown i t s e l f  to be an ambiguous force fo r  progress 
Machines can l ib e ra te  man; they can as eas ily  enslave him. Wells's
“ 1 8 “
automated paradise had already begun to arouse fee lings o f repugnance 
by the 1930s.
In the f ie ld  o f the social sciences, the quest fo r  ce rta in  
solutions has encountered fu r th e r  checks. The breakdown o f the 
framework o f re lig ious  b e l ie f  has led to the fragmentation o f the 
n a tu ra l is t  system o f e th ics , leaving behind a group o f concepts which 
now have to f ind  a new va lid a t io n , divorced from the context from 
which they o r ig in a l ly  arose. We are l e f t  w ith  moral p lura lism .
This p luralism is  re flec ted  in the organisation o f the socia l sciences 
themselves. Social science now recognizes competing models, and any 
such model w i l l  supply a ra t io n a l ly  coherent connection between actions 
and purposes, and between purposes and b e l ie fs .  The utopian ideal o f 
a un if ied  science o f soc ie ty , revealing an absolute t ru th ,  has not 
been rea lized. Social science reveals only competing moral t ru th s ,  
or ideologies.
The Utopians of e a r l ie r  centuries assumed tha t i t  was possible 
to discover absolute tru ths about man, e ith e r  from d iv ine sc r ip tu re ,  
or through painstaking empirical research. From these tru th s ,  i t  
would f in a l l y  be possible, with the aid o f s c ie n t i f i c  techniques, 
to deduce tru ths about the optimum shape o f so c ie ty . But in  the pre­
sent day, the l im ita t io n s  to the power o f s c ie n t i f i c  procedures, and 
especia lly  mathematical procedures, to overcome human problems, is 
acknowledged even among s c ie n t is ts .  J.Z. Young w r ite s ,  'The very 
fa c t of separating out precise, log ica l propositions about complex 
s itua tions  presupposes tha t such separations are possible, w ithout 
loss o f some features tha t are essential fo r  the so lu tion of real
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human problems ........  Systems o f computerized th ink ing have mostly
followed log ic ians in assuming that the processes o f the brain can 
be use fu lly  catagorized by abstract e n t i t ie s  The assumption
involved in such a method in tha t the essential features o f s ta te ­
ments, whose tru th fu lness is  in question, can be captured in simple 
symbols. We t r y  to define our terms to ensure th is ,  but the b io lo g is t ,  
l ik e  the so c io lo g is t,  f inds many s itua tions  so complicated tha t sim­
p l i f i c a t io n  produces d is to r t io n .  There are no simple answers to most
o f the questions tha t arise in everyday l i f e  ........  The use o f
abstract classes has obviously given sensational increases in  control 
o f  nature, especia lly  through mathematics . . . .  (but) i f  we s im p lify  
problems by log ica l or mathematical analysis we are l ia b le  to lose as 
well as to gain ___ Logic, mathematics, and computers represent
o
p o te n t ia l ly  dangerous reduction!sms'.
A th ird  attack upon the foundations o f utopianism has been 
brought about by the undermining o f h is to r ic is t  assumptions. Theories 
o f the in e v i t a b i l i t y  of progress towards u lt im ate perfection have 
been cast in to  doubt by the course o f h is to ry  i t s e l f .  Social 
Darwinism was, as I have already argued, based upon a radical mis­
understanding o f  Darwin's work. Those who considered tha t the 'forces 
of evo lu tion ' would carry favoured sections o f humanity forward to 
perfection gravely misread Darwin's in ten tions . Darwin was re luc tan t 
to use the term 'e v o lu t io n ',  because o f i t s  popular connotations, pre­
fe rr in g  instead the phrase, 'descent w ith m o d if ica t io n '.  Orthodox 
Darwinism reveals not an inev itab le  t ide  o f progress, but the part 
played in the development o f a species by chance mutation and random 
changes in  the natural environment.
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Lastly , material manifestations o f Marxist theory reveal no 
un if ied  v is ion o f the perfect s ta te , but ra ther a p lu r a l i t y  o f com­
peting v is ions. There is  no single s tructure shared by a l l  the Marxist 
states. Neither is  there any evidence o f a s ing le sequence o f h is to ­
r ic a l  events which leads inexorably to the in s t i tu t io n  o f  the Marxist 
s ta te . Each has followed i t s  own, unique h is to r ic a l  path.
(c) New images of utopia
I f  i t  is  accepted tha t the s p i r i t  o f confidence which supported 
the utopian theories of the past has been undermined, then i t  must
fo llow  tha t the utopias o f the present century w i l l  take on a form
very d i f fe re n t  from tha t o f th e i r  predecessors. The utopias o f the 
past were diverse in nature. They were the embodiment o f a wide 
va r ie ty  o f b e l ie fs ,  desires and dreams. Yet i t  was generally assumed 
tha t utopia was natural to man, i t  was the true c i t y ,  to which men
might be drawn, perhaps by the forces o f h is to ry ,  or by moral per­
suasion, or through increased knowledge and perception. I f  today the 
confidence of these e a r l ie r  bu ilders of utopias has been seriously 
undermined, then visions o f the utopian state in th is  century w i l l  no 
longer appear as man's natural home, to be accepted by a l l  who have 
w i t  or grace enough to perceive the t ru th .  What, then, w i l l  be the 
shape o f the new utopia? And how w i l l  i t  be possible to compel man 
to accept i t?
There are two fu r th e r  pr inc ip les  underlying utopianism, which 
I have so fa r  omitted to discuss. Neither e n ta i ls  b e l ie f  in a div ine^
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purpose fo r  man, nor b e l ie f  in any theory o f natural progress. Most 
s ig n i f ic a n t ly ,  ne ither e n ta i ls  b e l ie f  in man’ s natural goodness, 
nor, indeed, in his capacity fo r  making moral judgments a t a l l .  I t  
is  my contention tha t i t  is  upon these two p r in c ip le s ,  perhaps in  
combination with others, tha t the f ic t io n a l  utopias o f the modern 
world are founded, both in  the utopian s a t ire s ,  and in B.F. Skinner's 
p rescrip t ive  utopia, Walden Two. Huxley's mystical u topia. Is lan d , 
is  sui generis, but even here, traces o f these two p r inc ip les  may be 
discerned.
The f i r s t  is the b e l ie f  tha t a supreme le g is la to r  w i l l  a r ise , 
who w i l l  guide the destin ies o f his s ta te . Such a le g is la to r  w i l l  
supervise the social and p o l i t ic a l  arrangements o f the state with 
watchful detachment. He w i l l  be in the state but not o f i t .  Such 
is  the Leg is la to r o f Rousseau's Social Contract. The f igu re  o f the 
deus ex machina, the omnopotent ru le r ,  remote from a l l  human account­
a b i l i t y ,  able to change or abandon laws at w i l l ,  has haunted the 
consciousness o f man in the twentieth century, fo llow ing the experi­
ences o f S ta l in is t  Russia and Nazi Germany. Where a demi-god ru le s , 
the c it izens  are deprived o f th e i r  status as moral beings. The to ta l  
power of the ru lers predicates the to ta l powerlessness o f the ru led. 
The whole duty o f the subjects of a demi-god is  unconditional and 
un re flec t ive  obedience. And, to extend Lord Acton's maxim, i f  
absolute power corrupts absolute ly , so too does absolute powerlessness
The second concept underlying modern v is ions o f utopia is  
the theory tha t man is  i n f i n i t e l y  malleable. This is  the p r in c ip le
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of the behaviourist school o f psychology, and i t  l ie s  at the heart o f 
Skinner’ s Walden Two. Again, under th is  theory, man is  no longer 
considered to have any innate moral capacity. Experience in  the pre­
sent century has taught tha t to ta l m a lle a b i l i ty  implies to ta l  sus­
c e p t ib i l i t y  to techniques o f conditioning and manipulation, to 
oppresssion and to deformation.
A utopia founded upon b e l ie f  in the omniscience of a semi­
d iv ine ru le r ,  and upon b e l ie f  in to ta l human p la s t ic i t y  cannot pre­
tend to any form o f democracy. A ll power necessarily radiates from 
the top. Men are no more than inchoate matter, to be moulded and 
fashioned in such a way tha t th e i r  desires and needs exactly accord 
with the societa l arrangements la id  down by the ru le r .  Such are the 
imaginary states o f Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four and Huxley’ s 
Brave New World. So, too, is  the perfect state depicted in Zamyatin's 
We, although Zamyatin’ s an ti-u top ia  is  more complex, in tha t i t  is  
a powerful parody o f the t ra d i t io n a l utopia, in f le x ib ly  committed 
to precise ly computed ideals o f Reason, Happiness and V irtue . I t  is 
powered by the old b e l ie f  tha t a l l  human problems are u lt im a te ly  
susceptible to mathematical so lu t ion , and tha t thus the whole o f l i f e  
can be rendered predictable.
I t  is  the e lim ination of human u n p re d ic ta b i l i ty  in the per­
fe c t s tate which appears as the main concern o f many o f the w rite rs  
o f an ti-u top ian f ic t io n  in the twentie th-century; Zamyatin in We^ , 
Aldous Huxley in  Brave New World, E.M. Forster in  The Machine Stops
-  2 3 -
and David Karp in One. Ferdinand Mount defines this concern in the 
following words: * Human beings are not like a stable chemical sub­
stance, which may be refined to the n^^ degree of purity The
reformer sketches out his plan for the perfecting of this or that 
institution. But the reaction of the human material is unpredictable, 
as volatile as any explosive .... This unpredictability is such a 
striking fact that all progressive theorists of any stature have had 
to take account of it. And they have all chosen the same method - 
the silencing of the human material. Rousseau*s Legislator, the Benthamist 
tradition of the social engineer, the Communist tradition of the dictator­
ship of the proletariat, all work on the assumption that the mob must 
not be allowed into the planning office. For if the common people are 
allowed to participate, they will exercise their human freedom to make 
mistakes. And once that freedom is permitted, progress will be neither
9
sure nor necessary .... The first necessity for progress is silence...*
The conviction of the twentieth century utopian satirists is 
that utopia is established only through an act of violation, through 
an attempt to constrain nature, and to empty man of his rationality, 
his passions, and all that serves to identify him as human. The new 
citizen of utopia is the hollow man, bereft of the pride which might 
enable him to endure the necessities and the vicissitudes of the world, 
the imperfections of social life, and his own inadequacies with some 
sort of nobility - bereft, too, of that self-denying thirst for 
virtue, and for the achievement of universal well-being which typified 
the citizen of the older utopias, possessing simply the passive capa­
city to react mechanically to threats, or to give the appropriate 
conditioned response to external stimuli.
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The utopian s a t i r is t s  have reacted against p a r t ic u la r  m a te r ia l i ­
sations of utopia in the modern world, and by extrapo lating and in te n s i­
fy ing certa in  tendencies which they have observed in soc ie ty , they 
have sought to present an admonitory p ic ture o f  the l i f e  o f man as i t  
might be in the fu tu re . But the scope o f th e i r  condemnation spreads 
fu r th e r  than th is .  I t  is a condemnation o f the utopian p ro jec t as 
such. The utopian, they say, is  committed to an in f le x ib le  v is ion 
o f the nature o f social perfection. He is  unconcerned w ith the per­
ceived cha rac te r is t ics  and requirements o f men in the world about him. 
Instead, he pretends to a knowledge o f the Universal Man. The utopian 
s a t i r is t s  seek to depict the condition o f the p a r t ic u la r  man, as i t  
might be i f  he were to become subordinated to the requirements of any 
theory o f  social perfection. No man, they say, can w ith d ig n ity  
consent to become a figment in another man's dream.
I f  we accept the conclusion o f the utopian s a t i r is t s  tha t 
b e l ie f  in the utopian pro ject has no basis e ith e r in reason or nature, 
then we must accept the co ro l la ry  that any attempt to in s t i t u te  utopia 
must en ta il a radical rev is ion both of the world o f nature and o f the 
human mind.
In Part I of my thes is , I shall review the general nature o f 
the utopian enterprise, w ith p a r t ic u la r  reference to the c r i t i c a l  
standpoints adopted by the three w r i te rs ,  Yevgeny Zamyatin, Aldous 
Huxley and George Orwell.
In Part I I I ,  I shall assess the problems posed by man and the 
natural world to the a rch ite c t o f utopia, and also the s tra teg ies 
devised fo r  overcoming these problems, as they present themselves 
in  the work of these three w r ite rs .
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Part I (1) The an ti-u top ian c r i t iq u e
In th is  section o f my thesis I shall discuss the an ti-u top ian  
c r i t iq u e  in general terms and the p a r t ic u la r  response to utopianism 
to be found in the work o f Zamyatin, Orwell and Huxley.
I have chosen to re fe r to the to ta l states o f Orwell's  
Nineteen Eighty-Four, Zamyatin's and Huxley's Brave New World 
as 'a n t i -u to p ia s '.  This is  not a wholly sa t is fa c to ry  neologism, but 
i t  has the v ir tu e  o f being the one in the most common usage. Some 
w rite rs  prefer the term, 'd ys to p ia ',  but while th is  may be l i n g u i s t i ­
c a l ly  superior, i t  is  s t i l l  not beyond c r i t ic is m .  F ic t iona l models 
of the to ta l s ta te , whether proposed fo r  adoption or re je c t io n ,  e x is t ,  
a f te r  a l l ,  'nowhere'. I t  can be argued tha t the word, 'd ys to p ia ',  
and i t s  opposite, 'e u to p ia ',  should apply only to states which are 
extant in the real world.
The anti-Utopians challenge the v a l id i t y  o f ce rta in  assumptions, 
which are fundamental to utopian th ink ing : f i r s t l y ,  the utopian
assumes that i t  is  possible to devise a 'pe rfec t s ta te ' ,  in which 
perfected man may be sustained and perpetuated. This, in  tu rn , takes 
i t  fo r  granted tha t there can be general agreement as to the nature 
o f perfection , both o f man and o f society. The utopias depict 
enclosed systems where there is  no p o s s ib i l i t y  o f se lf-exc lus ion . 
A lte rna tive  philosophies are debarred, and, as fa r  as possible, 
rendered unthinkable. A common element in a l l  utopias is  tha t the 
state of a f fa i r s  described is presented as being se lf -e v id e n t ly  
desirable, incorporating and pre-empting a l l  ra t iona l c r i t i c a l  
response. Even where the utopian exposition is  presented in the form
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o f a dialogue between a c i t iz e n  o f utopia and an ou ts ider, the 
f ic t io n a l  c r i t i c  of the proposed social arrangements is  inva r iab ly  
portrayed as being i r r a t io n a l ,  in se n s it ive , weak or fra nk ly  malevolent 
The c lear im plica tion  is  tha t whoever re jec ts  the proffered perfec­
t io n ,  does so only as a re su lt  of his own f o l l y ,  in s e n s ib i l i t y  or 
in iq u i ty .  I t  is presumed tha t the state has discovered the u lt im ate 
t ru th ,  va l id  fo r  a l l  time, about how society should be constructed.
Each utopia is  a to ta l s ta te , the embodiment o f a closed system o f 
thought. There is  a central postulate to which the state is  committed, 
and from which a l l  rubrics governing social conduct are derived. The 
dogma o f the state cannot be re futed, since a l l  c r i t ic is m  is  re in te r ­
preted to conform to the l in g u is t ic  and conceptual conventions of 
the dogma, and thence contorted in to  a corroboration o f i t s  in te rna l 
lo g ic .  There are strong a f f in i t i e s  between the dogma of the to ta l  
state and re lig ious  dogma, and th is  is  a subject to which I shall 
return la te r  in th is  sub-section.
This primary assumption o f the Utopians, tha t i t  is  possible 
to a rr ive  at a un ive rsa lly  acceptable ideal o f pe rfec tion , is  wholly 
re jected by the an ti-u top ians. I t  would, they maintain, be impos­
s ib le  to define social perfection in such a way tha t the v a l id i t y  o f 
one's d e f in i t io n  would be manifest to a l l  men in a l l  ages. Thus the 
shape o f any proposed utopian society could never be established 
through reasoned argument, followed by general agreement. The 
'pe rfec t s ta te ' would only be taken to be desirable by a l l ,  once 
coercion, and probably the app lica tion  o f eugenic techniques and mecha­
nisms fo r  social conditioning and con tro l,  had purged society o f  a l l
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d iss ident elements. Moreover, the use o f such methods would have to 
be in s t i tu t io n a l is e d ,  since, in  the natural course o f events, new 
generations o f c r i t i c s  and sceptics would always a r ise , to muddy the 
ideological p u r i ty  o f the state.
The anti-Utopians, then, deny the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f defin ing 
social perfection in any way which would f in d  universal concurrence. 
Moreover they contend that the nature o f men is  such tha t no society 
dedicated to the expression o f a s ingle conception o f perfection could 
possibly promote the well-being of a l l ,  since men are by nature diverse 
in ta len ts  and temperament. Thus, i f  a l l  were to be induced to conform 
to one f ixed pattern of excellence, few would be in a posit ion  to 
achieve s e l f - fu l f i lm e n t .  Only those who, by natural good fortune, 
re flec ted  th e i r  so c ie ty ’ s preconceptions o f human perfection would 
be able to employ th e i r  p a r t ic u la r  ta le n ts ,  and express th e i r  mental 
and emotional asp ira tions, adequately.
The anti-Utopians consider tha t those who construct 'pe rfec t 
s ta tes ’ are concerned exc lus ive ly  w ith man as a social being. The 
ideal o f ind iv idual s e l f - re a l is a t io n  as a human need, a 'good', is 
a lien  to utopian thought. The well-being o f the ind iv idua l c it ize n  
is  perceived as being co-terminous with the well-being o f the state.
No priva te needs are recognized, and the achievement o f perfect social 
harmony is the f i r s t ,  and perhaps the on ly, consideration. That 
which serves to promote social cohesion is  ax iom atica lly  good, and 
tha t which underlines human p a r t ic u la r i t y  is bad, since i t  is  seen 
as co n s t itu t in g  a th reat to the un ity  o f the s ta te .
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Excluded from th is  p a r t ic u la r  c r i t ic is m  o f utopianism are the 
arcadian societies p ictured by such w rite rs  as William Morris. In 
News From Nowhere, Morris depicts a dream society where ind iv idua l 
fu l f i lm e n t  is  prized, and from which the oppressive machinery of the 
centra lised state is  e n t i re ly  absent. Absent, too, are the re a l i t ie s  
o f modern l i f e :  in d u s t r ia l is a t io n ,  sca rc ity ,  m i l i ta r is m , drudgery
and overcrowding. Also absent are the contingencies o f human l i f e :  
i l ln e s s ,  ugliness, incapacity and i l l - w i l l .  M orris 's  v is ion  is  one o f 
se lf - re g u la t in g ,  pastoral s im p lc ity ,  o f a world where work is  accom­
panied by aesthetic s a t is fa c t io n ,  and where humanity is  s tead ily  pro­
gressing in beauty and k ind liness. Such visions o f perfection w i l l  
f a l l  outside the scope of th is  thes is , since they do not depict 
c lose ly constructed perfect s ta tes, but ra ther, loosely k n i t ,  idea­
l ised  communities. M orris 's  work, and the work o f s im ila r  w r i te rs ,  
is  o f h e u r is t ic  value: as such, i t  does not a t t ra c t  the c r i t ic is m
o f the an ti-u top ians. Morris o ffe rs  no 'b lu e p r in t ' ,  and no precise 
'so lu t io n s ' to human problems.
Writing o f The Soul o f Man under Socialism, by Oscar Wilde, 
Orwell expresses the view tha t Wilde's 'Utopian and an arch is t ic ' 
v is ion  o f Socialism fa i l s  to take in to  account the re a l i t ie s  o f the 
world. Moreover, Wilde seems to overlook the fa c t  tha t the t ra n s i ­
t io n  to Socialism w i l l  be uncomfortable. But, Orwell w r i te s ,  'W ilde's 
pamphlet and other kindred w rit ings  - News From Nowhere, fo r  instance ■
  have th e i r  value. They may demand the impossible, and they may
- since a Utopia necessarily re f le c ts  the aesthetic ideas o f i t s  own
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period - sometimes seem 'dated' and r id icu lo u s , but they do at 
least look beyond the era o f food queues and party squabbles, and 
remind the S o c ia l is t  movement o f i t s  o r ig in a l ,  h a lf- fo rgo tten  
ob jective of human brotherhood'.^
In the work o f such w rite rs  as Morris, the ind iv idua l is  at 
the centre. But i t  is  s ig n if ic a n t  tha t in most utopian f i c t io n ,  the 
ind iv idua l is  barely characterised. He seems to e x is t  only in  re la ­
t io n  to his function in  the social system, and his sa t is fa c t io n  l ie s  
so le ly in his fu l f i lm e n t  o f his rô le as c i t iz e n .  So, too, does his 
vi rtue.
This brings us to the second assumption inherent in utopianism 
which is  challenged by the anti-u top ians. This concerns the concept 
o f human perfection. Here the anti-u top ian c r i t iq u e  is  complex: 
anti-u topians re je c t the concept of humm p e r f e c t ib i l i t y ,  and they 
re je c t  also the utopian v is ion  o f m ora lity .
The anti-utopians hold that the human ind iv idua l l ive s  in a 
world where good and e v i l  co -ex is t in e v ita b ly .  He is  therefore 
faced w ith making moral choices, and while , through the making o f such 
choices, he may become 'b e t te r ' ,  there is  no p o s s ib i l i t y  o f his 
becoming 'p e r fe c t ' .  Moral asp ira tion w i l l  take d i f fe re n t  forms fo r  
d i f fe re n t  men in d i f fe re n t  circumstances, and moral action is  always 
the re su lt  o f personal de libe ra tion .
But in the 'pe rfec t s ta te ' ,  a l l  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f choice is  
removed, and thus 'moral ac tion ' is  no longer a concept o f any 
worth. The 'v ir tuous ac t' requires no courage, no p r io r  de libera­
t io n ,  no discernment and no s e l f -d is c ip l in e .  I t  is  simply a
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habitual reaction to a given set o f s t im u li ,  The c it izen s  o f utopia 
act 'm o ra l ly ' ,  tha t is ,  in  such a way as to promote social s t a b i l i t y  
and to enact the b e l ie f  system o f the s ta te , simply fo r  lack o f any 
capacity to do otherwise. The m ora lity  o f utopia is  e sse n tia l ly  
passive, and therefore , paradoxica lly, amoral. And the new 'pe rfec t 
man', the inhabitant o f u topia, is  necessarily inhuman, having been 
deprived of a l l  the recognisable q u a l i t ie s  o f the human being - 
uniqueness, u n p re d ic ta b i l i ty  and the power o f choice.
For a behaviourist l ik e  B.F. Skinner, the contention tha t 
man would be deprived of the power of moral choice in a perfect 
society is based on a fa lse premiss. Skinner does not consider 
that man is capable o f exercising independent judgment, whether 
fo r  good or i l l ,  and a rr iv in g  at a decision as to how he w i l l  act. 
Skinner contends that in every socie ty, every separate human action , 
whether deemed virtuous or v ic ious, is  merely a piece o f conditioned 
behaviour. The important task fo r  man is  to devise an ideal con­
d it io n in g  programme. Man, fo r  Skinner, is  i n f i n i t e l y  malleable, and 
without innate cha rac te r is t ics  o f any kind. He is  no more than the 
t o t a l i t y  o f his responses to his physical and social environment.
I f  a man is co rrec t ly  conditioned, his action w i l l  be appropriate 
to the needs o f his society. In Skinner's utopia, Walden Two, the 
pe rfec t ly  regulated society has automatically produced the p e rfe c t ly  
regulated c i t iz e n .
The behaviourist, armed with the conviction tha t man is  
i n f i n i t e l y  malleable, has no problem in devising a perfect s ta te , 
except, o f course, fo r  the obvious problem as to who shall condition
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the conditioners who set up such a s ta te , since a perfect conditioner 
must himself have been p e rfec t ly  conditioned. This is  a problem o f 
which Skinner is  aware in w r i t in g  Walden Two, although he w i l l  not 
allow himself to admit tha t i t  is  lo g ic a l ly  inso lub le . The important 
th ing , fo r  Skinner, is to encourage men to discard unhelpful concepts, 
such as the idea o f ' f ree  w i l l ' ,  and study the pos it ive  im plica tions 
of the concept tha t man is  i n f i n i t e l y  malleable.
The an ti-u top ian w r ite rs  do not, o f  course, re je c t  Skinner's 
contention that man is malleable. They have themselves devised 
'pe rfec t S ta te s ',  and human s u s c e p t ib i l i ty  to manipulation is  a pre­
condition fo r  the founding o f  a to ta l s tate. Anti-u top ian fears are 
aroused precise ly because men are manipulable. Orwell, indeed, sub­
scribed to the view that the in fa n t mind is  a tabula rasa, wholly 
vulnerable to the imprints o f the adult world (see Part I I  ( i )  Note 
16 below). The contention o f Skinner's which the anti-u topians 
do re je c t  is  the claim tha t human misery could be cured once and 
fo r  a l l  i f  a c a re fu l ly  constructed, centra lised system of condition ing 
could be introduced. This, fo r  the an ti-u top ians , would i t s e l f  con­
s t i tu te  the ultimate human misery. Man, they hold, is  vulnerable to 
good and bad influences a l ik e ,  and his independence o f w i l l ,  the 
source of his m ora li ty , is  precariously founded. Within the t o t a l l y  
regulated sta te , man would be subject to the grossest deformation, 
since he would in e v itab ly  be deprived o f freedom of w i l l  and judg­
ment. Man's a b i l i t y  to guide his own destiny, already l im ited  by 
social necessity, chance events, corporeal f r a i l t y  and outside 
influence, would be wholly sac r if ice d  w ith in  the context o f utopia.
The c i t iz e n  o f such a state would be not man but machine.
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The happiness which utopia is  intended to a ffo rd  is  only bought 
at the price o f freedom,then, Three quite d is t in c t  but in te rre la te d  
questions arise here. F i r s t l y ,  is  i t  possible to a rr ive  a t a un iver­
s a l ly  va l id  d e f in i t io n  o f happiness? Secondly, a paradoxical question, 
would utopian happiness make people happy? T h ird ly ,  is  the provision 
o f universal happiness an appropriate goal to which the ru le rs  o f the 
state should aspire?
With the exception o f Orwell, whose imaginary state does not 
aspire to the provision of mass happiness, and who does not therefore 
need to discuss the nature of human f e l i c i t y ,  the anti-utopians deny 
the existence o f any generally acceptable image o f happiness. Happi­
ness, they hold, is not to be equated e ith e r  with pleasure or w ith 
ease. Happiness, they be lieve, takes d i f fe re n t  forms fo r  d i f fe re n t  
ind iv id ua ls , and even fo r  the same ind iv idua l from moment to moment.
The ind iv idua l should be free to choose from s itu a t io n  to s i tu a t io n  
and from day to day ju s t  what i t  is  which constitu tes happiness fo r  
him. The anti-utopians thus re je c t  general d e f in i t io n s  of happiness.
The answer to the second question is  more complex. The a n t i -  
utopians fear the type of mindless, uniform, mass-produced happiness 
which they consider would be provided in the perfect s ta te . To say 
tha t freedom is  necessary to men is  to say tha t th e i r  ind iv idua l 
needs vary, and tha t a common happiness would be no happiness a t a l l  
fo r  many ind iv idua ls  - unless they were foreced through condition ing 
to lose th e ir  personal c h a ra c te r is t ic s . There are two quite d is t in c t  
fears here: e ith e r  conditioning w i l l  be unsuccessful, and ind iv idua ls
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w i l l  be made miserable and frus tra ted  by the uniform ’ happiness' 
provided by the state planners, or i t  w i l l  be successful, and 
depersonalized men w i l l  g lo ry  in th e ir  submission to the soothing 
control o f the state machine. The most pessim istic anti-u top ians 
hold the second view.
The 'happiness' offered in utopia is  not ind iv idua l happi­
ness, which may come and go in response to an in f i n i t e  va r ie ty  o f 
s t im u l i ,  and which cannot be regarded as being a permanent s ta te .
I t  seems instead to l i e  merely in release from f ru s t ra t io n ,  struggle 
and indecis ion. Utopia deprives i t s  c it izens  o f the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f 
unassuaged desire. Thus, in Huxley's Brave New World, desires are 
a r t i f i c i a l l y  aroused and then accorded ins tan t g r a t i f ic a t io n .  No 
d issa t is fa c t io n  is allowed to remain. Any linge r ing  sense o f  unease 
is  soothed away with soma, the state-provided tra n q u i l is in g  drug.
In Zamyatin's human physical requirements have been so standard­
ised and regulated, and human emotionality has been so successfully 
quenched, tha t a l l  desire is  dead. The c i t iz e n  attends to the needs 
o f his body as impassively as i f  he were conducting the routine main­
tenance o f a machine under his charge. Zamyatin held tha t happiness, 
which is necessarily imperfect and f le e t in g ,  l ie s  in contrasts , and 
that man, who is not a component in a mechanical system, nor an ant 
in an a n t - h i l l ,  requires the stimulus o f desires, pains, struggle and 
change i f  he is not to be beset by boredom and apathy. Zamyatin's 
assessment o f human motivation is  supported in  the w rit ing s  o f J. Z. 
Young. Young w r ites , 'Workers as d i f fe re n t  as psychoanalysts, psycho­
lo g is ts ,  and physio logists have sometimes suggested tha t the aim o f 
the behaving animal is  repose .........  I believe tha t such a view under­
estimates the d ire c t ive  or aimed action o f the programs tha t the
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hypothalamus and core brain d ic ta te . The continuation of l i f e  is  
possible because the actions o f the ind iv idua l are aimed not at reduc­
ing exc ita t ion  but at obtaining those materials and s itua tions  tha t 
are needed. When such pursuits are e ffe c t ive  the ind iv idua l receives 
the reward o f  sa t is fa c t io n  and discontinues tha t p a r t ic u la r  a c t iv i t y .
The search is  not fo r  absence o f exc ita tion  but fo r  the fu l f i lm e n t  
2of a need.'
The idea tha t human happiness l ie s  not in  achievement, but in 
s truggle , not in c e r ta in ty ,  but in imagination and speculation, not 
in the absence o f desires, but in the desires themselves, is ,  o f 
course, not an exc lus ive ly  twentieth century idea. I t  occurs notably 
in Dostoievsky's Notes From Underground, a book which Hillegas con-
3
siders to have influenced Zamyatin profoundly. Dostoievsky writes 
tha t one may shower man 'w ith a l l  earth ly  blessings, plunge him so 
deep in to  happiness tha t nothing is v is ib le  but the bubbles r is in g  
to the surface o f his happiness, as i f  i t  were water; give him such 
economic prosperity tha t he w i l l  have nothing l e f t  to do but sleep, 
eat gingerbread, and worry about the continuance o f world h is to ry  - 
and he . . . .  w i l l  jeopardise his very gingerbread and de lib e ra te ly  
w i l l  the most pernicious rubbish, the most uneconomic nonsense, 
simply and so le ly  in order to a l loy  a l l  th is  pos it ive  ra t io n a l i t y  with 
the element o f his own pernicious fancy. I t  is prec ise ly  his most 
fa n ta s t ic  daydreams, his vu lg a r is t  foo lishness, tha t he wants to c l ing  
to ,  ju s t  so that he can assert (as i f  i t  were absolute ly essentia l)
4
that people are s t i l l  people and not piano-keys'. S u rp r is ing ly , 
the idea that happiness l ie s  in the act of desir ing occurs a lso , in a
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very d i f fe re n t  context, in Rousseau's La Nouvelle Héloise, a book 
which is  intended to convey utopian, rather than an t i-u top ian , 
sentiments. There is  every reason to suppose tha t Rousseau genuinely 
admires the pe rfec t ly  regulated domestic utopia which his characters, 
the Wolmars, establish at Clarens, and that he wishes to advance i t  
as a pattern fo r  emulation. Yet he allows his f ic t io n a l  heroine,
Ju l ie  de Wolmar, to de live r the most cogent attack upon the concept 
of utopian happiness. Ju lie  w rites , in a l e t t e r ,  ’ Tant qu'on desire 
on peut se passer d 'e tre  heureux . . .  et l ' inqu ié tu de  q u ' i l  donne est 
une sorte de jouissance qui suplée a la ré a l i té ,  qui vaut mieux 
peut-être. Malheur a qui n'a plus r ien à des ire r! . . .  Celui qui 
pourra it tou t sans etre Dieu se ra it  une miserable creature; i l  se ra it  
prive du p la is i r  de des irer; tou t autre p r iva t ion  se ra it  plus 
supportable* . (For as long as one desires one can pass fo r  being 
happy . . . .  and the disquietude which i t  gives is  a sort o f enjoyment 
which adds to r e a l i t y ,  which is  perhaps worth more. Woe to him 
who has nothing l e f t  to desire! . . . .  One who could achieve everything 
without being God would be a miserable creature; he would be deprived 
of the pleasure of des ir ing ; any other p r iva tion  would be more 
bearable)
Abruptly, in the act o f describing the unalloyed b l is s  o f her 
l i f e  at Clarens, Ju l ie  repudiates i t .  To l iv e  w ithout pain is  not a 
human condition she w rites ; to l iv e  thus is  to be dead. She con­
tinues, "Je ne vois partout que sujets de contentement, e t je  ne suis 
pas contente; une langueur secrète s 'ins inue au fond de mon coeur; 
je  le sens vide et gonflé . . .  l'attachement qu j ' a i  pour tou t ce
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qui m'est cher ne s u f f i t  pas pour l 'occuper; i l  lu i  reste une force 
in u t i le  dont i l  ne s a i t  que fa i r e .  Cette peine est b iza rre , j 'e n  
conviens; mais e l le  n 'e s t pas moins reel le . Mon ami, je  suis trop 
heureuse; le bonheur m'ennuie*. ( I  see nothing but causes fo r  content­
ment about me, and I am not content; a secret longing is  ins inuating 
i t s e l f  in to  the depths o f my heart; I feel i t  empty ye t swollen w ith in  
me . . . .  the attachment I feel fo r  a l l  who are dear tome does not
su ff ice  to f i l l  i t ;  i t  s t i l l  re ta ins a useless power, which i t  does
not know how to employ. This pain is  strange, tha t I agree; but i t
is  nonetheless rea l. My f r ie n d , I am too happy; happiness bores
me,)^ I t  seems tha t Rousseau, more than any other w r i te r ,  seems to 
have combined a utopian veneration fo r  order, harmony, s t a b i l i t y  and 
ra tiona l perfec tion , w ith a Romantic in tu i t io n  o f the supremacy o f 
the imagination, and regard fo r  the in d iv id u a l,  which leads him to 
re je c t  utopias even as he builds them.
For the utopian, the ind iv idua l has importance only as a compo­
nent of a mechanistically perfect whole. There is  no room w ith in  tha t 
whole fo r  in d iv id u a l is t ic  endeavour or personal asp ira tion . The 
utopian sees the raw, inchoate, unspecialised material with which he 
must work in his chosen task o f bu ild ing the perfect s tate. This mat­
e r ia l  must be ordered, quan tif ied , systematized and rendered p re d ic t­
able, so tha t perfection can be realized. I t  is  assumed tha t w ith in  
the pe rfec t ly  ordered, pred ic tab le , harmonious whole, the c i t iz e n  
w i l l  necessarily achieve his highest func tion , and in so doing, he w i l l  
be happy.
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The anti-utopians re je c t  th is  conception o f  happiness; they 
also re je c t  the idea tha t i t  is  appropriate fo r  the ru le rs  o f the state 
to seek to provide universal happiness. A ll  agree tha t the state should 
provide a framework in  which ju s t ice  is  promoted, and innovation and 
s e l f - fu l f i lm e n t  are encouraged. Within such a framework, ind iv idua l 
happiness is  at least a p o s s ib i l i ty .
C learly , happiness as defined by utopian standards, and happi­
ness as envisaged by the an ti-u top ians, are two very d i f fe re n t  states. 
While the corporate happiness offered by utopia seems to  be no more 
than freedom from anxiety and desire, happiness as seen by the a n t i -  
utopians seems to  come closer to M i l l ' s  conception o f happiness - 
the happiness o f s t r iv in g  towards higher leve ls  o f consciousness and 
higher states o f s e l f - re a l iz a t io n .  M il l  records how he asked him­
s e l f ,  at the time o f his mental c r i s is ,  'Suppose tha t a l l  your objects 
in l i f e  were rea lized ; tha t a l l  changes in  in s t i tu t io n s  and opinions 
which you are looking forward to ,  could be completely effected at 
th is  very ins tan t: would th is  be a great joy  and happiness to you?'
And to th is  question, which is  the question posed by a l l  the a n t i -  
utopians, 'an ir re p re ss ib le  self-consciousness d is t in c t l y  answered 
"No!" Happiness, fo r  the an ti-u top ians, is  ne ither s ta t ic  nor 
passive. I t  is  in t im a te ly  connected with human c r e a t iv i t y ,  and w ith 
a restless desire to seek out new challenges to human ingenuity and 
endurance. I t  has to  do with the heightening o f human consciousness. 
But, in  the anti-u top ian view, the happiness compulsorily prescribed 
in the utopian state would be no more than a means fo r  pac ify ing  the 
populace, fo r  lowering th e i r  consciousness o f  s e l f ,  and thus fo r  sap­
ping th e i r  ind iv idua l w i l l ;  i t  would be merely a tool fo r  enslavement.
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Dostoievsky's Underground Man declares, 'As fo r  my personal 
opinion, I f ind  i t  somehow unseemly to love only well-be ing. Whether 
i t ' s  a good thing or a bad th ing , smashing things is  also sometimes 
very pleasant. I am not here standing up fo r  su ffe r in g , or fo r  w e l l ­
being e ith e r .  I am standing out fo r  my own caprices and fo r  having 
them guaranteed when necessary. There is  no place fo r  su ffe r ing  in 
farces, fo r  example, I know tha t.  I t  is quite inconceivable in a 
millennium: su ffe ring  is  doubt, negation, and what so r t o f millenium
would i t  be o f which one could have any doubts? A ll the same, I am 
certa in  tha t man w i l l  never deny himself destruction and chaos.
Suffering is  the sole cause o f consciousness'. Consciousness, in the
Underground Man's view is  supremely important to  man, and man would 
not choose to exchange i t  fo r  any g r a t i f ic a t io n .  I f  ever a perfected 
state is  established, where a l l  human problems are held to have been 
solved, 'there w i l l ,  o f  course, be nothing l e f t  to do, much less to 
learn. A ll  tha t w i l l  then be possible w i l l  be to shut o f f  one's f iv e
o
senses and immerse oneself in m ed ita t ion '.
Zamyatin also holds tha t to accept the passive brand o f happi­
ness offered by the perfect state is  to accept a l iv in g  death. In
Zamyatin's the ru le rs  o f the perfect state are system atica lly  
seducing the c i t iz e n ry  in to  to ta l submission by a ffo rd ing them a l i f e  
where no cares, uncerta in ties or desires ever trouble th e i r  t r a n q u i l i t y  
One o f a band o f rebels against the state attempts to arouse her fe llow  
c it izens  from th e i r  lethargy in to  a recognition o f th e i r  growing 
enslavement. Scorn fu lly  she warns them, 'You w i l l  be fed w ith pastry- 
dough happiness u n t i l  you ca n 't  swallow another mouthful, and you, w ith
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your be ll ie s  f u l l ,  w i l l  doze in peace, in an organized way, a l l  snoring
9
metronomically' .
The figu re  of the rebel, or d issenter, in the an ti-u top ias  
is  inva r iab ly  of central s ign if icance . I t  is  possible to see, in 
the an ti-u top ian form, a restatement o f one of the prominent themes 
o f c lass ica l tragedy. The d issenter, a troubled and lonely f ig u re ,
grows in self-awareness to the point where he can no longer accept 
the secure anonymity of communal l i f e .  Thereafter, he fo llows a 
course which he knows w i l l  lead him to untimely death. In his act 
of se lf-a sse r t io n ,  he negates the p r inc ip les  upon which his society 
is  founded, thus revealing th e i r  weaknesses. He remains stubbornly 
aware of his uniqueness and power of choice in a world where ortho­
doxy proclaims him to be no more than a meek constituent o f a har­
monious whole. In terms of the p reva iling  system o f b e l ie f  he is  
more than a mere dissenter; he is  a dangerous he re tic .
In anti-u top ian f i c t io n ,  an analogy is  commonly drawn between 
the repression o f re lig ious  orthodoxy and the repression o f the o rtho­
doxy o f the to ta l s tate. The anti-u top ian w r ite rs  make frequent use 
o f re lig ious  imagery. Membership o f a perfect soc ie ty , they be lieve, 
demands the a t t i tu d e  of mind normally associated with membership o f 
a re lig ious  community. The utopian state imposes doc tr ina l p u r i ty  
upon i t s  c i t iz e n s ,  and assumes power not merely over th e i r  speech 
and actions, but also over th e i r  thoughts. Rejection o f the state 
ideology is  not simply subversive: i t  is  h e re t ica l.  The c it izen s
must surrender themselves u t te r ly  to the guidance o f the s ta te , and 
accept i t s  dogma with unquestioning fa i th .  Utopia is  fo r  the regenerate.
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the true believer. It is Paradise Regained. The heresy of the 
dissenters in the anti-utopias lies in their continuing awareness 
of their own moral freedom.
All the writers under review equate religious orthodoxy with 
bigotry, oppression and stupidity. Dogma, the mechanisation of human 
thought, is set against free, creative thought. A common centrepiece 
in anti-utopian fiction is a scene of confrontation between an 
inquisitorial figure and the figure of the heretic. For the anti- 
utopians, the battle for the human mind fought out between the inter­
rogator and the dissident in the total state, in the name of political 
orthodoxy, is a repetition of the battle between the Inquisitor and the 
heretic, in the name of religious orthodoxy. The figure of the heretic 
is of supreme importance in anti-utopian fiction, since while the here­
tic survives, the power of the state is less than total, and the possi­
bility of change remains alive.
The anti-utopians hold that the rejection of imposed ortho­
doxy is a noble and necessary activity, whether against church or 
state. They believe that man expresses his humanity in his ability 
to question and to deliberate. In all the anti-utopias, the heretic 
has social as well as personal significance. His act of self-authentifi- 
cation is of value in itself, but it also has implications for humanity 
as a whole. However, the anti-utopians do not all share a common con­
ception of the nature of heresy. For Orwell, Huxley and David Karp, 
heresy comes into being only in response to some abnormal repression in 
society. They denounce societies which impose a closed political and 
moral system upon the individual. Rather than extolling the value of 
heresy in itself, they advocate the destruction of those orthodoxies 
which give the concept of heresy meaning.
- 42 -
The In q u is i to r  in David Karp's One declares tha t 'Heresy in a 
free society is  meaningless and feeble. But in a society tha t is 
r ig id ly  jo ined , heresy is an explosive force . . . .  Eventually we must 
erase the concept of in d iv id u a l i ty .  U ltim ate ly we must come to the
stage where no man bears a separate, priva te id e n t i ty  ___ and when
that happens . . . .  (we) w i l l  be fo rc ing up in to  the l ig h t  a l l  the buried 
egos, a l l  the hidden heresies’ .
But fo r  Zamyatin, the author o f the most c ryp t ic  and complex 
of the an t i-u to p ias , heresy has a unique s ign if icance . The here tic  
is  the necessary mutant in socie ty. He is  the sole remedy against 
stagnation. 'Most o f mankind', w rites Zamyatin, 'su ffe rs  from heredi­
ta ry  sleeping sickness, and victims o f th is  sickness (entropy) must 
not be allowed to sleep, or i t  w i l l  be th e ir  f in a l  sleep, death '. In 
another essay, he w r ite s , 'Today is  doomed to die - because yesterday 
dies, and because tomorrow w i l l  be born . . . .  The world is  kept a live  
only by heretics : the heretic  C hr is t,  the heretic  Copernicus, the
here tic  Tolstoy. Our symbol of fa i th  is h e r e s y Z a m y a t i n  holds 
that heresy must necessarily arise as a v i ta l iz in g  force in every 
community, in every age, i f  humanity is  to survive.
Alone among the w rite rs  o f an ti-u to p ias , Zamyatin was himself 
a he re tic , and his book, l ^ ,  was created as an example o f heretica l 
l i te ra tu re .  Zamyatin believed tha t i t  was the duty o f the w r i te r  
to challenge the preconceptions and conventions o f his socie ty. 'True 
l i te ra tu re  can ex is t  only where i t  is  created, not by d i l ig e n t  and 
trustworthy o f f i c ia l s ,  but by madmen, hermits, he re tics , dreamers, 
rebels and sceptics . . . .  When a w r i te r  must be sensible and r ig id ly
- 43 -
orthodox , , ,  there can be no bronze l i te ra tu r e ,  there can only be
a paper l i te ra tu r e ,  a newspaper l i te ra tu r e ,  which is  read today,
12and used fo r  wrapping soap tomorrow,'
Although the anti-utopians draw p a ra l le ls  between re lig ious  
and to ta l i ta r ia n  orthodoxy, they consider the p o s s ib i l i t ie s  fo r  impos­
ing the new orthodoxies to be fa r  greater. The o ld , h is to r ic a l  
re lig ions  had power to mould the perceptions of th e i r  adherents, and 
those whom they oppressed, w ith in  a r ig id  framework. H is to r ica l 
and s c ie n t i f ic  facts could be suppressed, and a r t i s t i c  expression 
constrained, where they were deemed l i k e ly  to cast doubt upon that 
framework. But in the to ta l state o f  modern times, the w rite rs  
consider, technological advances have placed the ru lers in a stronger 
pos it ion  than ever before to impose th e i r  view of r e a l i t y  upon the 
world. Once the to ta l state has established i t s  secular dogma, th is  
new creed becomes the new re a l i t y .  U lt im a te ly , a l l  creative thought 
is  s t i f l e d ,  a lte rn a t ive  states become unimaginable, and a lte rn a t ive  
modes o f thought inconceivable.
In his biography of Father Joseph, Cardinal R ichelieu 's ch ie f 
p o l i t ic a l  assistant from 1614 to 1638, Aldous Huxley declares tha t 
the church, under Louis XIV, established in  seventeenth-century France 
a state which enforced so high a degree o f conformity, tha t i t  was
saved from to ta l i ta r ia n is m  only fo r  lack o f contemporary technological 
13expertise.
Orwell argues that the church has always exercised i t s  i n f l u ­
ence ’ against freedom o f thought and speech, against human e q u a li ty ,  
and against any form of society tending to promote ea rth ly  happiness'.14
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And in  Nineteen Eighty-Four, he draws a pa ra lle l between the ru lin g  
Party o f the despotic s ta te , and the Catholic Church. Both, he says, 
are adoptive organisations, and the endurance o f th e i r  power l ie s  in 
th e i r  a b i l i t y  to ensure ’ the persistence o f a certa in  world view
15and a ce rta in  way o f l i f e ,  imposed by the dead upon the l i v in g . '
Orwell, then, l ik e  Huxley, rejected the constra ints imposed 
by re lig ious  orthodoxy: but his re jec t ion  is  more profound than th is .
Orwell and Zamyatin, together w ith H.G. Wells, who constructed both 
utopian and an ti-u top ian models, a l l  seem to have re jected not only 
the tyranny o f re lig ious  orthodoxy, but also the tyranny o f an omni­
potent God.
Richard Gerber suggests tha t in Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
i t  is possible to detect a h o s t i l i t y  not only towards to ta l i t a r ia n  
systems, but also towards the Chris tian re l ig io n .  Gerber w r ites , 'On 
the surface i t  is  doubtlessly a savage p o l i t ic a l  sa t ire  in which the 
ind iv idual is  opposed to the party c o l le c t iv e .  But there is  more than
th is  . . . .  I t  almost seems as i f  Orwell ___ had f i l l e d  his p o l i t ic a l
sa t ire  w ith unconscious or half-conscious meanings o f a d i f fe re n t  
kind . . . .  Nineteen Eighty-Four has the age-old symbolic s truc tu re , 
and even phraseology, o f res is tan t man's breakdown and conversion to 
some power which we generally ca l l  by the name o f God'.^^ And in 
Orwell's work there is ce r ta in ly  a suggestion o f an anarchic re jec ­
t io n  o f a l l  forms o f au tho r ity  over the human mind, temporal or s p i r i ­
tual .
In Zamyatin's We, also, i t  seems that i t  is  not merely r ig id  
orthodoxy which is  condemned: in a b i t t e r l y  s a t i r ic a l  scene between
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the Benefactor o f the perfect state and a h e re t ic ,  the Benefactor 
exclaims, 'What about the Most Merciful God o f the C hris tians, Who 
is  charking a l l  the contumaceous over the slow f i r e s  o f Hell - is  he
not an executioner? Or take autos-da-fe and l iv in g  torches ........
And y e t,  ju s t  the same .........  th is  God was ___ g lo r i f ie d  fo r  ages as
the God o f Love. An absurdity? No; on the contrary, i t  is  a patent, 
w r i t te n  in blood, a ttes t ing  the ineradicable common sense of man.
Even when he was a shaggy savage he grasped tha t true , algebraic 
love fo r  humanity is  i n f a l l i b l y  inhuman, and tha t an in f a l l i b le  sign 
o f t ru th  is  i t s  c r u e l t y , ^
H. G. Wells shares Zamyatin's revuls ion a t the concept o f an 
a ll-powerfu l God, necessarily an accessory to human crime, i f  not 
i t s  in s t ig a to r ,  by v ir tu e  o f his omnipotence. Wells describes the 
moment o f his re jec tion  of such a d e ity  in The Happy Turning: ' I
had dreams o f to r tu re  and c ru e lty .  One made me an a the is t ___ one
day I read a descrip tion of a man being broken on the wheel 
over a slow f i r e ,  and in my sleep i t  f la re d  up in to  immeasurable d is ­
gust. By a mental leap which cut out a l l  in term ediaries, the dream 
a r t i s t  made i t  c lea r tha t i f  indeed there was an a ll-pow erfu l God, 
then i t  was he and he alone who stood there conducting th is  to r tu re .
I woke and stared at the empty darkness. There was no a lte rn a t ive
but madness, and san ity  prevailed, God had gone out of my l i f e .  He 
18was impossible '.
I t  is in te res t in g  tha t fo r  Wells, as fo r  Zamyatin, Chris t is  
here tic  rather than d e ity ,  an a l l y  to humanity, ra ther than an implac­
able ty ra n t,  Zamyatin numbers Christ w ith  'the here tic  Copernicus'
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and 'the heretic  Tolstoy' (see^^ above); Wells wrote o f Chris t as
'a congenial companion', whose 'scorn and contempt fo r  C h r is t ia n i ty '
19were profound beyond descrip tion . This image o f Chris t as here tic
is not new: i t  was elaborated e a r l ie r  by Dostoievsky, in  Ivan's
20poem o f the Grand In q u is i to r ,  in The Brothers Karamazov. I t  is
not C hris t, but the a ll-pow erfu l paternal de ity  whom Zamyatin and Wells
re je c t .
But the problem of d iv ine omnipotence, and therefore , sure ly ,
d iv ine prescience, has deeper im plications fo r  the an ti-u top ian , since
i t  is in t im a te ly  connected w ith propositions about free w i l l  and
determinacy, Stephen Clark discusses th is  problem in his review o f
Anthony Kenny's The God o f the Philosophers: 'Can God now make a
past event to have occurred? Perhaps, but in  such a world a l l  ta lk
of past and fu ture and the present time must founder: a l l  times are
simultaneous (as they are fo r  Boethius's timeless God)   I f  God
foreknows or knows immutably what men w i l l  do (are doing) then men are
not free in any sense tha t exculpates th e i r  Creator. I f  there is
genuine indeterminacy in human a f fa i r s ,  then even God cannot know
what he w i l l  do; tha t would be to know fo r  certa in  a thing tha t is
not certa in . I f  He does know, then there is  no indeterminacy: we
may have l ib e r ty  o f spontaneity ( th a t we do as we wish), but not o f
21ind if fe rence ( tha t we could do o therw ise )'.
For those who condemn the to ta l  s ta te , questions of free w i l l  
and determinacy are c ru c ia l.  The ru le rs  o f a l l  the to ta l states 
under review are omnipotent, in tha t they have to ta l  control over a l l  
the means fo r  c iv ic  coercion and c iv ic  education w ith in  th e i r  s ta tes .
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and there are no areas o f human a c t iv i t y  which are l e f t  unplanned.
The ru le rs o f the an ti-u top ian states of Zamyatin and Orwell may also 
lay claim to omniscience, since they have the technological equipment 
necessary to hear and perceive every event, no matter how t r i v i a l ,  
which occurs w ith in  the sta te . But in Orwell's a n t i-u to p ia ,  omni­
science seems to go beyond tha t which is  afforded, in  explicable 
terms, by technology, Orwell's Party leader, O'Brien, appears to 
have the power to perceive men's thoughts, and even to foreknow 
them. Orwell's O'Brien comes closer to godhood than do any o f the 
other ru lers of the perfect state created by the an ti-u top ians.
The an ti-u top ias are statements o f rebe ll ion  against the sub­
jugation  o f autonomous man, however he may be defined, in the real 
world; but more than th is ,  the an ti-u top ias  o f Orwell and Zamyatin 
are statements o f rebe ll ion  against the very concept o f the subjuga­
t io n  o f the human w i l l ,  whether to  powers which are e a rth ly ,  or to 
those which are supernatural. As I shall argue, there is  equivoca­
t ion  on th is  point in the work o f Huxley. The extent to which the 
w rite rs  consider the w i l l  to be e sse n tia l ly  capable o f free action 
d i f fe rs  from author to author, and th is  I shall discuss in Part I I  ( i v)  
o f my thes is .
But each o f the an ti-u top ians, to a greater or lesser extent, 
seeks to re-assert the worth of the in d iv id u a l,  and o f human freedom, 
c re a t iv i ty  and d ig n ity .  Each from his own standpoint a ff irm s that 
the ind iv idua l is  e th ic a l ly  p r io r  to the c o l le c t iv i t y ,  and possesses, 
as a d is tingu ish ing feature o f his humanity, some power o f choice, 
however impaired and l im ite d  th is  may be. They contend tha t w ith in
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the perfect s ta te , ind iv idua l v o l i t io n  would have to be suppressed 
in the cause of order and p r e d ic ta b i l i t y ,  and tha t th is  would neces­
s a r i ly  lead to the suppression o f humanity i t s e l f .
The fear o f the anti-u top ians is  complex; on the one hand, 
they hold tha t utopianism rests on assumptions about man and society 
which are ra d ic a l ly  misconceived, and therefore does not re f le c t  
r e a l i t y ;  yet on the other hand, they are aware that i t  may be a l l  
too possible fo r  utopian systems to be imposed upon socie ty. The old 
fear -  the fear o f the Utopians - was tha t man's egoism was in v in c ib le ,  
and would thus prevent his ever a tta in in g  perfec t ion . But the new fear 
is tha t man's apprehension of himself is  f r a g i le ,  and tha t the c i t i ­
zen of utopia might be induced at la s t  to re linqu ish  his own id e n t i ty  
e n t i re ly ,  and with i t  the source of his m o ra li ty .  Thus he would 
become no more than a featureless fragment o f a pe rfec t ly  regulated 
whole.
The an ti-u top ias under review are not simple expressions o f a 
reaction against over-mechanisation, high technology and an excess of 
state in te rven tion , and the c o n f l ic t  between utopian and an ti-u top ian 
should not be seen as being merely a disagreement between those who 
favour a h ighly organized state and those who favour the minimal 
state. As w i l l  become c lea r, none of the three w rite rs  who are the 
subject of th is  thesis in fac t advocates the minimal sta te . The 
disagreement between the utopian and the an ti-u top ian  concerns above 
a l l  the nature o f man.
In the next section o f th is  the s is . Part I ( i i ) ,  I shall give a
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general in troduction  to the four works with which I am mainly con­
cerned: Zamyatin's Orwell's Nineteen E-ghty-Four and the anti-
utopia and utopia o f Huxley, Brave New World and Island,
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Part I ( i i ) In troduction to the three w rite rs  under review
The three an ti-u top ias  w ith which I am p r im a r i ly  concerned in  
th is  thes is , Yevgeny Zamyatin's George Orwell's  Nineteen Eighty- 
Four and Aldous Huxley's Brave New World, were a l l  w r i t te n  w ith in  
t h i r t y  years o f one another. They are probably the best known and 
most in f lu e n t ia l  an ti-u top ias  o f modern times. The f i r s t  o f the 
an ti-u to p ias , was w r it te n  in 1920 (although not published u n t i l  
1924), the second. Brave New World, was w r it te n  in  1931 (published 
in 1932), and the la s t  o f the three a n t i-u to p ia s , Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
was w rit ten  over the period 1945 to 1948, and published in 1949. Each 
o f the w rite rs  was responding, at least in pa rt,  to tendencies he 
observed in the world about him, when he constructed his cautionary 
p ic ture of a possible fu tu re . But the shape o f the p ic tu re  each pre­
sents is ,  of course, conditional upon his own in te rp re ta t io n  of the 
nature o f socie ty, and his own estimation o f the nature o f human 
needs and asp ira tions. Thus, while there are c lear a f f in i t i e s  to be 
discerned between the an ti-u top ias  o f Zamyatin, Orwell and Huxley, 
some o f which may possibly be a t t r ib u ta b le  to d ire c t  influence or 
shared common in fluence, there are also important d is p a r i t ie s  between 
them.
The fourth  book which w i l l  be discussed at length in th is  
thesis is  not an a n t i-u to p ia , but a utopia: Aldous Huxley's Is land ,
w r it te n  in 1961, and published in 1962. I t  is  o f especial in te res t 
tha t Huxley should have w r it te n  both an anti^u top ia  and a utopia, 
and th is  is  a point which I shall discuss la te r  in th is  section.
Zamyatin's 1^, and Huxley's Brave New World and Is land, a l l  
depict societies dedicated to the pursu it o f  universal happiness and
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harmony, is ,  perhaps, the purest in te rp re ta t io n  o f the a n t i -  
utopian thesis. In i t ,  Zamyatin describes a world where man and machine 
a l ike  are merely in te r- re la te d  components o f a precise ly regulated, 
mathematically pe rfec t, mechanical whole. Of We, Zamyatin wrote,
•This novel is  a warning against the two-fo ld danger which threatens 
humanity: the hypertrophic power o f the machine and the hypertrophic
power o f the s ta te ' . ^
Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four d i f fe rs  ra d ic a l ly  from the two 
other a n t i-u to p ia s , ^  and Brave New World: Orwell describes an imagi­
nary state dedicated not to the pursuit o f common happiness, but to 
the pursuit o f power. I t  has some a f f in i t i e s  w ith the imaginary 
world of Huxley's Ape and Essence. In a l l  the a n t i-u to p ia s , freedom 
is sa c r if ice d , but in the imaginary state of Orwell's  Nineteen Eighty- 
Four, Oceania, as in Ape and Essence, freedom is  crushed through overt 
acts of b r u ta l i t y .  In ne ither case is i t  exchanged fo r  happiness.
The ru lers  of Oceania exert power e n t i re ly  fo r  i t s  Own sake.
Orwell admired Zamyatin's and even t r ie d  to arrange fo r  i t s
2
publication in England, in 1949. Yet in many ways, ^  and N ineteen 
Eighty-Four appear to parody one another. The central character in 
Zamyatin's book is  oppressed by a society on which a r ig id ,  mechanical 
system of 'pe rfec t r a t io n a l i t y '  has been imposed. He suffers the 
u lt imate psychic m u ti la t ion  when his imagination is  su rg ica l ly  dest­
royed, by order o f the s ta te : Orwell's central character, on the other
hand, l ives  in a chaotic nightmare world, where fa c t and fantasy are 
ind is t ingu ishab le . There is  no longer any ra tiona l framework w ith in  
which the c it izens  may o r ie n t themselves, and s tructure  th e i r  l iv e s .
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Orwell's main character is f i n a l l y  deprived o f his humanity when his 
r a t io n a l i t y  is crushed out o f existence,
Zamyatin's takes the form o f a d ia ry , w r it te n  by one o f the 
perfect s ta te 's  top mathematicians, who is  known as D-503, who appears 
at f i r s t  to be a pe rfec t ly  programmed 'number', id e a l ly  integrated 
in to  his society. His happiness is  unclouded, and l ie s  in  perfect 
conformity, and in the security  o f a t o t a l l y  predictable world order.
No ind iv idua l thoughts or emotions o f any kind d is tu rb  his peace o f 
mind, and he g lo r ies  in the geometrical perfection o f his i n f i n i t e l y  
knowable world, with i t s  all-encompassing timetables and l i s t s  o f 
ru les. The One State o f Zamyatin's an ti-u top ia  is  constructed e n t i re ly  
o f glass, so tha t a l l  a c t i v i t y  is pub lic , and each ind iv idua l action 
is no more than a c a re fu l ly  planned process in the function ing o f the 
state machine. The members o f the state are not d istinguished from 
one another by the possession o f names. They are simply a l lo t te d  
numbers, the males w ith a consonant fo r  a p re f ix ,  the females w ith 
a vowel. Thus they are known not as people, or c i t iz e n s ,  but as 
' numbers' .
In the f i r s t  entry in  D-503's d ia ry , he w rites  tha t a group o f 
numbers is  about to set fo r th  from the One State in a rocket, the In te ­
g ra l ,  o f  which he is  himself the designer, to carry fo r th  the perfect
cu ltu re  which they have developed to other p lanets, where men may be
s t i l l  in  the 'savage state o f  freedom'. Should the inhabitants
of these other planets f a i l  to recognize the great benefit  they are
3
about to receive, they w i l l  be 'compelled to  be happy'. D-503
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g lo r ies  in the task ahead, but during the course o f his d ia ry , i t  
becomes apparent that he is  not as p e rfec t ly  adapted to his society 
as he has believed he is .  He meets a female number, E-330, to whom 
he is  d isq u ie t in g ly  a tt rac ted , who arouses w ith in  him his imagination, 
and thus his emotions and passions, u n t i l  he is  ready to jo in  in 
rebe ll ion  against the s ta te , E-330 contends th a t humanity can sur­
vive and progress only through a never-ending series o f revo lu tions, 
and tha t a s ta t ic  society is  locked in a l iv in g  death.
As disorder mounts in the One State, the ru le r ,  known as 
the Benefactor, recognizes tha t i f  the perfect s tate is  to survive, 
imagination must be permanently eradicated. Sc ien tis ts  discover tha t 
i t  is  possible to iso la te  the area o f the brain which generates 
imagination, and to cauterize i t ,  thus providing a f in a l  so lu tion  to 
the problems o f the state. A ll  c i t izen s  are urged to undergo the 
operation, and many co-operate. Those who re s is t  are rounded up and 
forced to submit. The f in a l  entry in D-503's d ia ry  is made a f te r  he 
has been subjected to fantiesectomy. He is  once again calm, as anony­
mous as a blank sheet, devoid of any capacity fo r  c r i t ic is m ,  emotion 
or moral judgment.
Zamyatin considers the imagination to be the mainspring o f 
ind iv idua l freedom. For as long as the central character o f ^  remains 
devoid o f imagination, he is  pe rfe c t ly  adjusted to his mechanical 
world. But once imagination has developed w ith in  him, he is  a po ten tia l 
subversive. His peace and ce r ta in ty  are shattered, and he is  appalled 
and exhilarated at his new apprehension of self-hood, at the pain o f 
being a whole person, se lf-de te rm in ing, vulnerable to love, jea lousy, 
doubt and dreams.
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For Zamyatin, i t  is  the imagination which creaste the he re tic , 
the sole agent, in his view, fo r  rescuing humanity from everlasting 
entropy,
I t  was Zamyatin's b e l ie f  in the need fo r  a never ending series 
o f revolutions which brought him in to  c o n f l ic t  w ith the Soviet au tho r i­
t ie s .  Zamyatin was born in Lebedyan in 1884. In the early  years o f 
the twentieth century, he was a Bolshevik, but he l e f t  the party 
before the Revolution. He wrote in 1920, by which time he had 
already become a target fo r  o f f i c ia l  c r i t ic is m . His fundamental b e l ie f  
in a r t i s t i c  freedom prevented him from adhering to the o f f i c ia l  party 
l in e .  Thus he could not arrang^ub l ica tion  o f in Russia, and i t  
received i t s  f i r s t  pub lica tion , in  English t ra n s la t io n ,  in New York, 
in 1924. Two years la te r ,  a Czech ed it ion  was published, and th is  was 
in turn re translated in to  Russian, and d is tr ib u te d  among dissidents 
in Moscow, and among Russian emigres in Europe. This aroused the 
wrath o f the Russian Association o f Pro le tarian W riters, a party- 
sponsored l i t e r a r y  group in Moscow, and although the new Russian 
version o f had been c ircu la ted  without Zamyatin's permission, he 
was held to be f u l l y  responsible. An intensive campaign was launched 
against him, and publication o f a l l  his works was blocked. At la s t ,  
in despair, he appealed to S ta lin  fo r  leave to go in to  e x i le .  This 
appeal was granted, la rge ly  through the intercession on Zamyatin's 
behalf of Maxim Gorky, and Zamyatin l e f t  Russia, ostensib ly to receive 
medical treatment in Paris, early  in 1932, He was never to re turn .
During the F ir s t  World War, before Zamyatin wrote 1^, he spent 
a period of two years in England, and i t  was here tha t he became
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in terested in English l i t e r a r y  forms. In p a r t ic u la r ,  he became a t t ra c ­
ted to the novels of 'socio fantasy' o f H,G, Wells, about whom he 
published two essays, one in 1922 and one in 1924, Zamyatin wrote 
tha t Wei 1 s 'ssocio fantastic  novels were 'almost so le ly  instruments fo r  
exposing the defects of the ex is t ing  social order, ra ther than b u i ld ­
ing a p icture o f a fu ture paradise'. The only novel of Wells which 
did not please him was Men Like Gods, which had ju s t  been published, 
and which Zamyatin regarded as being a typ ica l.  I t  was Wells's ea rly  
s c ie n t i f i c  fantasies and a n t i-u to p ias , mostly w r i t te n  in the 1890's ,  
which attracted Zamyatin's adm iration '. 'The elements o f c lass ic
utopia are absent from Wells's work ', Zamyatin wrote, ' ........  S ta t ic
well-be ing, p e t r i f ie d  paradisiac social equ il ib r ium , are lo g ic a l ly  
bound with the content o f a utopian work; hence the natural conse­
quence in i t s  form - a s ta t ic  p lo t and absence o f story l in e .  In 
Wells's soc io fantastic  novels the p lo t is  always dynamic, b u i l t  on 
c o l l is io n s ,  on c o n f l ic t  . . . .  In adopting the form of the adventure 
novel. Wells deepened i t ,  raised i t s  in te l le c tu a l value, and brought 
in to  i t  the elements o f social philosophy and science. In his own 
f ie ld  - though, o f course, on a proportionate ly lesser scale - Wells 
may be likened to Dostoievsky, who took the form o f the cheap detec­
t iv e  novel and infused i t  w ith b r i l l i a n t  psychological a n a ly s is '.^
In Zamyatin adopted the form of Wells's 's o c io fa n ta s t ic a l '  
novel, using i t  as a vehicle to express his own concerns fo r  the 
p l ig h t  o f men and o f socie ty, and in fusing i t  w ith his own a r t i s t i c
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b r i l l ia n c e ,  H il legas, in his book on H.G. Wells, claims that the 
'an ti-u top ian  t ra d i t io n  a f te r  Wells pivots on W e ^
Wells's work has excited both admiration and contempt, but even 
his detractors allow tha t his influence has been profound and exten­
sive. ' Is  i t  not a sort of pa rr ic ide  fo r  a person my age ( t h i r t y -  
e igh t) to f in d  fa u l t  with H.G. Wells?' wrote George Orwell, one o f 
Wells's most pers is ten t and mordant c r i t i c s ,  in 1941. 'Thinking people 
who were born about the beginning of th is  century are in some sense 
Wells's own creation . . . .  I doubt whether anyone who was w r i t in g  
books between 1900 and 1920, at any rate in the English language, 
influenced the young so much. The minds o f a l l  o f  us, and therefore 
the physical world, would be perceptib ly  d i f fe re n t  i f  Wells had never 
exi sted'
Yet Wells's utopianism exasperated Orwell. Wells, he thought, 
confused 'mechanical progress with ju s t ic e ,  l ib e r t y  and common 
decency'.^ Orwell had some respect fo r  Wells's early  a n t i-u to p ia .
The Sleeper Awakes, but he was fundamentally opposed to Wells's
world-view. ' In  any book by Wells ___ you w i l l  f ind  passages o f the
same kind . . .  "the machines, our new race o f slaves, w i l l  set
humanity free" .......... ' Orwell wrote. 'Barring wars and unforseen
d isas te r, the fu ture  is envisaged as an ever more rapid march o f 
mechanical progress . . . .  machines to save work, machines to save 
thought, machines to save pain; hygiene, e f f ic ie n c y ,  organisation - 
u n t i l  f i n a l l y  you land up in the by now fa m i l ia r  Wellsian Utopia, 
ap tly  caricatured by Huxley in Brave New World, the paradise o f l i t t l e  
fa t  men'
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Aldous Huxley claimed tha t he o r ig in a l ly  intended Brave New 
World to be a parody o f Wells's Men Like Gods, although subsequently 
the book took on a rather d i f fe re n t  form. There are, in  fa c t ,  fa r  
c loser pa ra l le ls  to be drawn between Brave New World and The Sleeper 
Awakes. In both an ti-u to p ias , the lower caste o f  society is  d e l i ­
berate ly retarded and conditioned so as to provide the state with a 
race of uncomplaining machine-minders. Moreover, ch ildren are reared 
c e n tra l ly ,  in vast state creches, which are f i t t e d  with mechanical 
nursing devices. But Orwell and others th ink tha t Huxley was i n f l u ­
enced not so much by Wells as by Zamyatin, Huxley always denied a l l  
knowledge o f  l ^ ,  but H illegas writes tha t he considers i t  l i k e ly  
’ tha t the erud ite  Huxley somewhere at least heard o f and then 
forgot he had when he wrote Brave New World . . . .  ce r ta in ly  Brave New 
World seems very indebted to ^  fo r  Wellsian d e ta i ls ' . ^  Orwell 
is more b lun t: ' I  th ink  Aldous Huxley’ s Brave New World must
be plagiarized from i t  to some e x te n t ’ , he wrote. 'The f i r s t  
th ing anyone would notice about ^  is  the fac t - never pointed out,
I believe - tha t Aldous Huxley’ s Brave New World must be p a r t ly  derived 
from i t .  Both books deal w ith the rebe ll ion  o f the p r im it ive  human 
s p i r i t  against a ra t iona lize d , mechanized, painless world, and both 
s tor ies  are supposed to take place about s ix  hundred years hence. The 
atmosphere o f the two books is s im ila r ,  and i t  is  roughly speaking 
the same kind o f society tha t is being described, though Huxley's book 
shows less p o l i t ic a l  awareness and is  more influenced by recent b io ­
log ica l and psychological theories
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Huxley's Brave New World was published in 1932, Like Zamyatin's 
We, i t  explores the tension between the concept o f perfect happiness 
and the concept o f freedom. He prefaces i t  w ith a quotation, in  French, 
from Berdyaev's The End o f Our Time, Berdyaev considers tha t utopias, 
which at one time were thought unrea lisable, are now seen as being a l l  
too rea lisab le . Men w i l l  come to dread utopia, and long to return 
to a non-Utopian society which is less perfect and more free . He 
goes on to say, ' I t  appears that l ib e r ty  is  bound up with imperfec­
t io n ,  with a r ig h t  to im perfection '.^^  Huxley states unequivocally 
in  Brave New World tha t where perfect happiness becomes the goal fo r  
soc ie ty , freedom, and with i t ,  re l ig io n ,  love, a r t  and science, w i l l  
in e v ita b ly  be cast out. He describes a world where perfect s t a b i l i t y  
and mass happiness have at la s t  been achieved, a world where a l l  men's 
physical wants are s a t is f ie d ,  where a l l  doubts, anxieties and fears 
are e f f ic ie n t ly  s t i l l e d  through the jud ic ious adm inistra tion o f drugs, 
where ind iscr im inate and unrestr ic ted  sexual ac t iv ity  is o f f i c i a l l y  
advocated, where the necessary supply o f c it izens  is q u a n t ita t ive ly  
and q u a l i ta t iv e ly  con tro lled  through eugenic procedures, and a r ig id  
social hierarchy imposed from the moment o f conception, where social
unrest has been eliminated through the use o f condition ing techniques,
12to the end tha t everyone shall l ik e  'h is  inescapable social destiny '
- a world, in short, where a l l  notions o f s e l f - re a l iz a t io n  and s e l f -  
determination have been rendered nugatory,
Huxley's imaginary s ta te , the World State, is  ruled over, o r, 
rather, managed, by the World C on tro lle r , Mustapha Mond. The c it izen s
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are bred in the labora tory, in tes t-tubes, and th e i r  in te l l ig e n ce  level 
is pre-ordained at conception. They are divided in to  f iv e  groups, 
the Alphas forming the highest caste, and the Epsilons, the lowest. 
Though sexual a c t iv i t y  is un res tr ic ted , parenthood is  banned; the 
state has to ta l control over pro-creation. As in Zamyatin's One 
State, a l l  aspects o f l i f e  are e f f ic ie n t ly  planned, so tha t unpredict­
a b i l i t y  can be avoided. The complaisance o f the c i t iz e n ry  is  secured 
through the provision o f soothing drugs and sensual pleasures.
The s ta b i l i t y  o f the perfect state is  temporarily disturbed 
by the in trus ion  of the Savage, who has been brought up in an Indian 
reservation, beyond the boundaries o f the World State. His mother 
came o r ig in a l ly  from the World State, and she has longed always to 
re tu rn , but the Savage is  appalled by a l l  he finds there. In his 
rebe ll ion  he is joined by Helmholtz Watson, an Alpha, and an Emotional 
Engineer, who, in any other soc ie ty , would have been involved in  the 
world o f l i te ra tu r e .  Instead he w rites advertis ing slogans and con­
d it io n in g  slogans fo r  the World State. The f in a l  rebel, who is a 
very re luc tan t he re tic , is  Bernard, who is  also an Alpha, but does 
not qu ite  conform to the Alpha pattern o f physical excellence, owing 
to an accident in the labora tory , before he was born.
The key scene in  the book takes place between Mustapha Mond 
and the Savage. Mustapha Mond gives an eminently reasonable account 
to the Savage o f the workings o f the World State. He explains why 
freedom must be sac r if ice d  in the cause o f happiness and s t a b i l i t y .  
F in a l ly ,  in a burst o f f ru s tra t io n  and defiance, the Savage is  led to
exclaim, 'But I don 't want comfort. I want God, I want poetry, I want
13real danger, I want freedom, I want goodness. I want s in ' .
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rt would be hard to f in d  a c learer statement of re je c t ion  o f 
p e r fe c t ib i1 ism. Yet t h i r t y  years a f te r  w r i t in g  Brave New World,
Huxley constructed a utopia o f his own. Is land,
David Lodge, in  his review of H il legas 's  book o f Wells, comments, 
'Wells wrote an ti-u top ias before he wrote utopias, and the question is 
why did he change in th is  d irection? . . . .  The reverse s h i f t  is not so 
uncommon . . . .  Wells seems to have started o f f  d is i l lu s io n e d  and la te r
embraced o p t im is t ic  " i l lu s io n s "  .......... ' A s im ila r  question might
be asked in the case of Huxley: Why should Huxley, who, in Brave New
World upheld man's r ig h t  to be unhappy but fre e , la te r  come to regard 
as a p o s s ib i l i t y  the construction o f a perfect soc ie ty , dedicated to 
human happiness, where men could yet be free.
Three possible explanations may be considered here, any or a l l  
o f which may have some v a l id i t y .  It'may be tha t Huxley's decision to 
w r ite  a utopia o f his own indicates a s ig n if ic a n t  change in his asp ira­
tions and convictions, which took place a f te r  he had w r it te n  Brave New 
World, and before he wrote Is land . Or i t  may be tha t in Is lan d , he 
considers that he has succeeded in  providing a genuine so lu tion  to the 
problems posed in Brave New World. Las tly , i t  is  possible tha t Island 
is  to be seen p r im a r i ly  as an in trospective  work, as Huxley's attempt 
to come to terms with his own psychology, ra ther than as a f u l l ­
blown utopia. These possible explanations w i l l  be discussed more f u l l y  
in Part I I  ( iv )  o f  th is  th e s is ) .
When Huxley wrote his in troduction  to the new ed it ion  of Brave 
New World in 1946, he expressed a d issa t is fa c t io n  with certa in  aspects 
of the book. I t  no longer seemed to him sa t is fa c to ry  tha t the Savage
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should have been faced w ith only two a lte rn a t ive s ;  l i f e  in the World 
State, or l i f e  on an Indian reservation. Such a choice, wrote Huxley, 
is  not a f a i r  one, I t  is a choice between 'an insane l i f e  in  utopia, 
or the l i f e  o f a p r im it ive  in an Indian v i l la g e ,  a l i f e  more human 
in some respects, but in others hardly less queer and abnormal. At 
the time the book was w r it te n  th is  idea, tha t human beings are given 
free w i l l  in order to choose between insan ity  on the one hand and 
lunacy on the other, was one tha t I found amusing and regarded as 
qu ite possibly t ru e ' ,^ ^  Huxley now considered tha t the Savage should 
have been offered a th i rd  a lte rn a t ive :  l i f e  in a society where econo­
mics and p o l i t ic s  were decentralized, where science would be used in 
the service o f man, and where' re l ig io n  would be the conscious and 
in te l l ig e n t  pu rsu it of man's Final End, the intu itive knowledge o f the 
immanent Tao or Logos, the transcendent Godhead o f B r a h m a n ' . T h is  
soc ie ty , envisaged by Huxley in 1946, is  obviously the model fo r  his 
own utopia.
In Huxley's World State, the c it izens  are fashioned, con­
ditioned and con tro lled  by means o f the techniques - eugenic, genetic, 
physiological and psycholig ical - o f the b io log ica l sciences. These 
techniques are e f fe c t iv e  at such a fundamental le v e l,  tha t there is  
no need fo r  any overt coercion. Men have been phys ica lly  taken over; 
they are made, owned and serviced by the s ta te . In the utopian state 
o f Huxley's Is land , which is ca lled Pala, the b io log ica l sciences 
s t i l l  have an important ro le to play. Eugenic techniques are s t i l l  
practised, and hallucinogens are s t i l l  d is tr ib u te d  to the populace, 
although th e i r  use is  no longer ob liga to ry , and th e i r  use is  now said
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to enhance re lig ious  experience. As in the World State, the c it izens  
o f Pala are subjected to a ca re fu l ly  devised programme o f condition ing. 
The end to be achieved by th is  is ,  o f course, not the same, but i t  is 
possible to  detect a certa in  uneasy congruence between the two soci- 
t ie s .  In Brave New World, the p reva il ing  doctr ine . Fordism, guaran­
tees social cohesion and happiness; in Is land , Eastern mysticism 
f u l f i l s  th is  function . The timeless, drug-assisted, o rg ia s t ic  hedo­
nism which passes fo r  happiness in the World State has been exch­
anged fo r  t imeless, drug-assisted mystical ecstasy in  Pala.
The an ti-u top ian state envisaged in Orwell's  Nineteen Eighty- 
Four d i f fe rs  profoundly from Huxley's World State, The possible future 
world o f which Orwell warns is  dedicated not to hedonism, but to bru­
t a l i t y .  Orwell considered tha t Huxley's book was a ' b r i l l i a n t  ca r ica ­
tu re ' o f i t s  time (the early  1930s) but tha t i t  probably cast no l ig h t  
on the fu tu re . 'No society o f tha t kind would la s t  more than a couple 
o f generations, because a ru ling  class which thought p r in c ip a l ly  in 
terms o f a "good time" would soon lose i t s  v i t a l i t y .  A ru lin g  class 
has got to have a s t r i c t  m o ra li ty , a quas i-re lig ious  b e l ie f  in i t s e l f ,  
a mystique', Orwell wrote in Ju ly , 1940.^^
Orwell admired Jack London's The Iron Heel. London, he 
believed, had a c lear understanding, as early  as 1907, o f the dangers 
facing mankind. London possessed, Orwell considered a 'streak o f 
savagery' which enabled him to grasp something which Wells and Huxley 
could not: he recognized tha t hedonistic socie ties do not endure.
He also recognized, perhaps instinctively,the brutal side o f human 
n a t u r e . O r w e l l  himself could accept violence as a part o f l i f e  to a
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degree and with an openness which would have been impossible fo r  Wells.
Writing In 1940, Orwell welcomed the revo lu tion which he believed to
be Inev itab le  w ith in  a short space o f time, ' I  daresay the London
gutters w i l l  have to run with b lood ', he concluded. 'A l l  r ig h t ,  le t
19them, i f  i t  is necessary'. Like London, Orwell could contemplate 
the prospect o f a revolution in which blood was shed without any 
p a r t ic u la r  horror. [See Conclusion, note 10.]
Orwell was a w r i te r  o f intense p o l i t ic a l  commitment, whose 
p o l i t ic a l  involvement was p ra c t ic a l ,  ra ther than th e o re t ic a l.  He was 
a self-acknowledged S o c ia l is t ,  who hated the Communist Party, gave 
very wary support to the Labour Party, and had favoured the Anarchist 
cause in the Spanish C iv i l  War. This is not at a l l  to say tha t 
Orwell lacked a coherent p o l i t ic a l  outlook: he drew a tten tion  to the
short-comings of those states which professed Socialism, while betray­
ing the ideals which he believed to be fundamental to Socialism. He 
expressed an un fa i l ing  concern fo r  the preservation o f p o l i t ic a l  ra t io n ­
a l i t y  and honesty, fo r  the promotion o f S o c ia l is t  idea ls , and fo r  the 
protection o f the in te g r i ty  o f language. As a jo u rn a l is t ,  he reacted 
with swiftness and s e n s i t iv i t y  to changing p o l i t ic a l  conditions, warn­
ing of possible dangers, and drawing a tten tion  to the fa i l in g s ,  as he 
saw them, of p o l i t ic ia n s  and in te l le c tu a ls  a l ik e :  the breaches of
fa i t h ,  the verbal deceit, the acts of p o l i t ic a l  dishonesty and the 
betrayals o f common sense. He regarded Socialism as the only hope fo r  
B r i ta in  in the fu tu re , but he did not consider tha t there was, as 
ye t,  any genuinely B r i t is h  S o c ia l is t  movement capable o f a t t ra c t in g
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general support. He was not a Marxist, since he considered Marxism 
to be *a German theory in terpreted by Russians and unsuccessfully
transplanted to England' ,  that possessed '-nothing tha t re a l ly  touched
20the heart of the English people’ .
Orwell’ s Nineteen Eighty-Four, s tarted during the summer of 
1945, was not f in ished u n t i l  la te  in 1948, owing to O rwell’ s i l l  
health. He was never e n t ire ly  s a t is f ie d  with i t s  f in a l  shape, but he 
believed that the message he had t r ie d  to convey was an important 
one. The book was intended to serve as a warning against the spread 
o f to ta l i ta r ia n  ideas, but i t  was in terpreted by many people as re­
presenting an attack on Socialism. This Orwell f i rm ly  denied. Although 
he had termed the prevailing ideology of his imaginary s ta te , 'Ingsoc' 
(an abbreviation fo r  'English Socialism ') he was at pains to explain 
that what he condemned was not Socialism i t s e l f ,  but a corruption o f 
Socialism, in which pr inc ip les o f equality  and brotherhood had been 
to t a l l y  abandoned,
’My recent novel is NOT intended as an attack on Socialism or 
on the B r i t is h  Labour Party (o f which I am a supporter) but as a show- 
up of the perversions to which a centra lised economy is  l ia b le  and 
which have already been pa rt ly  realized in Communism and Fascism', he 
wrote ' I  do not believe tha t the kind of society I describe neces­
s a r i ly  w i11 a r r iv e ,  but I believe ........  tha t something resembling i t
could a rr ive .  I believe also tha t to ta l i t a r ia n  ideas have taken root 
in the minds o f in te l le c tu a ls  everywhere, and I have t r ie d  to draw 
these ideas out to th e ir  log ica l consequences. The scene o f the book
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is laid in Britain in order to emphasise that the English-speaking
races are not innately better than anyone else, and that totalitarianism,
21
if not fought against, could triumph anywhere*,
Orwell believed that intellectuals were chiefly to blame for 
the drift towards totalitarianism. They accepted its principles far 
more readily than did the mass of people, in Orwell's view. Although, 
in the main, they had opposed Hitler, they had only done so at the price 
of accepting Stalin. 'Most of them are perfectly ready for dicta­
torial methods, secret police, systematic falsifications of history,
22
etc., so long as they feel that it is on "our" side', he wrote.
Intellectuals accepted totalitarianism, he believed, in the name of
23
a specious 'realism', which led them to abandon all moral sense. 
Ultimately, perhaps, ordinary people would come to accept the views 
of the intellectuals, and then totalitarianism would become inevit­
able.
The point which had to be understood by Socialists, Orwell 
thought, was that the Soviet regime was not truly collectivist, and if 
Socialism were ever to be established in England, the failings of the 
Soviet system would first have to be exposed. In the preface to 
Animal Farm, he wrote 'In my opinion, nothing has contributed so much 
to the corruption of the original idea of Socialism as the belief that
Russia is a Socialist country For the past ten years I have been
convinced that the destruction of the Soviet myth was essential if 
we wanted a revival of the Socialist m o v e m e n t T h e  major failing 
of the intellectuals was, in Orwell's view, that they had done much to 
support the Soviet myth, when they should have been working to destroy 
it, so that true Socialism could emerge.
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Orwell considered tha t the 'managerial c la s s ',  by which he 
meant the s c ie n t is ts ,  teachers, technicians, jo u rn a l is ts ,  bureaucrats 
and professional p o l i t ic ia n s ,  was fascinated by the idea o f the to ta ­
l i t a r ia n  s ta te . Such people believed tha t to ta l i ta r ia n is m  would favour 
them as a group. The ar is tocracy would be elim inated and the working 
class would be f i rm ly  suppressed under such a system. ^The English 
russophile in te l l ig e n t s ia ’ , he wrote, wish to destroy the o ld ,
equa lita r ian  version o f Socialism and usher in a h ie rarch ica l society
25where the in te l le c tu a l can at la s t  get his hand on the whip '.
Orwell was interested in the predictions o f James Burnham, whose 
books. The Managerial Revolution and The Machiavellians, were the 
subject o f an essay by Orwell. Burnham, basing his arguments on ideas 
drawn from Machiavell i ,  Mosca and Pareto, wrote tha t experience had 
shown that such concepts as democracy and equa lity  were against nature. 
Man had always established a h ierarch ica l form of society under a 
ru lin g  e l i t e ,  and no other form o f government could be sustained. 
H ithe rto , there had been a c irc u la t io n  o f é l i te s ,  but there were signs 
tha t a new, permanent é l i t e  was now emerging. The world would come 
to be divided in to  two or three super-states, c lose ly  resembling one 
another, each o f which would be in te rn a l ly  s e l f - s u f f ic ie n t ;  thus 
there would be no need o f external trade. The super-states would be 
o f roughly equal strength, so none would be able to conquer the 
others, but a series o f skirmishes would take place continuously 
along the fro n t ie rs  d iv id ing  the states from one another. The new 
é l i t e  o f 'managers, sc ie n t is ts  and bureaucrats' would destroy o ld- 
s ty le  cap ita lism , but would hold the working class in permanent
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subjection, 'Something ra ther l ik e  "Communism" would prevail every- 
where’ . Such a world would represent the f in a l  stage in  the c irc u ­
la t io n  o f é l i te s .
The p icture presented by Burnham appalled Orwell, and Burnham's 
ideas obviously influenced Orwell when he was w r i t in g  Nineteen Eighty- 
Four. Discussing his an ti-u top ia  in a le t t e r ,  Orwell wrote, 'What 
i t  is  re a l ly  meant to do is  to discuss the im plica tions o f d iv id ing  
the world up in to  "Zones o f Influence" ___, and in addition to in d i-
27cate by parodying them the in te l le c tu a l im plications o f to ta l i ta r ia n is m '.  
Orwell wrote that the idea o f "Zones o f Influence" came to him in 1944, 
at the Teheran Conference, but i t  was surely Burnham's Managerial 
Revolution which c ry s ta l l iz e d  the idea fo r  him. Shortly a f te r  the 
Conference, in February, 1945, Orwell wrote, 'Already, qu ite  v is ib ly  
and more or less with the acquiescence of a l l  o f us, the world is  
s p l i t t in g  up in to  the two or three huge super-states forecast in  James 
Burnham's Managerial Revolution. One cannot draw th e i r  exact boun­
daries as ye t,  but one can see more or less what areas they w i l l  com­
prise . And i f  the world se tt le s  down in to  th is  pattern , i t  is l i k e ly  
tha t these vast states w i l l  be permanently at war w ith one another, 
although i t  w i l l  not necessarily be a very intensive or bloody kind 
o f war. Their problems, both economic and psychological, w i l l  be a
lo t  simpler i f  the doodlebugs* are more or less constantly whizzing
28to and f r o ' .
Orwell's imaginary state is  ca lled Oceania. The ru lin g  é l i t e  
of Oceania is  the Inner Party, which accounts fo r  some tw o  per cent
*doodlebugs - f ly in g  bombs in Second World War
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o f the populace. The Inner Party is the 'b ra in  o f the s ta te ' .  The 
members o f the Inner Party do not l iv e  in luxury, but they do enjoy 
certa in  p r iv i leges denied to the Outer Party, the next stratum of 
socie ty, which accounts fo r  a fu r th e r  th ir teen  per cent o f the popu­
lace. The Outer Party members are the 'hands o f the s ta te ' .  They l iv e  
under constant surve illance by the Thought Police, and through closed 
c i r c u i t  te le v is io n  cameras. Below them come the 'P ro le s ',  who make 
up e ig h ty - f ive  per cent o f the population. They are excluded from 
the Party, and are not subjected to p o l i t ic a l  ind oc tr in a t ion , since 
they are wholly apathetic , and pose no threat to the d u ra b i l i ty  o f the 
s ta te . A rudimentary n a t io n a l is t ic  fervour is  whipped up amongst them 
from time to time, through the dissemination o f war propaganda. To 
maintain th e ir  minds in a state o f l i s t le s s  compliance, the Party pro­
vides them with vapid amusements: obscene f i lm s ,  mechanically pro­
duced pornography, s tu l t i f y in g  books and newspapers, and above a l l ,  
the mindless excitement o f gambling. Such things are, however, f o r ­
bidden to the Party members, on whom a fanatica l puritanism is 
imposed.
The leader-f igure  o f Oceania is  Big Brother, whose pictures 
stare down from every w a ll.  He is  an in f a l l i b l e ,  in v in c ib le  God, 
seemingly immortal, omnipresent. The arch-enemy of the state is  
Emmanuel Goldstein, who had once been a leading figu re  in the Party, 
close to Big Brother in  importance, but had been cast out fo r  rebel­
l io n  and heresy. Goldstein is  thus the fa l le n  angel, a new Satan, 
against whom a l l  hatred can be d irected.
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The th ink ing of Oceania is  governed by the p r in c ip le  o f the 
id e n t i ty  o f  opposites: thus every Party member is  acquainted with
three basic slogans: War is  Peace, Freedom is Slavery and Ignorance
is Stength, This mode of th ink ing is termed 'doub le th ink '.  Double­
th ink allows the Party leaders to adjust t ru th  from day to day, and 
s t i l l  to sustain the unwinking c re d u l i ty  o f Party members.
The p lo t o f Nineteen Eighty-Four concerns a Party member, 
Winston Smith, who works in the M in is try  o f Truth, where fa lse propa­
ganda is  produced. He meets a g i r l ,  J u l ia ,  who works in the F ic tion  
Department, manufacturing novels by machine. He at f i r s t  avoids her, 
th ink ing her to be a spy or informer, but gradually they gain c o n f i­
dence in one another. They form a sexual re la t io n sh ip , which is 
he re tica l in Oceania, and f i n a l l y  run the supreme r is k  o f renting a 
room where they can meet together, in the Proles' quarter.
Winston is  also drawn to make contact w ith a member o f the 
Inner Party, O'Brien, whom he believes may be a member o f an under­
ground organisation. O'Brien allows Winston to continue in  th is  
b e l ie f ,  and lends him a book, exposing the true nature o f the s ta te , 
purportedly w r it te n  by Goldstein.
Pred ictably, Winston and Ju l ia  are arrested, and a f te r  weeks 
o f physical and mental to r tu re ,  Winston is  brought to O'Brien fo r  
in te rroga tion , O'Brien succeeds in  destroying Winston's capacity fo r  
ra tiona l thought, and also his capacity fo r  human love. But the pro­
cess o f destruction is  s t i l l  not complete. The la s t  stage o f 
Winston's 'cure' takes place while he is  s i t t in g  in a cafe, a f te r  
his release from custody, gazing at the image o f Big Brother on the
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telescreen. His surrender is  pe rfec t, and his subjection to the state 
t o t a l ,  when in a moment o f gin-soaked enlightenment he suddenly 
experiences an access of love fo r  Big Brother, He is  at la s t  worthy 
o f death: physical ex t in c t ion  must be preceded by psychic a n n ih i la t io n
fo r  the triumph of the Party to be perfect.
Despite the obvious pessimism of Nineteen Eighty-Four, Orwell 
retained a b e l ie f  in the d e s i ra b i l i t y  of progress towards a free and 
equal society. He had contempt fo r  those who suggested tha t a l l  inno­
vation was impossible. ' I t  is  not very d i f f i c u l t  to see tha t th is  
idea is  rooted in the fear o f progress', he wrote. ' I f  there is  
nothing new under the sun, i f  the past in some shape or another always 
re turns, then the future when i t  comes w i l l  be something fa m i l ia r .
At any rate what w i l l  never come - since i t  has never come before - 
is tha t hated, dreaded th ing , a world o f free and equal human beings. 
P a r t ic u la r ly  comforting to reactionary thinkers is  the idea of a 
cyc l ica l universe, in  which the same chain o f events happens over and 
over again. In such a universe every seeming advance towards demo­
cracy simply means tha t the coming age o f tyranny and p r iv i le g e  is 
29a b i t  n e a re r '.
Oceania is  a very imperfect s ta te . As Orwell himself exp la ins, 
the ru le rs  o f Oceania, having successfully overthrown cap ita lism , 
have fa i le d  to estab lish  equa lity  and co l le c t iv ism .^^  In th is  sense, 
Orwell's an ti-u top ia  is  less pessimistic than tha t of Zamyatin. In 
Zamyatin's One State the goals o f equa lity  and co llec t iv ism  have 
indeed been achieved, in a very extreme form. The perfect state has 
been realized.
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The picture of human degradation presented by the three writers 
with whose work I am concerned takes on very different forms. There 
are, however, certain points of congruence. All three writers condemn 
rigid orthodoxy, all condemn technological tyranny, and the destruc­
tion of privacy, and all condemn the corruption of language. Both 
Huxley and Zamyatin also condemn the substitution of mass happiness 
for freedom.
The most obvious disparity between the various anti-utopias 
is that between Orwell on the one hand and Huxley and Zamyatin on 
the other: Orwell did not consider that the total state would offer
happiness in place of freedom. He held that freedom would be crushed 
by the instilling of fear and anxiety.
But a less immediately apparent rift occurs between the anti­
utopias of Orwell and Zamyatin, and that of Huxley. Both Orwell and 
Zamyatin emphasise the responsibility of the individual to seek to 
join with others to overthrow tyranny. The heretics in Oceania and 
in the One State attempt to engage in active rebellion, designed 
to bring about the destruction of the total state. Their desire is 
to wrest power away from the rulers of the state, and thus to alter 
society. But the heretics in Huxley*s World State have no political 
consciousness. They are sent into exile, where they may exercise 
their individuality without harming society, and once they have 
become accustomed to the idea of leaving the World State, they are 
well satisfied. The one heretic vdio does not go into exile, the Savage, 
escapes from the state by killing himself. Similarly, in Huxley*s Ape 
and Essence, the heretics escape to join a dissident community, beyond
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the reach o f the s ta te . In Zamyatin’ s the heretic  E-330 s p e c i f i ­
c a l ly  excludes the option o f jo in in g  the p r im it ive  community who l iv e  
in  contentment beyond the walls o f the One State. The destiny o f 
th heretics o f Zamyatin and Orwell is  to seek to change th e i r  soc i­
e ty , however impossible th is  may seem to be, not to attempt to re trea t 
from i t .
Huxley seems f in a l l y  to have re jected Western man, and with
him the whole of Western cu ltu re . P h i l ip  Thody remarks tha t in  his
in troduction  toKrishnamurti's The F ir s t  and Last Freedom, Huxley
wrote, 'A world in which ideas did not e x is t  would be a happy 
31w or ld '.  Huxley seems to have reached the conclusion tha t although 
free speculation may be in te l le c tu a l ly  s t im u la t ing , i t  is  s o c ia l ly  
damaging. Man, through his ingenuity and his a b i l i t y  to generalize 
and theorize , has explo ited and corrupted the natural world. This 
ingenuity is ,  o f course, an e sse n tia l ly  human c h a ra c te r is t ic , but 
Huxley seems to suggest tha t i f  man is  to l iv e  in peace and jo y ,  seek­
ing mystical fu l f i lm e n t ,  he must become less ingenious, less creative 
and more conforming and accepting.
The three w rite rs  under review represent quite separate t r a d i ­
tions of thought from one another, and th is  is  re f lec ted  in the nature 
o f the fears expressed in  th e i r  w r i t in g s .  B r ie f ly ,  Orwell feared the 
eclipse o f ra tiona lism ; he depicts a state ruled by te r ro r ,  dedica­
ted to r i tu a l ism , ir ra t io n a l is m , b igotry  and dishonesty. Although a
professed S o c ia l is t ,  Orwell saw h im self, as a w r i te r ,  as belonging
32necessarily to the l ib e ra l  t r a d i t io n .  He was a ra t iona l humanist, 
with a streak of anarchism. He prized reason, l ib e r t y  o f conscience.
-  75 -
rigorous in te l le c tu a l honesty, unpretentiousness and common sense, 
and had an especial contempt fo r  cant, dogma and a l l  devices designed 
to separate men from the ob jective t ru th .  Zamyatin feared the suppres­
sion of fee ling : he portrays a world where nature has been excluded,
and where a grotesquely bloated mathematical ra tiona lism  has engulfed 
the whole realm o f human thought. In the One State, th ink ing has been 
replaced by precise computation, and the m u lt ip l ic a t io n  tables serve 
as the new Creed fo r  socie ty. Zamyatin prizes the passions and the w i l l  
as the source o f human freedom, whereas Orwell prizes ra t io n a l i t y .
He values nature, self-expression and creative energy, and he perceives 
the imagination as being the sole generator o f both c re a t iv i ty  and 
conscience. In th is  he follows the Romantic t ra d i t io n .  Huxley 
feared the power o f the b io log ica l sciences to transform man: his
an ti-u top ian state is  governed by technologists, psychologists and 
p u b l ic i ty  experts. But, in a d i f fe re n t  form, a l l  o f  these reappear 
in  Huxley's u topia. Is land . Huxley came to re je c t most categories o f 
Western thought, including Rationalism, Romanticism and Freudianism.
He turned increasing ly towards Eastern mysticism and the philosophy 
o f non-attachment. He feared the misuse o f the arts  and sciences, 
he feared the misuse o f man's s p ir i tu a l  d r ive . He feared the body, 
society and death. He feared progress in any Western context. Both 
his an ti-u top ia  and his utopia proclaim the d isso lu t ion  of the in d iv i ­
dual; in Brave New World, the ind iv idua l is  d iffused in to  his socie ty, 
and in Is land , he is  d iffused in to  the mystic Void.
Orwell s t i l l  hoped fo r  the establishmentof a S o c ia l is t  soc ie ty , 
which would somehow avoid the mistakes o f e a r l ie r  repressive régimes 
which ca lled themselves S o c ia l is t .  Zamyatin held tha t man progresses
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through an in f in i t e  series o f revo lu tions, and hoped tha t men would 
recognize the need to keep a l ive  heretica l thought. But Huxley com­
bined a general philanthropy w ith a fas t id ious  d is tas te  fo r  human 
nature.
Writing not o f Huxley but o f Gandhi, Orwell gave the fo llow ing 
view o f the philosophy of non-attachment:
■In th is  yogi-ridden age, i t  is  too re ad ily  assumed tha t
"non-attachment" is  not only be tte r than a f u l l  acceptance o f
ea rth ly  l i f e ,  but tha t the ordinary man re jects  i t  because i t  is  too
d i f f i c u l t :  in other words tha t the average human being is  a fa i le d
sa in t.  I t  is  doubtful whether th is  is true . Many people genuinely
do not wish to be sa in ts , and i t  is  probable tha t some who achieve or
aspire to sainthood have never f e l t  much temptation to be human
beings. I f  one could fo llow  i t  to i t s  psychological roots , one would,
I be lieve, f ind  tha t the main motive fo r  "non-attachment" is  a desire
to escape from the pain o f l i v in g ,  and above a l l  from love, which,
sexual or non-sexual, is  hard work. But i t  is not necessary here to
argue whether the o ther-world ly  or the humanistic ideal is  "h igher".
The point is tha t they are incompatible. One must choose between
God and Man, and a l l  " rad ica ls " and "progressives", from the mildest
33Liberal to the most extreme Anarchist, have in e f fe c t  chosen Man'.
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Part I I  -  In troduction - Utopia and the " a r t i f i c i a l  Adam"
'To sequester out o f the world in to  A t la n t ic  and Utopian
p o l i t ie s ,  which never can be drawn in to  use, w i l l  not mend our condi­
t io n ;  but to ordain w isely in th is  world o f e v i l ,  in the midst
whereof God hath placed us unavoidably ___ Here the great a r t  l ie s ,
to discern in what the law is  to bid re s tra in t  and punishment, and in 
what things persuasion only is  to work. I f  every action which is 
good, or e v i l  in man at r ipe  years, were to be under p ittance , and 
p resc r ip t io n , and compulsion, what were v ir tu e  but a name, what praise 
could be then due to well-doing Many there be tha t complain o f
Divine Providence fo r  su ffe r ing  Adam to transgress; foo lish  tongues 1 
when God gave him reason, he gave him freedom to choose, fo r  reason 
is but choosing; he had been else a mere a r t i f i c i a l  Adam ........ ' ^
This passage from the Areopagitica o f John Milton w i l l  serve
very well as a summary o f  the arguments o f the anti-Utopians.
F i r s t l y ,  the heroic voyage to Utopia is  seen as being no more 
than a tim id  re trea t from a world where Good and Evil are ine v itab ly  
and in e x tr ica b ly  in te rtw ined, and where the sense and s ign if icance 
of each is  derived by reference to the other. In his s a t i r ic a l  work. 
Les Hauteurs Béantes, the Russian w r i te r ,  Alexandre Zinoviev, con­
demns utopianism fo r  fa i l in g  to recognize the necessary interdependence 
between Good and Evil in the fo llow ing words: 'Tous les inventeurs
d'utopies commettent tous la même erreur, comme un sel homme. I ls  
oublient tout simplement que les aspects p o s i t i fs  et négatifs d'une 
ré a l i té  sont engendrés les uns comme les autres par une même structure
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socia le . Les uns ne vont pas sans les autres Les utopies sont 
des contrad ictions logiques, en raison même de la fa^on dont e lles  
sont constru ites. C'est pourquoi justement e l les  sont i r ré a l is a b le s ' .^  
( 'A i l  devisers o f utopias make the very same mistake, to a man.
They fo rg e t ,  qu ite  simply, tha t pos it ive  and negative aspects o f a 
given re a l i t y  are both engendered by the same social s truc tu re .
They cannot ex is t on th e i r  own -----  Utopias are log ica l contrad ic­
t io n s , because o f the very way in which they are constructed. That 
is exactly  why they are una tta inab le '.)
Secondly, while i t  is  conceded tha t in human a f fa i r s  there is 
an area in which i t  is  quite proper fo r  ce r ta in , spec if ic  actions to 
be precluded under th reat o f legal sanction, i t  is also considered 
tha t there is another, and wider, area o f l i f e  in which legal com­
pulsion should have no place. The a r t  o f the statesman consists in 
his being able to  d is t ingu ish  the two areas o f l i f e  - the public and
the pr iva te  - the one from the other.
T h ird ly ,  i t  is argued tha t freedom of choice is  essential to
man, since i t  is the expression o f his reason, without which he is
less than human. The man who is  not free to exercise choice, but
3who is  retained in 'a perpetual childhood o f p re s c r ip t io n ‘ , is  a 
mere simulacrum o f man. This argument is  very c lose ly re lated to 
the f i r s t .  Recognition o f the co-existence o f Good and Evil is  a 
pre-condition fo r  moral action, M ilton w r ite s , ' I t  was from out of 
the rind  o f one apple tasted, tha t the knowledge o f good and e v i l ,  as 
two twins cleaving together, leaped fo r th  in to  the world. And per­
haps th is  is  tha t doom which Adam f e l l  in to  o f knowing good and e v i l .
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tha t is  to say of knowing good by e v i l .  As therefore the state o f man 
now is , , ,  I cannot praise a fu g i t iv e  and c lo is te red  v ir tu e ,  unexer­
cised and unbreathed, tha t never s a l l ie s  out and sees her adversary, 
but s links out o f the race, where tha t immortal garland is to be run 
fo r ,  not w ithout dust and heat. Assuredly, we bring not innocence 
in to  the world, we bring impurity much ra ther; tha t which p u r i f ie s  
us is t r i a l ,  and t r i a l  is by what is  con tra ry ’
In the an ti-u top ian states devised by Zamyatin, Orwell and 
Huxley, the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f choice, tha t is ,  o f moral ac tion , has been 
excluded. There is  no area o f l i f e  which is  not subject to o f f i c ia l  
regu la tion . A ll power has been drained from the populace and concen­
tra ted  at the centre. I ts  exercise is  pure, untempered by the res­
t ra in ts  afforded by formal p o l i t ic a l  and legal in s t i tu t io n s .  There is 
no le g is la t iv e  body, since the shape o f soc ie ty , and of the nature of 
c i v i l  ob l ig a t io n , has been established fo r  a l l  time, and there is no 
p o s s ib i l i t y  o f recourse to legal a rb i t ra t io n  or mediation, since there 
is no recognition o f  any conceivable set o f circumstances in which there 
could be cause fo r  contention. The to ta l  s tate is  the embodiment of 
a single set o f p r in c ip le s ,  which are to remain forever in v io la te .
The to ta l  power of the ru le r  en ta i ls  the to ta l subjection o f 
the ruled. But the means by which th is  subjection is secured and 
maintained varies in accordance with the nature o f the pr inc ip les  
upon which the imaginary state is  founded: in the One State o f
Zamyatin’ s We, a formal ra tiona lism  governs men's l iv e s .  Every human
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a c t iv i t y  is  subjected to q u a n t if ica t io n ,  computation, and s ta t is t ic a l  
analysts. Freedom is  excluded because i t  is  untidy. Oppression is  
impersonal and mechanical. In Orwell's Oceania, however, ru le  is 
a rb i t ra ry .  Human ra t io n a l i t y  is  suppressed, and fear and hatred 
drive out freedom. Oppression is  overt and physical. In Huxley's 
World State, power is  maintained in yet another way: management has
replaced government, and freedom is rendered impossible, a t least 
fo r  the mass of c i t iz e n s ,  since they have been subjected to physical 
m od if ica tion , and de lib e ra te ly  adapted to the needs o f the s ta te .
To a lesser extent, th is  is also true o f the c it ize n s  o f Huxley's 
utopia, Pala. A ll are subject, in some sense, to  b io log ica l 
oppression.
But while the anti-u topians portray states where the e lim ination  
o f freedom has been successfully achieved, they nonetheless consider 
tha t the concept o f the to ta l  state is  contrary to the nature o f man, 
and o f his environment. 'A r t i f i c i a l  Adam' can be created and sus­
tained only w ith in  an a r t i f i c i a l  world, where r e a l i t y  has been 
reconstructed.
I f  utopia can be constructed only against nature, i t  must 
fo llow  tha t whoever wishes to devise a utopian state must f i r s t  encoun­
te r  and overcome certa in  fundamental problems. In th is  section of my 
thes is , I shall discuss the va r ie ty  o f ways in which these problems 
have been conceived and 'solved' in  the imaginary states proposed 
by the three w rite rs  with whom I am concerned. The problems I have 
iso lated concern ( i )  the nature o f man's perception of r e a l i t y ,
( i i )  the conception o f time as the enemy o f utopia, ( i i i )  the natural 
world and the human body in re la t io n  to utopia, ( iv )  the ind iv idua l
w i l l  in re la t ion  to utopia, and (v) the status o f the arts  and sciences 
in utopia.
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Part I I  ( i )  Utopia and the subjugation o f human percepti on
■We boast our l i g h t ;  but i f  we look not w isely on the Sun 
i t s e l f ,  i t  smites us in to  darkness . . . .  The l ig h t  which we have 
gained, was given us, not to be ever s taring on, but by i t  to discover 
onward things more remote from our knowledge There be who perpe­
tu a l ly  complain o f schisms and sects, and make i t  such a calamity tha t 
any man dissents from th e i r  maxims, 'T is th e i r  own pride and igno­
rance which causes the d is tu rb ing , who ne ither w i l l  hear with meek­
ness, nor can convince, yet a l l  must be suppressed which is  not found 
i n thei r  Syntagma' . . . J
For the an ti-u top ian w r i te rs ,  as fo r  M ilton , man's quest fo r  
t ru th  is e te rna l. No f in a l ,  all-embracing conclusions can ever be 
reached. The find ings of one generation are open to reappraisal by 
the next. But in the perfect s ta te , they hold, the search fo r  t ru th  
can no longer be allowed to proceed. The utopian believes he has 
revealed the whole extent o f the t ru th .  He o ffe rs  a f in a l ,  fa lse 
so lu tion  to the inso luble. Truth, in utopia, is  ossifed in to  dogma.
The utopian ru le r  must impose a single v is ion  o f r e a l i t y .  The 
c i t iz e n 's  apprehension o f t ru th  must accord, in a l l  respects, w ith the 
orthodox conception of t ru th  offered by the s ta te . Only in th is  way 
can the mechanical e f f ic ie n c y  of the state be safeguarded. There is 
no p a r t ic u la r  system of thought which is  uniquely and id e a l ly  approp­
r ia te  fo r  adoption and promulgation in the utopian s ta te ; what is  of 
supreme importance is tha t the mode o f perception adopted by the state 
should be universal and exclusive.
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Each o f the three anti-u top ian states of Zamyatin, Orwell and 
Huxley is founded upon a d i f fe re n t  system of perception. In Orwell's 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, the state imposes a corporate, s u b je c t iv is t  
v is ion o f the world. Truth is  merely a property o f the state mind, 
unrelated to the passage o f events, or to the substance o f ob jects, 
in the physical world. The In q u is i to r ,  O'Brien, terms the o f f i c ia l
9
mode o f perception, 'c o l le c t iv e  so lips ism '. In Zamyatin's We, 
however, t ru th  is  equated wholly w ith  mathematical c e r ta in ty .  A ll 
tha t which is not susceptible to q u a n t if ica t io n  and ca lcu la t ion  is 
dismissed as meaningless. 'Everything great is  s im p le ',  declares
D-503. ' ------- The only things unshakable and eternal are the four rules
o f  a r ithm etic . And only m ora lity  which is  b u i l t  upon those four rules
3
w i l l  prove great, unshakable, e te rna l. This is the u lt im ate wisdom'. 
For Zamyatin's D-503, mathematical symbols have a substance and a 
re a l i t y  which l iv in g  people do not. F in a l ly ,  in  Huxley's Brave New 
World, the concept o f t ru th  has been discarded a ltogether. 'T ru th 's  
a menace', declares Mustapha Mond,the C on tro lle r o f the World State.
The happiness o f the masses can only be secured a t the cost o f t ru th ,  
he exp la ins.^ In the World State, each c i t iz e n  is  in s t i l l e d  with tha t 
v is ion  o f the world which is appropriate to his place in the social 
s truc tu re . The value of any statement about the world is  held to l i e  
not in i t s  t ru th  or falsehood, but in i t s  u t i l i t y  or uselessness. 
Language has been deprived o f e th ica l or philosophical s ign if icance .
I t  is  merely a tool in the service of the behavioural conditioner.
The capacity o f language to disclose or conceal r e a l i t y ,  and 
to  enhance or confound mutual understanding, has in terested utopian
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and an ti-u top ian thinkers a l ik e .  From the time o f the Enlightenment 
onward, men have dreamed o f constructing a p e rfec t ly  precise language, 
comprehensible to a l l ,  which would bind men together in a common per­
ception o f r e a l i t y .
Writing of L e ib n itz 's  pro ject o f a universal character, Jonathan 
Cohen describes the functions i t  was intended to perform in the fo l lo w ­
ing terms: ' I t  would provide a " lo g is t ic "  treatment o f science
in general, a s im p lif ie d  system o f symbolism fo r  the exact expression 
of a l l  actual and possible knowledge. And i t  would serve as an in s t ru ­
ment o f discovery and demonstration. The f i r s t  two purposes could be 
achieved on Le ibn itz 's  view by devising a notation in which each single 
or basic symbol represented a simple concept and complex notions were 
expressed by combining the appropriate symbols in one way or another. 
The number of fundamental symbols would thus be as small as the number 
o f p r im it ive  concepts in human thought, so tha t the notation, together 
w ith i t s  voca lisa t ion , could be lea rn t in a few weeks. Moreover, 
throughout the world, science would be developed in the form of a 
s ing le , un if ied  encyclopaedia, sc ie n t is ts  would be able to a t ta in  the 
same degree o f r igour in metaphysics and morals as in geometry or
5
an a ly t ics , and nothing chimerical would ever be w rit te n  down'.
In th is  dream o f Le ibn itz  i t  is  easy to f in d  the seeds of 
Zamyatin's nightmare notion o f a world where moral precepts would be 
mathematically computed, and human compassion would have no place.
The Enlightenment ideal o f a new, universal language was 
adopted, in the present century, by H.G, Wells. But Wells d if fe red  
from Le ibn itz , in tha t he did not consider tha t such a language should
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be perfec t, in the sense o f being s ta t ic ,  As Zamyatin noted, the 
imaginary states of Wells were dynamic, ra ther than s ta t ic .  (See Part 
I ( i i )  note 4), And Wells was well aware tha t a ‘p e r fe c t ’ language 
would be in f le x ib le ,  and therefore unsuitable in the type of ideal 
world which he envisaged, Utopians usually made the mistake, in 
Wells's opinion, o f advocating the development o f  a ’ s c ie n t i f ic  
language . . . .  without ambiguity, as precise as mathematical formulae, 
and with every term in re la tions o f exact log ica l consistency with 
every other . . . .  a language with a l l  the in f lex ions  o f verbs and nouns 
regular, and a l l  i t s  constructions in e v ita b le , each word c le a r ly  
d istingu ishable  from every other word in sound as well as s p e l l in g ' .^
But Wells considered tha t such a language would ac tua lly  l im i t  the 
scope of communication. 'The language of u to p ia ',  he wrote, 'w i l l  
no doubt be one and in d iv is ib le ;  a l l  mankind w i l l ,  in the measure o f 
th e ir  ind iv idua l d ifferences in q u a l i ty ,  be brought in to  the same phase, 
in to  a common resonance o f thought, but the language they speak w i l l  
s t i l l  be a l iv in g  tongue, an animated system of imperfections, which 
every ind iv idual man w i l l  i n f i n i tes im ally  modify. Through the univer­
sal freedom o f exchange and movement the developing changein i t s  
general s p i r i t  w i l l  be a world-wide change; tha t is the q u a l i ty  of 
i t s  u n iv e rs a li ty .  I fancy i t  w i l l  be a coalesced language, a synthesis 
o f many' ?
Such was Wells's prescrip t ion  fo r  a universal language in 1905, 
when he wrote A Modern Utopia. But by the time he wrote The Shape of 
Things to Come, his ideas seem to have undergone some m odif ica tion . 
Language, in the la t t e r  utopia, is  c e r ta in ly  not s ta t ic ,  but i t s  
growth is o f f i c i a l l y  con tro l led , fo r  the purpose o f achieving
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’ increasing delicacy and precision o f expression’ , ’ C r i t ic ism , in  the 
form o f the "D ictionary Bureau", sc ru t in ises , but permits desirable 
a d d it io n s ’ to the language. The aim is fo r  language to be brought ' to
o
a new level o f e f f ic ie n c y ' .  Wells, who had e a r l ie r  valued the a l lu ­
sive and evocative properties o f language, and had considered that 
ind iv idua l in te rp re ta t io n  would serve only to enrich the common store 
o f language, now appears to favour order and fo rm a li ty .  He seems not 
to consider tha t human freedom may be threatened, where a government 
chooses to exercise exclusive control over the development o f language. 
Nor does Wells perceive the p o te n t ia l ly  s in is te r  implications inherent 
in his proposal fo r  a Language Discard organisation. In Wells's 
imaginary fu ture world, th is  in s t i tu t io n  has been set up to co l le c t  
obsolete terms, or those which have lo s t  th e i r  o r ig ina l meanings, and 
to e lim inate them from current usage. But the organisation has come 
to acquire another function : 'the enquiry in to  these changes and
preferences and abandonments' has led 'very d i re c t ly  in to  an exhaustive 
analysis o f the primary processes o f human thought’ .^ In The Shape 
o f Things to Come, Wells expresses the b e l ie f  tha t utopia w i l l  be 
f in a l l y  atta ined only once man has undergone mental reconstruction.
This ' rearrangement o f the association systems o f the human brain 
brings with i t  . . .  the prospect o f  a t present inconceivable extensions 
of human mental capacity
Both Hillegas and S te inhoff consider tha t Wells ’ s conception o f 
a utopian language was u t i l iz e d  by Orwell, when he came to w r i te  
Nineteen Eighty-Four. Certa in ly  pa ra l le ls  can be drawn between Wells's 
utopian language scheme and Orwe ll’ s Newspeak, and S te inhoff o ffe rs
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evidence which indicates that Orwell could well have been influenced 
by Wells. Orwell co llected pamphlets on Basic English, among which 
is  C.K. Ogden's System of Basic English, w r it te n  in 1934. This pamphlet 
is  i t s e l f  w r it te n  in Basic English, and i t  includes a ' t ra n s la t io n ' 
o f  the section o f The Shape o f Things to Come which is  concerned w ith 
'Language and Mental Growth'. S te inhoff claims tha t Ogden's pamphlet, 
and p a r t ic u la r ly  the excerpt from Wells's utopia, 'gave Orwell the 
design fo r  a language l ik e  Newspeak, and, more important, examples of 
what could be done with i t s  e ight hundred words
Newspeak is  the o f f i c ia l  language o f Orwell's Oceania. I t  is  
designed so to l im i t  thought processes that u lt im a te ly  thoughtcrime 
(the conception of ideas a lien  to state dogma) w i l l  become an impossi­
b i l i t y .  Undesirable words are discarded, or here tica l connotations 
stripped from them, so tha t the human brain may be robbed o f the con­
ceptual apparatus needed fo r  the generation o f unorthodox thoughts.
A ll new words invented by the Party have h ighly spe c if ic  meanings, and 
care is  taken tha t they should not acquire any subsidiary meanings 
in im ica l to the Party v is ion . I t  is the Party 's  purpose not merely to 
impose i t s  own vocabulary upon the subjects o f Oceania, but to ensure 
tha t a lte rn a t ive  modes o f expression cease to e x is t .  Thus the minds 
o f the c it izen s  w i l l  u lt im a te ly  come to contain only those mental 
images which serve to re in force Party dogma.
Orwell considered that control over language can cons titu te  a 
very potent weapon in the hands of those who wish to exercise control 
over thought processes. He was deeply in terested in language; i t s
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perversion seemed to him to constitu te  one o f the major threats to 
human ra t io n a l i t y .  He considered tha t where language is  m utila ted, 
freedom of thought becomes impossible.
’ To ta lita r ian ism  has abolished freedom of thought to an extent 
unheard o f in any previous age*', Orwell wrote, ’And i t  is important 
to rea lize  tha t i t s  control o f  thought is not only negative, but posi­
t iv e .  I t  not only forb ids you to express - even to th ink - certa in  
thoughts, but i t  d ic ta tes what you shal1 th in k ,  i t  creates an ideo­
logy fo r  you, i t  t r ie s  to govern your emotional l i f e  as well as se tt ing  
up a code of conduct. And as fa r  as possible, i t  iso la tes you from
the outside world, i t  shuts you up in an a r t i f i c i a l  universe in which
12you have no standards o f comparison'.
This is  the s itu a t io n  of Orwell's central character, Winston 
Smith, in Nineteen Eighty-Four. Winston Smith's greatest misery is 
that he has no one with whom he can share his ideas, and thus v e r i fy  
his conception o f r e a l i t y .  Locked in his ' a r t i f i c i a l  un iverse ', he 
is desperately and constantly aware o f the unsystematic nature o f his 
own thought processes, and although he t r ie s  laborious ly  to order 
his in te rna l arguments ra t io n a l ly ,  he has l i t t l e  fa i th  in his powers 
of reasoning. This sense of mental inadequacy causes him to fear fo r  
his own san ity . Since he cannot formulate and a r t ic u la te  his ideas 
openly, he ceases to be able to s tructure  them w ith in  his own head.
Orwell believed tha t i t  was impossible to sustain freedom of 
thought w ith in  the to ta l  s ta te , because freedom o f thought and freedom 
of speech are inseparably linked. He held tha t no man can in d e f in i te ly
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preserve an independent l in e  o f thought without the mental support o f 
others, 'The fa l la c y  is to believe tha t under a d ic ta to r ia l  govern­
ment you can feel free in s id e ’ , he wrote. Why is th is  idea
false? I pass over the fa c t  tha t modern d ic ta to rsh ips d o n 't ,  in 
fa c t ,  leave the loopholes that the old-fashioned despotisms d id ; 
and also the probable weakening o f the desire fo r  in te l le c tu a l  l ib e r t y  
owing to to ta l i t a r ia n  methods of education. The greatest mistake 
is  to imagine tha t the human being is an autonomous in d iv id u a l.  The 
secret freedom which you can supposedly enjoy under a despotic govern­
ment is  nonsense, because your thoughts are never e n t i re ly  your own. 
Philosophers, w r i te rs ,  a r t i s t s ,  even s c ie n t is ts ,  not only need encourage­
ment and an audience, they need constant s tim ula tion from other people.
I t  is almost impossible to th ink without ta lk in g  . . . .  Take away freedom
13Of speech, and the creative faculties dry up' .
Orwell likened the to ta l  state to a theocracy, in which the 
ind iv idua l is required to adapt his thoughts to conform with the o f f i ­
c ia l c r e e d . Y e t  he drew a d is t in c t io n  between re lig ious  dogma and 
the dogma o f the to ta l  s ta te . Although the mediaeval Church in Europe 
d icta ted what men should be lieve, i t  at least allowed men to re ta in  
the same set o f be l ie fs  from b ir th  to death. 'The p e c u l ia r i ty  o f  the 
t o ta l i t a r ia n  state is  tha t though i t  controls thought, i t  does not f i x  
i t ' ,  he wrote. ' I t  sets up unquestionable dogmas, and i t  a l te rs  them 
from day to day. I t  needs the dogmas, because i t  needs absolute obedi­
ence from i t s  subjects, but i t  cannot avoid the changes, which are
dictaged by the needs of power p o l i t ic s .  I t  declares i t s e l f  i n f a l l i b l e ,
15and a t the same time i t  attacks the very concept o f ob jective t r u t h ' .
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In Nineteen Eighty-Four, Orwell describes a state where the 
c it izen s  have been reduced to the level of in fa n ts , permanently 
anxious to th ink and do what is  required o f them, yet unable to d is ­
cover and understand the nature o f  the orthodoxy to which they must 
adhere. Orwell appears to have believed that the human mind, in 
infancy, is featureless and u t te r ly  defenceless, a palimpsest, on 
which society may inscribe at w i l l ,  'The weakness o f the c h i ld ' ,  he 
wrote, ' i s  tha t i t  s ta r ts  w ith a blank sheet. I t  ne ither understands 
nor questions the society in which i t  l iv e s ,  and because o f i t s  credu­
l i t y ,  otherpeople can work upon i t ,  in fe c t ing  i t  w ith the sense of 
i n f e r io r i t y  and the dread of offending against mysterious, te r r ib le  
laws '.^^  For Orwell, th is  b e l ie f  in human m a lle a b i l i ty  was a source 
o f pessimism and foreboding.
The c it izen s  of Orwell's imaginary s ta te , Oceania, are bere ft 
o f any confidence in th e i r  own powers o f observation and reasoning.
The Party which governs them claims to be i n f a l l i b l e ,  and disguises 
i t s  frequent changes o f po licy and i t s  errors o f judgment by subs ti­
tu t in g  propaganda fo r  ob jective t ru th .  Party members must be ready at 
a l l  times to forget 'by in s t in c t '  tha t which i t  is  necessary fo r  them 
to fo rg e t ,  while at the same time reg is te r ing  subconsciously the reason 
why i t  is necessary fo r  them to fo rg e t,  and the circumstances in which 
i t  might become necessary fo r  them to remember again. This form o f 
self-hypnosis is  termed Doublethink, With Doublethink i t  is  even 
possible to hold two mutually exclusive opinions at the same time.
The c i t iz e n  must exercise to ta l  control over his thought processes 
at a l l  times. He must accept tha t r e a l i t y  is  no more than the con­
venient f i c t io n  offered by Party rhe to r ic  at any given moment. Thus
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the basis fo r  human ra t io n a l i t y  is  destroyed, and sanity  is  redefined. 
The sane man in Oceania is he who can unhes ita ting ly  accommodate his 
mind to the contortions o f the Party ra t io n a l i t y .
In a manner s t r ik in g ly  reminiscent o f Orwell, Arthur Koestler 
describes his experiences in S ta l in is t  Russia, in ‘ the magic world of 
"double-think" ' ,  in the fo llow ing words: ' I  reacted to the brutal
impact o f re a l i t y  on i l lu s io n  in a manner typ ica l o f the true be liever.
I was surprised and bewildered - but the e la s t ic  shock-absorbers 
of my Party t ra in in g  began to operate at once, I had eyes to see, and 
a mind conditioned to explain away what they saw. This ' inner censor’
is  more re lia b le  and e f fe c t iv e  than any o f f i c ia l  censorship ___ I t
helped me to  overcome my doubts and to rearrange my impressions in the 
desired pattern. I learn t to c la s s ify  automatically everything that 
shocked me as 'the heritage o f the past' and everything I l iked  as ‘ the 
seeds of the fu tu re ' .  By se tt ing  up th is  automatic sort ing  machine in 
his mind, i t  was s t i l l  possible in  1933 fo r  a European to l iv e  in Russia 
and yet to remain a Communist. A ll my fr iends had tha t automatic 
sort ing  machine in th e i r  heads. The Communist mind has perfected the 
techniques o f self-deception in the same manner as i t s  techniques of 
mass propaganda. The inner censor in the mind o f  the true be liever 
completes the work o f  the public censor; his se lf-desc ip lin e  is  as 
tyrannica l as the obedience imposed by the regime; he te r ro r ise s  his 
own conscience in to  submission; he carries his pr iva te  Iron Curtain 
inside his s k u l l ,  to protect his i l lu s io n s  against the in trus ion  o f 
r e a l i t y '
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Koestler does not suggest, o f course, tha t th is  method of th in k ­
ing is peculiar to the orthodox in S ta l in is t  Russia. Like Orwell, he 
considers tha t the apparatus fo r  se lf-de lus ion w i l l  be brought in to  
operation wherever a society is  governed according to the precepts 
of some closed system of thought, tha t is ,  wherever observable facts  
have to be refashioned to s u i t  the terms of an i n f a l l i b le  creed. For 
both w r i te rs ,  to ta l i ta r ia n is m  is  both the cause and the re su lt  o f the 
eclipse o f the ra t iona l mind.
The passage by Koestler quoted above was w r it te n  in 1954, and 
i t  is reasonable to suppose tha t at tha t time he was fa m i l ia r  with 
Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, and tha t he drew on the Orwellian con­
ception o f double-think when he came to s tructure  his own account of 
his personal experiences under to ta l i ta r ia n is m .
In Nineteen Eighty-Four, Orwell envisages a world in which 
the boundaries between fac t and fantasy have been dissolved, and where 
the concept o f ob jective t ru th  has ceased to have meaning. The state 
requires i t s  c it izens  to accept w ithout question the subjective v is ion 
o f r e a l i t y  which the Party devises from moment to moment, to protect 
i t s  claim to i n f a l l i b i l i t y .  As th is  conception o ffe rs  no s t a b i l i t y ,  
the ind iv idua l c i t iz e n  is thrown in upon h imself, in an e f fo r t  to 
d ire c t  his own thought processes so that they may accord with the 
Party ra t io n a l i t y .  Thus, although a l l  subjects o f the state are com­
pelled to share a common conception of r e a l i t y ,  th is  has the e f fe c t ,  
not o f un it ing  them, but o f severing them one from another. The 
c it ize n s  are deprived o f the sense o f security  to be found in the 
sharing o f a common body o f empirical knowledge, accessible to a l l .
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and unaffected by the passing convenience of Party leaders. Ind iv idual 
surviva l depends upon the sub ject's  a b i l i t y  to ignore the evidence of 
his senses, and in te rp re t  the s h i f t in g  demands o f Party dogma. Com­
munication ex is ts  so le ly  between the subject and the power centre.
The c i t iz e n  cannot allow himself to open his mind to the opinions 
and apprehensions o f others, since they may run counter to Party doc­
t r in e .  Thus re la t ions  between ind iv idua l c it izen s  are characterised 
only by emotions o f suspicion, fear and hatred.
While in Nineteen Eighty-Four, the concept o f objective t ru th  
is  destroyed, in Zamyatin's imaginary One State, i t  is  man's subjective 
appreciation of r e a l i t y ,  his ind iv idua l capacity fo r  in te rp re ta t io n , 
which has been sac r if ice d . Men are regarded as being homogeneous beings, 
whose actions are t o t a l l y  predictable. Immutable facts e x is t ,  as they 
do not in Orwell's Oceania, but the capacity of the ind iv idua l c i t iz e n  
to respond to those facts  in his own way is  destroyed. In the One 
State, the whole o f l i f e  has been assessed, quan t if ied  and incorpora­
ted in to  one s ta t ic ,  a l l - in c lu s iv e  model. Everything knowable is  
known. Every human question has been provided w ith  a precise, incon­
t ro v e r t ib le  answer. 'T ru th ' has been irrevocab ly established. The 
One State takes no cognisance o f the imponderable and the immensurable.
While the ru le rs  o f Oceania sustain th e i r  v is ion  o f r e a l i t y  
through the exercise of physical oppression, in Zamyatin's One State, 
such p r im it ive  and haphazard c ru e lty  has no place. Acts o f oppression 
are not g ra tu itous ly  performed, as they are in Orwell's Oceania. Punish­
ment is  meted out to those who d is tu rb  the perfection o f the One State 's  
arrangements by th ink ing and acting as unique beings.
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In the One State, the ra t io n a l i t y  o f machines has replaced the 
ra t io n a l i t y  of men. The human capacity to speculate, to question, to 
doubt and to choose, has been suppressed, Most of the c it izen s  are 
content. They are no longer called upon to adjust to unpredictable 
occurrences in th e i r  l iv e s ,  nor do they have to su ffe r the anguish of 
desires and indecision. They have no need o f thought. With machine­
l ik e  precision they perform th e i r  a l lo t te d  functions, guided by mindless 
hab it,  ra ther than by human in te l l ig e n ce ,
Human a d ap tab il i ty  and c re a t iv i ty  have been extinguished in the 
One State. The c it izens  are so conditioned tha t they have no awareness 
o f th e i r  own existence as d iscre te beings, able to exercise independent 
v o l i t io n  to achieve ind iv idua l aims. The actions they perform in th e i r  
d a i ly  l ives  are without personal s ign if icance. This is  demonstrated 
in an account given by D-503, Zamyatin's central character. He reca lls  
tha t in the period sho rtly  a f te r  the founding o f the One State, an 
experiment was carried out, in  which three labourers were released 
from th e i r  work in the factory fo r  one month, to see how they would 
choose to occupy themselves. D-503 describes how the three labourers, 
the 'manumitted ones', removed from th e i r  usual surroundings and 
deprived o f th e ir  habitual occupations, 'kept lo i te r in g  around th e i r  
customary place of work and peeping w ith in  with hungry eyes; they would 
stop in the public squares and fo r  hours on end go through the motions 
which, at set times during the day, became an actual physical need: 
they sawed and planed the a i r ,  or clanged and pounded with in v is ib le  
sledges upon in v is ib le  i n g o t s ' . T h u s ,  although the One State is
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said, by i t s  ru le rs ,  to  be founded upon perfect ra tiona l i s m , the manu­
mitted workers are no longer capable o f independent reasoning. They 
perform movements which are ra tiona l in one given set o f circumstances 
only. Within th e i r  usual environment, the three men are e f f ic ie n t ly  
function ing parts of a ra tiona l whole, but withdrawn from tha t environ­
ment, they are incapable o f adapting th e i r  actions to s u i t  th e i r  new 
surroundings.
The dogma of Zamyatin's mechanically perfect state invests c o l­
le c t ive  abstractions with r e a l i t y ,  while physical human e n t i t ie s  are 
regarded as real only in re la t io n  to the c o l le c t iv i t y  which subsumes 
them. M ora lity  is  shaped by a mathematical system of e th ics , under 
which the c i t iz e n ,  or 'number', is  reduced to the level o f a term in 
an equation. 'P i ty  based upon arithm etica l i l l i t e r a c y  was something 
tha t was known only to the anc ien ts ',  D-503 writes in his d ia ry . 'We 
f in d  i t  m irth -provok ing '. He describes how ten fac to ry  workers have 
ju s t  been k i l le d  while the rocket motor of the ' In te g ra l '  was being 
tested. 'A t the f i r s t  t r y  (= b las t) something l ik e  h a lf  a score of 
the numbers working on our s i te  hadn't been fas t enough in getting 
out from under the exhaust - and absolutely nothing was l e f t  of them 
except a few t in y  nondescript fragments and a l i t t l e  soot. With pride 
I record here tha t the rhythm of our work was not broken even fo r  a 
second by th is ,  not a man was s ta r t le d ,  and we and our lathes went 
on with our re c t i l in e a r  or c i rc u la r  motions w ith the same precision 
as i f  nothing had happened. Ten numbers represented hardly 
1/100,000,000th o f our One State; fo r  the purposes o f p rac tica l
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ca lcu la tion  th is  is an in f in ite s im a l of the th i rd  o rd e r ',  Under 
the eth ica l system of the s ta te , the c it izen  is w ithout s ign if icance , 
and without r ig h ts , D-503 remarks that the sole r ig h t  o f the c it iz e n  
is  to receive punishment, -No number among us should renounce, or 
should dare to renounce th is  sole -  and hence the most precious - 
r ig h t  of h is ' ,  he w rites . 'Even among the ancients, the more mature 
ones knew that the source o f r ig h t  was force, tha t r ig h t  was a func­
t ion  o f force. Well, here is  a pa ir of scales. On one is  a gramme, 
on the other a ton; I on one. We, The One State, on the other. Is 
i t  not c lea r, then, tha t the assumption that the I can have some r igh ts  
or other in re la tionsh ip  to the State, and the assumption tha t a gramme 
can counterbalance a ton - why these two assumptions absolute ly amount 
to one and the same th ing. Hence the a l loca tion : the r ig h ts  to the
ton, the duties to the gramme, while the natural course from n u l l i t y
to grandeur is  to fo rget tha t you are a gramme and to feel tha t you are
20a m il l io n th  part o f a to n '.
D-503, himself a mathematician, is at ease only in the world of
mathematical symbols and formulae. Solids must be redefined fo r  him in
abstract terms before they can arouse his perception. Accordingly, he
perceives his fe llow  c it izens  not as so lid  people, but as symbols.
0-90, the woman with whom he is  registered by the state fo r  sexual
re la t io n s , presents no problems fo r  him, She is  'made up e n t i re ly  o f
21circumferences', and her mouth, too, is round l ik e  an 'O '. To D-503 
she is  nothing, a nought, never actua lly  perceived by him. I t  is  also 
possible tha t the image o f the c irc le  which is  associated with 0-90 
in the mind o f D-503, is  to be seen as the symbol o f perfect re g u la r i ty .
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the image o f perfection, in the sense understood by id e a l is t ic  p h i lo ­
sophers such as Plato, C erta in ly , fo r  D-503, 0-90 is  w ithout ambigui­
t ie s  or imperfections, u t te r ly  simple, and therefore demanding no 
e f f o r t  o f understanding on his behalf, D-503 f a i l s  to recognize 0-90's 
innate unorthodoxy, ju s t  as he f a i l s  to recognize the Guardian, S-4711,
as a subversive, and a fe llow  conspirator o f E-330's. S-4711 is
22■formed in a double curve, on the nature o f the le t t e r  S '. For
reasons which he is  unable to  comprehend, D-503 finds the presence o f
S-4711 obscurely disconcerting. He senses tha t there are certa in
ambiguities surrounding the f igu re  o f S, S u p e r f ic ia l ly ,  the facts
are c lea r: S-4711 is  a Guardian, constantly concerned to keep D-503
from d r i f t in g  in to  subversive action, D-503 is  aware tha t wherever
he goes, S is  always watching his movements, and he w rites ' I t  is
g ra t i fy in g  to feel somebody's v ig i la n t  eye upon one, lo v in g ly  guard-
23ing one from the least mistake, from the least e rr ing  s tep '.  Yet 
in p rac tice , although S is always present when D-503 commits an in d is ­
c re t ion , S uses his o f f i c ia l  power not to have D-503 arrested, and
removed from socie ty, but to protect him from suspicion. D-503 won-
24ders whether S has 'some secret purpose' in sparing him. There are
fu r th e r inconsistencies which trouble D-503: S is  a constant, and
obviously in tim ate , companion o f E 's, and D-503 is  obscurely aware
of 'some sort of thread between them'. This perplexes him. He
w r ite s ,  ' I am constantly aware of th is  thread - I s t i l l  don 't know
25i t s  nature, but some time or other I shall unravel i t ' ,  D-503
suddenly becomes convinced, fo r  reasons which he cannot define, tha t 
S is  registered in E-330's name fo r  sexual r e l a t i o n s . 26 y^is in
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i t s e l f  is  d is turb ing and unexpected, but the l in k  between S and E is
something more s ig n if ic a n t  than a purely sexual l in k ,  he senses, D-503
does not re a l ly  want to have his suspicions c ry s ta l l is e d  fo r  him:
when E-330 takes him on an i l l i c i t  journey beyond the Green Wall, in
company with other d iss idents , he catches a momentary glimpse o f S-4711
moving among the crowd. This image is  so incongruous to him, tha t he
27la te r  dismisses i t  from his mind e n t i re ly .
The shape of S-4711 is i t s e l f  s ig n if ic a n t  f o r  D-503. For him,
the curve is  geometrically unsatis fac tory , suggesting imprecision,
and S is  formed l ik e  a double curve. ’ The l in e  o f  the One State is
the s tra ig h t l in e .  The great, d iv ine , exact wise s tra ig h t  l in e  -
28the wisest of l in e s ' ’ , D-503 observes. I t  is  possible tha t Zamyatin 
intended tha t the curve of S-4711's shoulders should suggest the shape 
of a question mark. Thus S-4711 would stand as a symbol o f doubt and 
uncerta inty fo r  D-503. In his s a t i r ic a l  essay. Paradise, Zamyatin 
wrote, 'Doesn't the very curve o f the question mark - ? - suggest the 
Great Serpent, tempting the blessed inhabitants o f the ancient paradise 
with doubts?'
But i t  is the appearance of E-330 which most profoundly d isturbs 
D-503's equanimity. She at once fascinates and repels him. Describ­
ing her face, D-503 w r ites , ’ I perceived a strange combination: dark
eyebrows, quirked high at the temples; an acute t r ia n g le  of mockery; 
and two deep, small wrinkles from the nose to the corners o f the mouth: 
another t r ia n g le ,  coming to an apex. And these two tr iang les  somehow 
contradicted each other, placing upon the en tire  face tha t disagreeable, 
i r r i t a t i n g  cruciform X; i t  was a crossed-out face ’ . 30 e- 330 is  an 
enigma, defying neat, mathematical so lu tion . She is  X, the unknown 
quantity .
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D-503 needs to believe tha t he perceives the whole o f r e a l i t y ,
including the thoughts o ^ o th e rs .  ‘We constantly l iv e  in  f u l l  s igh t
o f a l l ,  constantly bathed in l ig h t  and surrounded by our glass walls
tha t seem woven o f corruscating a i r .  We have nothing to conceal
31from one a n o t h e r h e  w rites . Yet th is  to ta l transparency reveals
nothing to D-503. He is  incapable o f perceiving others as separate
e n t i t ie s .  Rising in the morning in his glass cub ic le , he seems to
see nothing but repeated re f le c t io n s  o f  h imself, s tre tch ing o f f  in to
i n f i n i t y  in every d ire c t io n ,  as a l l  the members o f the state r ise  at
32the same in s ta n t,  and dress in  unison in iden tica l c lothes.
Zamyatin uses the image o f transparency, and o f  glass, to express 
a paradox. Whereas o rd in a r i ly  i t  might be taken to symbolise reve la t ion , 
w ith in  Zamyatin’ s framework, i t  symbolises the i l lu s o ry .  I t  is  only 
when fog descends upon the c i t y ,  d isso lv ing the transparency o f the 
glass walls in i t s  opaqueness, tha t D-503 becomes aware o f the pres­
ence o f separate, so l id  forms, moving about w ith in  the bu ild ings . In 
his d iary  he notes, 'There were no longer any bu ild ings : the glass
walls had deliquesced in fog, l ik e  small s a l t  c rys ta ls  in water. I f  
one looked up from the pavement, the dark figures of those inside the 
bu ild ings appeared l ik e  pa rt ic les  suspended in some phantasmagorical
m ilky so lu t ion ; some were dangling low, but one saw them on higher
33and higher f lo o rs  up to the te n th ' ,
D-503 desires to  penetrate in to  the minds o f others, so tha t 
there shall be no mysteries fo r  him, He laments the fa c t  tha t 'human 
heads are opaque, and the only windows in to  the in te r io r  - the eyes - 
are t i n y ‘ ,34 he looks in to  the eyes o f  0-90, i t  seems to him
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tha t they present no problem. They are 'blue c r y s ta l ’ , and resemble
open windows. Within them he is  reassured to f in d  no complexities,
35'nothing extraneous, unnecessary'. But the emptiness he encounters
when he penetrates her eyes is  delusory, i t  is  no more than a re f le c ­
t io n  of his own in s u b s ta n t ia l i ty  and emptiness. 0-90's mind is  closed 
to him. By contrast w ith 0-90's eyes, the eyes o f E-330 trouble  him. 
They are dark and mysterious, and w ith in  them he seems to see some­
where a f i r e  raging. Her eyelids seem to him l ik e  b linds , which she
36lowers over her secret thoughts. E-330 is  not transparent, and her
eyes reveal to him only the r e a l i t y  o f a mind which is  incomprehensible 
to him. He is seized w ith an ir ra t io n a l  fea r, when, catching s ig h t  
o f his own re f le c t io n  in E-330's eyes, he has a sudden impression 
that he is himself imprisoned w ith in  them.
D-503 is  himself l ik e  glass, in e r t ,  unable to transmit or 
re ta in  images. He is  w ithout the capacity fo r  perception. But w ith 
the growth o f his imagination, under the influence o f E-330, he begins 
to acquire s e n s i t iv i t y  to h is surroundings. Bewildered at the changes 
he senses in h im self, he v is i t s  a doctor, who draws an analogy between 
the mind o f D-503 and a m irro r.  A m irror re f le c ts  passing images, but 
re ta ins nothing, he expla ins, 'But ju s t  imagine tha t through the a p p l i ­
cation o f some sort o f f i r e  th is  impenetrable surface has suddenly 
softened, and nothing any longer g lides over i t  -  everything penetrates 
i t ,  in to  tha t m irror world we eyed w ith such c u r io s i ty  when we were
children ........  tha t which is  w ith in  the m irro r is  w ith in  you ........  a
cold m irro r re f le c ts ,  re je c ts ,  whereas my suppositious m irro r absorbs,
and re ta ins a trace through a l l  time o f a l l  things tha t have affected 
37i t ' .  The f i r e  which has softened D-503's m irro r is  the f i r e  which he 
has seen burning w ith in  the eyes o f E-330.
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The image o f the m irro r ,  and the world beyond i t ,  occurs e lse­
where in A secret path, to  the p r im it ive  world beyond the Green
Wall is  approached through the mirrored door o f a clothes c loset in 
the House of A n t iq u i t ie s ,  an ancient house, which has been preserved 
as a museum. As in the case o f D-503-s -m irror^, beneath the smooth
surface o f the glass m irro r on the c loset door, l ie s  another r e a l i t y ,
38hidden from view,
D-503 comes to suspect tha t beneath the surface o f his fa m i l ia r ,  
abstract world o f mathematical laws and neat formulae l ie s  another, 
perverse, unquantifiab le world, which is  perhaps more real and so lid  
than his own. From childhood onwards, he has been tormented by the 
concept o f i r ra t io n a l  numbers, and o f i n f i n i t y .  He needs the reassur­
ance o f simple calculable fa c t .  As his imagination develops, he 
finds himself beset by the incomprehensible. 'For every equation, 
every formula in the su p e rf ic ia l world, there is  a corresponding 
curve or so l id .  For i r ra t io n a l  formulae, fo r  my we know o f no
corresponding so lid s ; we have never seen them. But tha t is  precise ly 
where the horror l ie s ;  these so lid s , though unseen, do e x is t ,  in e v i­
ta b ly ,  ine luc tab ly , because in  mathematics, as i f  on a screen, th e i r  
whimsical, p r ic k ly  shadows - i r ra t io n a l  formulae - pass before us; 
and mathematics and death are never in  e rro r .  And i f  we do not see 
these solids in our universe, on the surface, there does ex is t - there
must inescapably e x is t  - on e n t ire  immense universe o f th e i r  own there,
39below the s u r f a c e D - 5 0 3  becomes obsessed by the conviction tha t 
the cool, harmonious transparency o f his glass world masks a world o f 
movement, emotion and nature, which contains a l l  tha t is  'r io to u s .
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40blood-red, shaggy', And he also suspects th a t the veneer o f c ry s ta l­
l in e  perfection which passes fo r  r e a l i t y  in the One State is  f r a i l ,  
and may be burst apart at any moment. 'Everything is  greenish- 
g la ssy ',  he records in his d ia ry , 'but th is  is  some sort o f d i f fe re n t ,
f ra g i le  glass; not our s o r t ,  not the real glass -  th is  is  a th in  glass
41s h e l l ,  and under tha t shell everything is  s w ir l in g ,  rushing, humming'.
Zamyatin's image o f the glass c i t y ,  symbolising the u ltimate
e x tinc t ion  o f privacy, is  foreshadowed in Dostoievsky's Notes From
Underground. The narra tor o f Dostoievsky's book envisages 'a Palace
o f C rys ta l, e te rn a l ly  in v io la b le ' ,  which w i l l  come in to  being as an
embodiment o f the pe rfe c t ly  ra tiona l state which is  to come. But,
he confesses, 'Perhaps I fear th is  e d if ice  ju s t  because i t  is  crysta l
and e te rn a lly  in v io la b le ,  and i t  w i l l  not be possible even to put out
42one's tongue at i t  in sec re t '.  For the utopian, perfect trans­
parency o ffe rs  the promise o f perfect communication, perfect under­
standing, perfect unanimity and perfect t ru th .  But fo r  Dostoievsky, 
as fo r  Zamyatin, the cost o f transparency is  loss of s e l f .  I t  is  
enslavement.
As Starobinski has pointed out, the concept o f transparency 
is  especia lly  s ig n if ic a n t  in  the work o f Rousseau. In Rousseau's 
R&veries, as in  La Nouvelle Heloise, the same ideal can be perceived, 
the ideal o f la be lle  âme, self-knowing, a ll-knowing, perfect in  i t s  
1impidi ty .
Of La Nouvelle Heloise, Starobinski w r i te s ,  'Ce grand roman 
de la transformation des coeurs poursu it, à travers sa dimension 
c r i t iq u e ,  un but utopique de transformation du monde'. (This great
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novel o f the transformation o f hearts, pursues, through i t s  c r i t i c a l
dimension, a utopian goal o f the transformation o f the world). In
th is  book, Rousseau-s f ic t io n a l  characters have established at Clarens
•une sorte de république p r iv i lé g ié e ,  supérieure par ces in s t i tu t io n s
au monde qui la précédait e t qui l ’ encercle. Cette république n 'e s t
que l'expansion "p o l i t iq u e "  des belles âmes qui ont résolu de mettre
leurs destins en commun’ . ( a  kind of p r iv i leged  repub lic , superior
by reason o f i t s  in s t i tu t io n s  to the world which preceded i t ,  and to
tha t which encirc les i t .  This republic is  nothing other than the
expansion in to  the p o l i t ic a l  f ie ld  o f the 'noble so u ls ',  who have
resolved to unite th e i r  de s tin ies ) .
Les bel les"âmes o f Clarens are depicted as having achieved an
in te r - re la t io n s h ip  o f perfect transparency and harmony. They pass
th e i r  time in wordless communion, in which the thoughts and emotions
o f each are con tinua lly  and s i le n t ly  accessible to a l l ,  S t . -Preux,
one of the group of intimate fr ie nds , describes in a le t t e r  a morning
he has ju s t  spent 'dans une immobilité d ’ ecstase ........  réunis e t dans
le  s ilence, gdutant à la  fo is  le  p la is i r  d 'ê tre  ensemble e t la douceur
du réceuillem ent. Que de délices de cet é ta t sont connues de peu de
gens! , . . .  Mon Dieu! qu'une main serrée, qu'un regard animé, qu'une
é tre in te  contre la p o it r in e ,  que le  soupir qui la s u i t ,  d isent de
choses, et que le premier mot qu'on prononce est f ro id  après tou t
cela! . . .  I l  est sûr que cet é ta t de contemplation f a i t  un des grands
44charmes des hommes sens ib les ', ( transfixed  with ecstasy
reunited in s ilence, savouring at the same time the pleasure o f being
together and the sweetness o f re co n c i l ia t io n .  How few people know the
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de ligh ts  o f th is  condition- 0 God! How much is  said through the 
clasp o f a hand, an animated look, a close embrace, and by the sigh 
which follows i t !  Certa in ly  th is  state o f contemplation con s t i­
tutes one o f the greatest charms of l i f e  fo r  men o f s e n s i t iv i t y ) .
But In contemplating th is  ideal o f transparency, certa in  ques­
tions need to be answered. Would the d isso lu tion  o f in ter-personal 
b a rr ie rs , and the consequent eradication o f misunderstanding and human 
is o la t io n ,  perhaps not also en ta il the s a c r if ic e  o f  ind iv idua l in te g r i ty?  
Is i t  conceptually possible fo r  a man to be a t the same time p e rfe c t ly  
and permanently receptive to the thoughts o f others, and ye t to re ta in  
the capacity fo r  generating o r ig ina l thoughts? And would not the capa­
c i ty  fo r  ra tiona l de libera tion  cease to e x is t i f  one's embryonic 
thoughts, one's rudimentary impressions and one's unpolished judgments 
were perpetually seeping in to  the minds o f others? Would not th is  
mutual invasion e n ta i l  loss o f l ib e r ty ?  Does not the very p o s s ib i l i t y  
o f in d iv id u a l i ty  l i e  precise ly in opacity, in  privacy? The a n t i -  
utopians consider tha t perfect transparency would lead to a form of 
corporate consciousness, a lack o f personal d i f fe re n t ia t io n ,  and thus 
to a loss o f  the power o f thought i t s e l f .  There would be nothing l e f t  
to communicate.
One o f the harshest c r i t i c s  of the ideal o f transparency, and 
o f la  be lle  ame was Hegel, as Starobinski comments: ’ On connaît la
sev^rite  de Hegel envers la ’’ be lle  ame": l ’ob je t qu’ e l le  c r o i t  devant
e l le ,  c ’ est encore elle-même. Quand e l le  pense le to u t ,  e l le  ne pense 
que sa propre transparence, et finalement son propre vide, son inan ité  
inconsistante: "Comme conscience, e l le  est divisée dans l ’ opposition
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du Soi et de l 'o b je t  qu i, pour e l le s ,  est l'essence, mais cet ob je t 
est précisément le parfaitement transparent, i l  est son Soi, e t sa 
conscience n 'es t que le savoir de so i, Toute vie et toute e s s e n t ia l i t y  
s p i r i t u e l le  sont revenues dans ce Soi", La be lle  ame cree un monde pur, 
qui est sa parole et son écho q u 'e l le  perçoit immédiatement. Mais 
"dans cette pureté transparente" , e l le  va "s 'évanouir dans une vapeur 
sans forme qui se dissout dans l ' a i r " .  E lle  perd toute r é a l i t é  e t ,  
s'épuisant en elle-même, e l le  se v o la t i l is e  dans l'extrême abstrac­
t io n ,  Pour Hegel, qui vise sans doute Novalis, mais aussi le  Rousseau 
des Rêveries à travers Novalis, la transparence est une perte de 
so i,  une s té r i le  réassertion de l ' i d e n t i t é  Moi = M o i'.^^  (The harsh­
ness o f Hegel towards the concept o f " la be lle  ame" is well known: 
the ob ject which i t  believes to be before i t  is  forever i t s e l f .  When 
i t  th inks o f everything, i t  is  re a l ly  only th ink ing  o f i t s  own 
transparency, and f i n a l l y ,  o f i t s  own emptiness, i t s  inconsistent 
foolishness: "As with consciousness, i t  is  divided in to  opposition
between the Self and the object which is ,  fo r  i t ,  the essence, but th is  
object is  prec ise ly  transparent pe rfec t ion , i t  is  i t s  S e lf,  and i t s  
consciousness is  only knowledge o f i t s e l f .  The whole o f l i f e  and s p i r ­
i tu a l  being have returned in to  th is  S e lf" .  La be lle  ame creates a 
pure world, which is  i t s  word and i t s  echo which i t  immediately perceives 
But in th is  " transparent p u r i ty ,  i t  w i l l  "vanish in a formless vapour 
which dissolves i t s e l f  in to  the a i r " .  I t  loses a l l  r e a l i t y ,  and d is ­
s ipa ting  i t s e l f  w ith in  i t s e l f ,  i t  evaporates in to  extreme abstraction.
For Hegel, who no doubt has in mind Novalis, but also the Rousseau of 
the Reveries, through Novalis, transparency is a loss o f s e l f ,  a
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s te r i le  reassertion of the id e n t i t y  " I  am I " ) ,  For Hegel, the concept 
o f the transparent, noble soul is  fraudulent. I t  is  log ica l nonsense.
As Starobinski remarks, Rousseau compared his heart to a
c ry s ta l .  'Une f l u id i t é  qui ne s'écoule pas, e t qu i,  par conséquent,
s 'e s t s tab il isée  hors du t e m p s ( a  l iq u id  substance which does not 
flow , and which consequently has s tab il ise d  i t s e l f  outside tim e).
In the same way, in the c ry s ta l l is a t io n  of D-503's heart removes 
him from time and death (and thus from r e a l i t y ) .  When he is  in the 
company o f E-330, D-503 fee ls his heart melting and flowing once more:
' I was a c ry s ta l ,  and I was d isso lv ing in  her, in E-. I f e l t  w ith 
perfect c la r i t y  how the polished facets defin ing me in space were d is ­
solving ___ in her; I was becoming smaller and smaller - and a t the
same time expanding, increasing more and more, becoming more and more 
unencompassable' ,  he w rites . Time and movement (and the ce r ta in ty  o f
death) have thus been reintroduced in to  D-503's l i f e  by
Starobinski comments that i t  is  no surprise tha t the process o f 
v i t r i f i c a t io n  was o f great in te re s t  to Rousseau. In S ta rob insk i ' s 
view, 'La technique de la v i t r i f i c a t io n  est inseparable d'un rêve  
d'innocence et d 'im m orta lité  subs tan tie l le . Transformer un cadavre 
en verre translucide est une v ic to ire  sur la mort e t sur la décompo­
s i t io n  des corps. C'est déjà un passage à la vie e te rn e lle : "Ce
n 'e s t pas seulement dans le règne minéral que Becher é ta b l i t  sa te r re  
v i t r i f i a b l e ;  i l  en trouve une toute semblable dans les cendres des 
végétaux . . . .  et une troisième bien plus merveilleuse dans les animaux 
I l  assure q u ' i ls  contiennent une te rre  fu s ib le ,  v i t r i f i a b l e ,  et de
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laque lle  on peut fa ire  des vases preferables a la  plus be lle  porcelaine.
Par des procèdes sur lesquels i l  garde un grand mystère i l  en a f a i t
des épreuves qui 1^ont convaincu que 1 * homme est verre et q u ' i l  peut
retourner en verre de même que tous les animaux. Cela lu i  f a i t  fa ire
les plus jo l ie s  re flex ions sur les peines que se donnaient les
anciens pour b rû ler les morts ou les embaumer e t sur la  manière dont
on pourra it conserver les cendres de ses Ancêtres en substituant en
peu d'heures a des cadavres dégoûtants et hideux, des vases propre
48et b r i l la n ts ,  d'un beau verre transparent (The technique
of v i t r i f i c a t io n  is inseparable from a dream of innocence and physi­
cal im m orta lity . To transform a corpse in to  translucent glass is  a 
v ic to ry  over death and over the decomposition o f the body. I t  is  
already a path to eternal l i f e :  " I t  is  not only in the realm o f
mineral substances tha t Becher establishes his v i t r i f i a b l e  substance; 
he detects a s im ila r  substance in the ashes o f vegetation . . . .  and a 
th i r d ,  fa r  more amazing substance in  the animal world. He is  certa in  
tha t they (animals) contain a fu s ib le ,  v i t r i f i a b l e  substance, from which 
one could make vases superior to the f in e s t  porcela in. By processes 
about which he is very secretive he has carried  out tests  which have 
convinced him tha t man is  glass and tha t he could return to glass ju s t  
as a l l  animals cou ld. This leads him to the most charming re f le c t io n s  
about the trouble to which the ancient peoples put themselves, in 
burning the dead and in embalming them, and in the manner in  which one 
would be able to preserve the ashes o f one's ancestors by sub s t itu t in g  
fo r  the disgusting and hideous corpses, in a few hours, clean and 
shining vases, o f a beautifu l transparent glass ........ ).
-  1 1 0 "
With th is  'dream o f innocence and immortal1i t y ’ , which Staro­
binski holds as being associated w ith the desire fo r  transparency, 
there goes another dream, the dream o f omnipotence.
U lt im ate ly , to wish to be transparent is  to wish to be in v is ib le .  
And with th is  wish, as Starobinski comments, goes a concomitant desire 
fo r  super-human power. In his Reveries, Rousseau wrote, 'Si j ’ eusse 
ete in v is ib le  et tou t-pu issant comme Dieu, j 'a u ra is  été b ienfa isant 
comme lu i  Si j 'eusse été possesseur de l ’ anneau de Gygès, i l  
m'eut t i r e  de la dépendance des hommes et les eut mis dans la  mienne'. 
Starobinski adds, ’ Devinir in v is ib le :  c 'e s t  le  po int ou l'extrême
n u l l i t é  de l ’ ê tre se c o n v e r t i ra i t  en un pouvoir sans l im i t e ' .
( ' I f  I had been in v is ib le  and a i l -powerful l ik e  God, I should have 
been beneficent l ik e  him . . . .  I f  I had been the possessor o f the 
r ing o f Gyges, i t  would have drawn me out o f dependence upon men and 
brought them in to  dependence upon me' . . . .  To become in v is ib le :  
tha t is  the point where ultimate n u l l i t y  o f being is  converted in to  
l im i t le s s  power). Here is a c lear expression o f the utopian dream 
of f l i g h t  from the f ru s tra t io n s  and inadequacies o f the natural world, 
and of social re la t ion sh ips , in to  a world where omnipotence, and thus 
in v in c ib i l i t y ,  is  a p o s s ib i l i ty .
In Zamyatin’ s We, D-503 himself transparent, and in d is t in g u is h ­
able from his transparent world, experiences the i l lu s io n  tha t he is  
the divince creator o f his universe, tha t he has transcended physical 
l im ita t io n s  and become a facet o f supernatural power. As he takes 
part in the Daily March o f the One State he gazes around him in 
rapture, fo r  an ins tan t seized with the confidence o f an in v is ib le
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d e ity .  He w rites , U saw the irrevocably s t ra ig h t  s tree ts , the 
ray-spurting glass o f the roadways, the div ine parallelepipedons of 
the transparent dwellings, the square harmony o f our grey-blue ranks. 
And so i t  struck me tha t i t  had not been the generations upon 
generations before me but I - precise ly I - who had conquered the old 
God and the old l i f e :  tha t i t  was precise ly I who had created a l l
th is .  And as i f  I were a tower, I was a fra id  to move my elbow le s t  
I send the w a lls , cupolas, machines tumbling in a cascade o f f ra g ­
ments ' ,
I t  is only when D-503 has acquired consciousness o f himself 
as a corporeal e n t i ty  tha t he can begin to perceive r e a l i t y ,  and his 
re la t io n  to i t ,  and his progress toward humanity is  very slow. The 
loss o f transparency is  very painfu l to him.
Transparency, fo r  Zamyatin, is  to be equated with insubstan­
t i a l i t y .  The c i t izen s  o f the One State, supposedly locked in perfect 
communion w ith one another, are unable to achieve any real intimacy 
because they f a i l  to see one another. As in Orwell's Oceania, in 
the One State, ceaseless physical propinquity and the abandonment of 
privacy are accompanied only by mental is o la t io n .  But whereas in 
Oceania, the c it izen s  are driven apart from one another by fear and 
suspicion, in the One State, they are iso la ted by th e i r  lack o f sub­
stance.
In the One State, as in  Oceania, there is  no love or a f fe c t io n ,  
but ne ither is  there any hatred. Any manifestation o f emotion, whether 
pos it ive  or negative, is regarded as being c le a r ly  symptomatic o f an 
inner sickness, D-503 expresses the orthodox reaction to emotion in
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the fo llow ing words; ' I  f e l t  an unpleasant (s ic k ly )  con traction, 
linked w ith a fee ling  o f p i ty  w ith in  my heart (the heart is  nothing 
but an ideal pump: to speak o f compression, con tract ion , in  con­
nection w ith a pump’ s suction o f a l iq u id  is  a technical absurd ity ; 
hence i t  is  c lear to what an extent a l l  these loves, p i t i e s , e tc , ,
e tc . ,  which bring about such a contraction, are e sse n tia l ly  absurd,
52unnatural, s ic k ly ) ’ . The r a t io n a l i t y  o f the One State proclaims man 
to be no more than a component in a vast, perfect machine. Human 
b io log ica l needs are recognized and s a t is f ie d ,  under state supervision, 
in order tha t men may function e f f ic ie n t l y ;  but under the s ta te 's  
d e f in i t io n  o f  the nature o f man, the concept o f human emotional need 
is  incongruous. The ideal is  fo r  man to th ink 'p h i lo so p h ica l ly -  
mathematically’ .
Thus power in  the One State is  exercised through the suppres­
sion o f  human em otionality . The state has imposed a v is ion  o f r e a l i t y  
under which emotion does not e x is t .  Orwell, who read and admired 
Zamyatin's seems not to have f u l l y  understood th is .  Orwell was 
impressed by Zamyatin’ s ' i n t u i t i v e  grasp o f the i r ra t io n a l  side o f
to ta l i ta r ia n is m  - human s a c r i f ic e ,  c ru e lty  as an end in i t s e l f ,  the
54worship o f a leader who is  credited w ith d iv ine a t t r ib u te s ’ . Here 
perhaps Orwell assumes too close a congruence between Zamyatin’ s 
analysis o f the nature o f  control in the utopian state and his own.
The r i tu a l  which ex is ts  in Zamyatin’ s to ta l state is  essen tia lly  
mechanical; i t  is  not intended to arouse group hyste ria , as i t  is  in 
O rwe ll’ s Oceania. Nor is the c ru e lty  displayed in the One State 
random and i r ra t io n a l .
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In Orwell's Oceania, matters stand very d i f fe re n t ly .  Reality 
is  d is to rted  through the suppression of man's ra tiona l fa c u l t ie s ,  
and thus the emotional side o f human nature is  thrown in to  prominence. 
But the unpredictable force o f human emotion would present problems 
fo r  the ru le r  o f the to ta l  s ta te , i f  i t  were not contained and d ire c ­
ted. In Oceania, emotion expresses i t s e l f  in gnawing anxiety, and 
th is  anxiety is  subsequently nurtured and explo ited fo r  the purposes o f 
the state. There is  no law, and therefore , th e o re t ic a l ly ,  nothing 
is i l le g a l .  Paradoxically, re t r ib u t io n  is  meted out not in response 
to some criminal action already committed, but as a punishment fo r  
some possible future deviation from the o f f i c ia l  orthodoxy. 'A Party
member is  required to have not only the r ig h t  opinions, but the r ig h t  
55in s t in c ts ' .  In th is  way, he w i l l  be able to exercise crimestop, 
a habit of mind which w i l l  prevent his s l ipp ing  in to  facecrime or 
thoughtcrime. The n a tu ra l ly  orthodox person, or goodthinker, 'w i l l  
in a l l  circumstances know, without taking thought, what is  the true 
b e l ie f  or the desirable emotion', but fo r  a l l  c i t iz e n s ,  an elaborate 
programme of 'mental t ra in in g '  in childhood w i l l  make him 'u n w il l in g  
and unable to th ink  too deeply on any subject w h a t e v e r E a c h  
Party member is  required to be 'competent, industrious and even i n t e l ­
l ig e n t  w ith in  narrow l im i t s ,  but i t  is  also necessary tha t he should
be a credulous and ignorant fa n a t ic ,  whose preva il ing  moods are fea r,
57hatred, adulation, and o rg ia s t ic  tr ium ph '. This state of mind 
is  fostered by the harsh puritanism of the s ta te . Love, desire and 
a ffe c t io n  are outlawed, and emotion must be channelled in to  outbursts 
o f rage and vicious hatred, which the state d irec ts  against pre­
determined ta rge ts , or in to  demonstrations o f b lind  adoration o f the
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State. Emotional energies, can also be transformed in to  war hysteria 
and fanatica l nationalism, since the vast superstate o f Oceania is  
con tinua lly  at war with i t s  neighbouring superstates. This warfare 
is  a r t i f i c i a l l y  stimulated so le ly fo r  the purpose of fo r t i f y in g  
domestic con tro l.  In Oceania, the p o te n t ia l ly  subversive power o f 
human emotion has been so harnessed as to become the dominant force 
by which the ru lin g  e l i t e 's  v is ion  o f r e a l i t y  is  sustained.
While a l l  emotion is  perverted in to  fear and hatred in  Oceania, 
and subsequently u t i l is e d  fo r  the purposes o f the s ta te , in Huxley's 
World State, in Brave New World, emotional energy is  transformed in to  
mindless sensuality , and then d issipated. The c it ize n s  o f  the World 
State have been tamed by pleasure, and fo r the most part they r e l i n ­
quish th e i r  human capacity fo r  judgment, fo r  emotional attachment, 
fo r  endurance and fo r  anguish without regre t. As fa r  as possible, 
the state contrives to convert complex, and p o te n t ia l ly  subversive, 
creative  and emotional drives in to  simple, und iffe ren tia ted  sexual 
d r ives , which can be stimulated and sa t is f ie d  as necessary. Sexu­
a l i t y  remains purely at the in fa n t i le  level o f s e l f - g r a t i f i c a t io n ,  
and is  devoid o f emotional content. There is  no interpersonal commit­
ment, and, as in Oceania and the One State, the c it izen s  are rendered 
incapable o f intimate communication w ith one another, despite the 
enforced commonality o f th e i r  l ive s .
The inhabitants o f the World State are gene tica lly  bred and 
psychologically conditioned to perform certa in  f ixed  functions in 
the l i f e  o f the s ta te , and they accept the contorted v is ion  o f th e i r
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nature, needs and capacities decreed by official dogma without 
question. The state provides them with a euphoria-inducing drug, 
soma, with which are they taught to anaesthetise their sensibilities in 
times of unavoidable stress and tension. The managers and conditioners 
who control the World State ensure that individual perception of reality 
can be dulled whenever the cause of harmony and stability so dictates.
The citizens of the World State escape the risks normally 
inherent in life. They experience no anguish, no indecision, no pain 
and no fear. They also experience no love and no inspiration. The 
World State is a land of lotus-eaters. 'Reality, however, is some­
thing from which people feel the need of taking pretty frequent 
holidays', Huxley remarks drily in his introduction to Brave New World. 
Yet in Huxley himself there seems to have been a similar desire to 
escape reality, at first suppressed, but later readily apparent.
In Brave New World, soma stands condemned as a poison of the
mind. In one of the key scenes of the book, the outsider, John Savage,
affirms his allegiance to the cause of freedom and humanity by destroy­
ing a quantity of the drug. 'I'll teach you; I'll make you be free
whether you want to or not', he exclaims to the uncomprehending popu- 
58
lace. Yet Huxley's attitude to drug-taking is equivocal. A year
before writing his anti-utopia, Huxley wrote, in his essay. Wanted a
New Pleasure, 'If I were a millionaire, I should endow a band of 
research workers to look for the ideal intoxicant. If we could sniff 
or swallow something that would, for five or six hours each day, 
abolish our solitude as individuals, atone us with our fellows in a 
glowing exaltation of affection, and make life in all its aspects seem 
not only worth living, but divinely beautiful and significant, and if 
this heavenly, world-transforming drug were of such a kind that we
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could wake up next morning with a c lea r head and an undamaged co n s t i­
tu t io n  -  then i t  seems to me a l l  our problems , , ,  would be wholly
59solved and earth would be paradise*. I t  is  hard to d is t ingu ish  
th is  imaginary drug from the soma of Brave New World, or the 
Moksha-medicine o f Is land , Huxley wrote his u top ia . Is land , between 
1956 and 1960, during a time when he was himself experimenting w ith 
the use o f mescal in and L.S.D. Huxley claimed th a t with the use of 
such drugs he could experience 'a transcendence o f the ordinary subject- 
ob ject re la t ion sh ip . A transcendence o f the fear o f death. A sense 
o f s o l id a r i ty  w ith the world and i t s  s p ir i tu a l  p r i n c i p l e ' T h e  inhab­
i ta n ts  o f Pala achieve a s im ila r  sensation. They feel themselves to 
be' b l i s s fu l l y  one w ith  oneness' in th e i r  moksha-tak ing ceremonies
The words Huxley wrote in 1931, in the passage from Wanted a 
New Pleasure quoted above, are very revealing. Throughout his l i f e ,  
w ith increasing in te n s i ty ,  Huxley craved the p o s s ib i l i t y  of a re trea t 
from immediate experience. His desire is  not to 'make l i f e  worth 
l i v in g '  - th is  would require some programme of action - but to 'make 
l i f e  seem worth l i v i n g ' .  He longs to escape lone liness, the d i f f i ­
c u l t ie s  o f personal re la tionsh ips  and dread o f death. This longing 
seems to be a s ig n if ic a n t  element in utopianism, and th is  is  a theme 
to  which I shall return la te r  in th is  thes is .
Island is  a utopia dedicated to  the pursu it o f man's Final End. 
I t  is  a utopia b u i l t  as a remedy against human is o la t io n  and lo n e l i ­
ness. There is  a bizarre and improbable correspondence between 
Huxley's Island and Kurt Vonnegut's S laps tick . The iro n ic  utopia 
which c ry s ta l l iz e s  at the end of Vonnegut's bleak and n i h i l i s t i c
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comedy is  founded upon the slogan, ''Lonesome No More', As in Is land , 
in Slapstick drugs are used to ease man’ s sense o f iso la t io n  and recon­
c i le  him to his neighbours. As in Is land , personal attachments are 
dissolved in generalised goodwill and ch a r i ty ,  and la s t ly ,  the Mutual 
Adoption Clubs o f Huxley’ s Island f in d  th e i r  d is to rted  re f le c t io n  in 
Vonnegut’ s a r t i f i c i a l l y  extended fam ilies  in  S laps t ick . Such con- 
g ru ity  is  surpris ing : in s ty le  and content. S lapstick and Island have
nothing in common. Yet each is  esse n tia l ly  a response to a Romantic 
sense of is o la t io n  in a secular age.
What is  remarkable in Huxley’ s la te r  work is  the importance 
he attaches to Eastern mysticism. In 1926, in Jesting P i la te , he had 
cast scorn upon the 'pure-souled Oriental mystics who, we are to ld ,  
are to leaven the materialism o f our Western c i v i l i s a t i o n ' .  At 
th is  stage, Huxley considered tha t transcendentalism had been cyn i­
c a l ly  introduced by the ru le rs  o f India to keep the poverty-str icken 
masses in a compliant s ta te . In 1928, in Do What You W i l l , Huxley 
re jected transcendentalism and mysticism as being merely an attempt 
to escape from re a l i t y .  He considered tha t a l l  e f fo r ts  to devise 
a un if ied  and consistent world view were meaningless; absolute one­
ness was no more than absolute nothingness. However, in 1937, in 
Ends and Means, he had revised th is  view so fa r  as to w r ite  tha t 'the 
mystical experience te s t i f ie s  to the existence o f s p i r i tu a l  un ity  
underlying the d iv e rs i ty  o f separate ex is tence '. As P h i l ip  Thody
points out, the d iffe rence between the views expressed in Ends and
64Means and Do What You W ill could hardly be greater,
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Huxley’ s acceptance o f mysticism in la te r  l i f e  does not seem 
to have reconciled him to the human condition. In Is land , his pessi­
mism is as profound as ever. Although Pala is  depicted as being a 
place where men may l iv e  together in happiness and a f fe c t io n ,  one o f 
the inhabitants remarks tha t ’ every good Buddhist knows tha t begetting 
is  merely postponed assassination'. One must do one’ s best to 'get
o f f  the Wheel o f B irth  and Death’ and avoid, by the use o f contracep-
65t iv e  techniques, 'pu tt ing  superfluous v ictims on to the Wheel'.
Death is  s t i l l  the&ernal Horror fo r  Huxley tha t i t  always was.
But in Island Huxley allows himself the comfort, which e a r l ie r  he had 
eschewed, o f believing that mysticism and Moksha-medicine may pro­
vide some escape from the pain of experience.
The dogma o f Pala denies the existence o f the ind iv idua l as a 
unique and permanently separate being, and thus denies the v a l id i t y  
o f ind iv idua l perception. Truth exists not in the physical world, 
but in the mystical world beyond appearance and beyond language.
In Pala, l i f e  is seen as being merely a preparation fo r  death, 
and thus fo r  reunion with the One. The indiv idual perceives r e a l i t y  
only through the 'temporary death of the ego' in mystical experience, 
which may be induced e ith e r through contemplation or through the 
use o f drugs. The philosophy o f the islanders is  set out in a book, 
w r it te n  by the founder o f the community. Dr, McPhail, 'Dualism 
Without i t  there can hardly be good l i te ra tu re .  With i t ,  there most 
c e r ta in ly  can be no good l i f e ,  " I "  a ff irm s a separate and abiding 
me-substance, "am" denies the fac t that a l l  existence is  re la t ion sh ip  
and change. " I  am", Two t in y  words; but what an enormity o f
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u n t r u t h " , C o n s c io u s n e s s  o f s e l f ,  in Huxley's utopia, as in 
Zamyatin's a n t i-u to p ia ,  is  outlawed in the name o f a higher un ity .
In Huxley's two imaginary worlds, the World State and Pala, the 
range o f techniques used to achieve social s t a b i l i t y  is remarkably 
s im ila r ,  In both states, economic hardship has been ex tirpa ted , 
in both, sexua lity  is stimulated, in both society is  eugenically con­
t ro l le d ,  the use o f drugs is  encouraged, and ch ildren are subjected 
to social cond it ion ing. The techniques are applied in very d i f f e ­
rent ways, to achieve d i f fe re n t  ends, and the societies which they 
support have l i t t l e  in common, but in each case the c i t iz e n 's  a b i l i t y  
to order his l i f e  according to his own vis ion o f r e a l i t y  is  impaired. 
The founders o f both socie ties operate from the premise tha t man must 
be provided with some means whereby he can 'take a holiday' from the 
r e a l i t y  o f the physical world.
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Part I I  ( i l )  Utopia and the subjugation o f time
As has been argued in the previous section, fo r  the a n t i -  
utopians, tru th  is  not a f i n i t e  commodity, to be seized and preserved 
in v io la te  from one generation to the next. Truth is  an object o f 
ever- las t ing  quest, and man reveals his humanity in his ceaseless 
struggle to disclose new aspects o f re a l i ty .
In the Areopagitica, M ilton wrote, 'Well knows he who uses to 
consider tha t our fa i th  and knowledge thrives by exercise, as well as 
our limbs and complexion. Truth is  compared in Scripture to a stream­
ing founta in; i f  her waters flow not in a perpetual progression, they 
sicken in to  a muddy pool o f conformity and t r a d i t io n ' . ^  A man who 
possesses the tru th  passively, without thought or de lib e ra t ion , 
simply because he has received i t  a t the hands o f his ru le rs ,  may not 
claim to be a man of t ru th ,  M ilton contends. 'A man may be a heretic  
in the t ru th ;  and i f  he believe things only because his Pastor says 
so, or the Assembly so determines, without knowing other reason, 
though his b e l ie f  be true, yet the very tru th  he holds, becomes his 
heresy'. But in the frozen landscape o f utopia, M ilton 's  'streaming 
founta in ' is  s t i l le d .  Truth is immutable and s ta t ic ,  to be accepted 
w ithout struggle and without contention. There can be no 'perpetual 
progression' o f ideas.
The c it iz e n  o f utopia must be compelled to accept only the 
current dogma. He must ignore the lessons of the past, and he must 
re fra tn  from imagining a possible fu tu re , founded on p r inc ip les  d i f f e ­
rent from those o f his own time. In the world o f c lass ica l mythology, 
the two sons o f the T itan, lapetus, Epimetheus (he who re f le c ts  upon
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past events) and Prometheus (he who foresees fu ture events) are both 
c ru e l ly  punished fo r  th e ir  audacity, The power o f c r i t ic is m ,  and there­
fo re , conceivably, of re b e ll io n , which is  bestowed by the possession o f 
h indsight or fo res igh t, is recognized as posing a th rea t to the established 
order, In the same way, the ru le rs  o f the utopian state perceive a need 
to suppress a l l  knowledge o f the past, or speculation about the fu tu re .
Time is the enemy of utopia, since utopia is  a land o f unchanging 
v is ta s , o f unaltering r i t u a l ,  regulated only by the cyc l ica l time o f 
n igh t and day. Cognizance o f  the l in e a r time o f h is to ry  would be lie  
the supposed perfection o f utopia, d isclosing pre-utopian modes o f ex is ­
tence, betraying the utopia 's  past weaknesses and fa i l in g s ,  and o ffe r ing  
the prospect o f new and undiscovered f ie ld s  o f experience in the fu tu re .
The utopian must seek to suppress the flow o f h is to ry ,  since the only 
true utopian time is 'now'.
At the simplest le v e l,  a c o n f l ic t  e x is ts ,  fo r  the utopian ru le r ,  
between the past and the present, between the vanquished values of former 
times, and the new syntagma o f utopia, fo r  although, in space, there may 
e x is t  no a lte rna t ive  soc ia l,  p o l i t ic a l  and e th ica l systems to r iv a l  
those o f utopia, yet such a lte rna t ive  systems ce r ta in ly  e x is t  in time.
The ru le rs  o f utopia, therefore, seek to e f fe c t  a to ta l severance between 
past and present.
In Aldous Huxley's World State, the ru le rs  have 'mounted a cam­
paign against the past' by suppressing a l l  the a r t ,  l i te r a tu r e ,  and
s c ie n t i f i c ,  re lig ious  and philosophical w r it in g s  o f former times, and by
2
destroying a l l  h is to r ica l monuments and museums. The c it ize n s  are
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taught to regard the in te l le c tu a l conceptions and the cu ltu ra l practices 
and customs of e a r l ie r  c iv i l iz a t io n s  with fea r, amazement and disgust.
The pre-utopian past is  seen as being merely an unpleasant aberration.
The c it izen s  o f the World State have also to learn to re je c t the mate­
r ia l  products of the past, since the health o f the s ta te 's  economy depends 
upon th e i r  providing a ready market fo r  a constant stream of new, d is ­
posable goods. Thus in  Huxley-s imainary s ta te , re je c t ion  o f the past is  
based upon material as well as ideologica l grounds. In th is ,  the World 
State d i f fe rs  from the One State o f Zamyatin, and from the anti-u top ian 
state of Orwell, Oceania.
While in Huxley's World State the past has been system atically 
o b lite ra ted , in Zamyatin's One State, the past is  regarded with amused 
tolerance, tinged with in c re d u li ty .  The inhabitant o f the One State 
is  taught to regard himself as a new being, unrelated to his forbears.
Thus the products of the past, which are preserved in the House of 
A n t iq u ity ,  are regarded as mere objects o f c u r io s i ty ,  the d e tr i tu s  o f 
some remote and alien species. S im ila r ly ,  the ideas, emotions, achieve­
ments and creations of the pre-utopian age insp ire  merely r id ic u le  and 
disdain,
A symbolic confrontation between past and present is  a recurrent 
theme in an ti-u topian w r it in g .  A l iv in g  remnant of pre-utopian times 
intrudes in to  the complacent monotony o f utopian l i f e ,  d is trub ing  i t s  
smooth conformity. In Wells's early  an t i-u to p ia .  The Sleeper Awakes, 
the past is  embodied in the person o f Graham, the Sleeper, who emerges 
from a two-hundred-years' sleep to confront Ostrog, the person if ica tion  
o f the new utopian era. Graham is  a l iv in g  reminder o f past hopes.
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values and asp ira tions. He is  the re liquary  o f half-remembered dreams. 
As such, he becomes the focal point fo r  rebe ll ion  against the new order. 
S im ila r ly ,  in Brave New World, the past becomes incarnate in the figu re  
o f the Savage, who comes to utopia from a small Indian encampment, 
which l ie s  remote from the s ta te , i t s  boundaries sealed by an e le c t r ic  
fence The Savage d isturbs the peace o f the World State by expounding 
fragments o f the doctrines and values o f a buried age, which he himself 
only imperfectly comprehends. His presence in utopia, and his evident 
contempt fo r  the be lie fs  and practices o f the World State, serve to 
provoke a r ip p le  o f re b e ll io n . Through him, the rebel Helmholtz Watson 
is  enabled to recognize and accept the nature and extent o f his own un­
voiced d issa t is fa c t io n .  F in a l ly ,  in the past is  perpetuated in 
the persons of the race o f w ild , pagan people, overgrown with h a ir ,  who 
l iv e  in the woods beyond the glass wall which surrounds the c i t y .  These 
strange descendants of a pre-utopian race serve to remind the rebels 
of the passions which men have fo r fe i te d  in the new, pe rfe c t ly  ra tiona l 
u top ia .
In Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, there are no such survivors 
from a pre-utopian age, although the Proles have been less changed by 
events than has the rest of society. The one remaining symbol o f the 
past is  the small, glass paperweight, enclosing a pink curl o f co ra l,  
which Winston and Ju lia  keep in th e i r  secret room, Winston says o f the 
paperweight, ' I don 't th ink i t  was ever put to any use. That's what I 
l ik e  about i t .  I t ' s  a l i t t l e  chunk of h is to ry  tha t they've forgotten 
to a l te r .  I t ' s  a message from a hundred years ago, i f  one knew how to
read i t ' .3  This 'chunk o f h isot^ry ' is  crushed beneath the boots o f
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the secret po lice , when Winston and Ju lia  are f i n a l l y  arrested in 
th e i r  hideout,
Oceania, un like the to ta l states of Huxley and Zamyatin, is  not 
a s ta t ic ,  perfect s ta te . I t  is  a repressive, t o ta l i t a r ia n  s ta te , 
founded upon te r ro r ,  and ruled by power p o l i t ic s ,  Zamyatin's One State 
and Huxley's World State are not p o l i t ic a l  s ta tes; they are soc ie t ies , 
shaped and con tro lled  according to a fixed dogma, where h is to ry  f a i l s  to 
happen. But in Oceania, the flow o f events continues. Decisions are 
made, ba ttles are fought, and party leaders r ise  and f a l l .  Consequently, 
h is to ry  poses problems fo r  the ru le rs  o f Oceania, which are not enount- 
ered by the ru le rs  o f the One State or the World State.
The ru lers  o f Oceania recognise that i t  is  necessary fo r  them to 
suppress or d is to r t  h is to r ic a l  fac t in order to perpetuate th e i r  own 
power. They have not simply to bury the past, as in Huxley's World State. 
They have also to recreate h is to ry  from day to day. Thus, past events are 
held to have no ob jective existence. O'Brien reminds Winston Smith of 
a Party slogan: 'Who contro ls the past controls the fu tu re : who contro ls
the present contro ls  the p a s t ' .^  The Party contro ls the past by a l t e r ­
ing h is to r ic a l  records according to present requirements, and also by 
tra in in g  i t s  members to fo rget that any such a lte ra t io ns  have been made.
I t  is  the duty of each Party member to adjust his memory to accept the 
current account o f a series of h is to r ica l events as permanent t ru th ,  no 
matter how often i t  may have been rew ritten , Winston reads, in the pro­
scribed book, purportedly by Goldstein, which O'Brien lends him, tha t the 
Party has a need to suppress h is to r ic a l  knowledge, p a r t ly  because h is to ry
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provides standards o f comparison, but also because a factual account 
o f h is to r ic a l  events catalogues the fa i lu re s  o f p o l i t ic a l  leaders as 
in d i f fe re n t ly  as i t  recounts th e ir  triumphs; i t  exposes th e i r  s h i f ts  
in po licy , th e i r  errors in judgment, and th e i r  betrayal o f professed 
Party ideals. H is tory , in Oceania, is  therefore rendered mutable.
•And since the Party is  in f u l l  control o f a l l  records and in equally 
f u l l  control o f the minds o f i t s  members, i t  fo llows tha t though the 
past is  a lte rab le , i t  never has been a lte red in any spec if ic  instance. 
For when i t  has been recreated in whatever shape is  needed at the 
moment, then th is  new version j^s the past, and no d i f fe re n t  past can
5
ever have ex is ted , '
I t  is  not only in Nineteen Eighty-Four tha t Orwell expresses his 
concern fo r  the in te g r i ty  o f h is to r ic a l fa c t .  He believed tha t t ru th  
was inva riab ly  an early  casualty in power p o l i t ic s .  W riting in 1943, 
Orwell declared tha t there was already a 'world movement' in the d ire c ­
t ion  o f the to ta l state. 'Already h is to ry  has in a sense ceased to 
e x is t ,  i .e .  there is no such thing as a h is to ry  o f our own times which 
could be un ive rsa lly  accepted', he wrote. Even in B r i ta in ,  Orwell was 
disturbed to f ind  a tendency to d is to r t  h is to r ic a l  fa c t  fo r  the sake 
o f p o l i t ic a l  expediency. W riting in Tribune in 1944, he noted tha t 
h is to ry  was frequently  fa ls i f ie d  by the simple procedure o f changing 
the order o f occurrence o f a sequence o f events. In th is  way, a wholly 
new impression could be given, favourable to whichever cause one chose. 
'•It doesn't matter so long as we keep our eyes open and see to i t  
tha t the l ie s  do not creep out o f the newspapers and in to  the h is to ry  
books' ,  he wrote.^
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The destruction of h is to ry  fo r  p o l i t ic a l  ends is  a prominent 
theme in Nineteen Eighty-Four, Winston Smith works in the M in is try  o f 
Truth, and is  himself charged w ith the duty o f fa ls i fy in g  h is to r ic a l  
records so tha t they accord with the current Party t ru th ,  Winston des­
pises a l l  the material w ith which he works. The old versions o f h is to ry  
seem to him as unsatis factory and as fa r  removed from tru th  as the new 
ones. Thus he approaches his work with the dispassionate in te l le c tu a l 
pleasure o f the problem-solver. Inconvenient h is to r ic a l  records are 
discarded in the ’memory ho le ’ beside his desk, and fo r  the most part 
Winston gives them no fu r th e r  thought. Laboriously, he invents new 
f ic t io n s ,  which w i l l ,  fo r  a time, replace the old ones. But although 
Winston performs his work e f f ic ie n t ly ,  he is  a natural he re tic . Within 
his mind, there is  no psychic equivalent of the 'memory ho le ’ . He is  
unable to believe the l ie s  which he creates. He is  incapable o f 
doublethink, The disposal o f old records, and the invention o f new ones,
is ,  fo r  him, a mere mechanical ac t, which has no bearing on the r e a l i t y
o f a past sequence of external events.
I t  is  the Party ’ s claim to be able to o b l i te ra te  the past which
most fr igh tens Winston. He realizes that his sanity depends upon his 
being able to re s is t  the idea that the past is  mutable. ' I f  the Party 
could th rus t i t s  hand in to  the past and say o f th is  or tha t event, i t  
never happened' ,  Winston re f le c ts ,  then that would be ’more te r r i f y in g  
than mere to r tu re  and death
Winston is determined to c l in g  on to san ity , and to the idea of 
ob jective r e a l i t y ,  in order to  be able to guard the human heritage fo r
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the sake o f coming generations. But in Oceania, the transmission o f 
ideas and knowledge between generations is  no longer feas ib le , fo r  two 
quite d is t in c t  reasons. F i r s t ly ,  the state has arrogated to i t s e l f  
alone the r ig h t  to in s tru c t  the young, and secondly, there no longer 
ex is ts  any generally accepted body o f knowledge which may be expected 
to remain constant. Time has been sp lin tered in to  dissociated fra g ­
ments, and only the moment ex is ts . Men and events f l i c k e r  in and out 
o f existence, and only the Party endures. The ind iv idua l e n t i ty  may 
leave no mark upon his society, The c i t iz e n  alone is  without substance 
He may hope to a t ta in  salvation only i f  he can ann ih ila te  his personal 
id e n t i ty ,  and so fuse himself with the body o f the state tha t he no 
longer has any separate existence. In th is  way, he may partake of 
the c o l le c t iv e  immorta lity  o f the Party, The in d iv id u a l,  O'Brien t e l l s  
Winston, is  no more than a ce l l  in an everlasting body, the body o f 
the Party, O'Brien admits tha t he himself is  growing weaker, but adds 
tha t th is  is  without s ign if icance , since 'the weariness o f  the ce l l  is  
the vigour o f the organism'.^
Strangely, O 'Brien’ s conception of corporate im m orta lity  has 
s im i la r i t ie s  with O rwell’ s own. Orwell held tha t m ora lity  in the West 
was based upon the Christian b e l ie f  in personal survival a f te r  death, 
and tha t as th is  b e l ie f  was eroded, so m ora lity  was eroded with i t .
He then postulated the idea tha t i t  might be possible fo r  a new, non­
re lig io u s  b e l ie f  in the c o l le c t iv e  immorta lity  o f humanity to f u l f i l  
the same function, ’Man is  not an in d iv id u a l ’ , Orwell wrote. 'He is  
only a ce ll in an everlasting body, and he is  dimly aware of i t .  There 
is  no other way of explaining why i t  is  tha t men die in b a tt le  ___
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they are aware o f some organism greater than themselves, stre tch ing 
in to  the future and the past, w ith in  which they feel themselves to be 
immortal. People sa c r if ice  themselves fo r  the sake of fragmentary 
communities -  nation, race, creed, class - and only become aware tha t 
they are not ind iv idua ls  in the very moment when they are facing bu lle ts  
A very s l ig h t  increase in consciousness, and th e i r  sense o f lo y a lty
9
could be transferred to humanity i t s e l f ,  which is  not an ab s trac t io n . '
Orwell's argument is  unsatis factory  on several counts: f i r s t l y ,
'humanity* is  indeed an abstract ion , i f  i t  is  to be taken to mean 
anything other than a heterogeneous co lle c t io n  o f separate e n t i t ie s .  
Secondly, there are many explanations which might be given as to why i t  
is  tha t men die in b a tt le ,  and none is  susceptible to proof. I t  is  
strange that Orwell should assume tha t v o l i t io n  is  necessarily in v o l­
ved, Th ird ly ,  there is no reason to suppose that the human species 
w i l l  prove any more durable than any other species, past or present, 
Orwell re jec ts  the Christian b e l ie f  in personal im m orta lity  as i l l o g i ­
ca l,  yet b e l ie f  in the c o l le c t iv e  immorta lity  o f humanity is  s im i la r ly  
rooted in fa i th ,  rather than in lo g ic . Moreover, i f  Orwell is  correct 
in his assumption that i t  is  b e l ie f  in im m orta lity  which has under­
pinned m ora lity  in the Western world, then i t  is  prec ise ly  b e l ie f  in 
ind iv idua l immortality which has done so. The price o f ind iv idua l 
salvation is  ind iv idual moral re s p o n s ib i l i ty .  The Chris tian e th ica l 
system is  founded upon recognition o f the ind iv idua l as the u ltimate 
u n i t ,  to  be saved or damned according to personal conduct. A b e l ie f  
in c o l le c t ive  immortality would more read ily  support a b e l ie f  in c o l le c ­
t iv e  moral re sp o n s ib i l i ty .  Such a b e l ie f  would not be acceptable to
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Orwell, Moreover, where man is held to be 'on ly  a c e l l  in an ever­
las t in g  body', i t  is  an easy matter fo r  the state to contend tha t a 
c e l l  should be sacr if iced  fo r  the health o f the organism. Such is  the 
m ora lity  o f Orwell's Oceania.
I t  may be tha t the conception of im m orta lity  which Orwell wishes 
to promote l ie s  less in the sentiment that ind iv idua l men are merely 
expendable fragments o f immortal humanity, than in the b e l ie f  that there 
is  value in the continuous accretion of human knowledge and experience 
over time, and value too in the contract o f ob liga tion  which binds one 
generation to the next. But perhaps th is  is  to cast Orwell's thought 
in too Burkean a mould. There is  no ind ica tion  to suggest tha t Orwell 
was d i re c t ly  influenced by Burke. Perhaps the case is  rather tha t Orwell 
had a presentiment that consciousness of s e l f ,  and a sense o f the r e a l i t y  
o f personal existence, is  re l ia n t  upon the con t inu ity  o f a stream of 
re co l le c t io n ,  and tha t thus, by extension, the re a l i t y  of the existence 
of humanity as a whole can only be demonstrated through the fa i th fu l  
recording of the course o f h is to r ic a l  events. The ind iv idua l s e l f ,  and 
ind iv idua l memories may d ie , but fo r  as long as humanity remembers, i t  
l iv e s .  In Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four, he depicts a world where such 
con t inu ity  is  no longer possible. The coherent l inks  between past, 
present and future have been ruptured, and w ith them has gone the 
a th e is t 's  v is ion o f im morta lity ,
Winston Smith is  to ld  tha t on his death, he w i l l  be expunged 
from memory, 'You must stop imagining that p o s te r ity  w i l l  v ind icate 
you, Winston', O'Brien t e l l s  him, 'P o s te r ity  w i l l  never hear o f you.
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You w i l l  be l i f t e d  clean out from the stream o f h is to ry  Nothing w i l l  
remain o f you; not a name in a re g is te r ,  not a memory in a l iv in g  brain 
You w i l l  be annihilated in  the past as well as in the fu tu re . You w i l l  
never have e x i s t e d ' , I n  Oceania, whoever res is ts  the Party becomes 
an ’ unperson'. On his death, every trace o f his existence is  erased.
I t  is  not simply tha t he is  fo rgo tten ; r e a l i t y  is  so rearranged tha t 
the fac t o f his physical existence at any po in t in space and time is 
o b lite ra ted . With increasing anguish, Winston seeks to reassure him­
s e l f  that he does e x is t ,  and tha t the fac t o f his existence cannot be 
subject to a lte ra t io n  at a la te r  date. But he is  to ld  by O'Brien that 
he is  already non-existent, tha t he is  'outside h is to ry
The a b o l i t io n  o f h is to ry  in Oceania has the e f fe c t  o f destroying 
the p o s s ib i l i t y  of ra tiona l thought The in d iv id u a l 's  apprehension o f 
past, present and fu tu re , his conception o f causa lity , and his a b i l i t y ,  
therefore , to make ra tiona l judgments, have been destroyed. The c it ize n  
must learn to suppress memory, and even to reca ll tha t which has never 
happened, should the state require him to do so. Time no longer orders 
past, present and fu tu re . The denial o f the ob jective re a l i t y  of h is ­
to r ic a l  fa c t ,  and the de libera te  fa ls i f i c a t io n  o f the chronological 
re la tions  between events, has mutilated the human capacity fo r  reason. 
For Orwell, to ta l i t a r ia n  th ink ing is  c lose ly linked w ith  a re jec tion  
o f the re a l i t y  o f the past, and i t  is  c lear from his general w r i t in g s ,
how much he despised those who l iv e  ' in  a continuous present, a minute-
12to-minute cancella tion o f memory'.
Whereas in Oceania the ru lers  perceive a need to control the 
past in order to perpetuate the ru le o f the Party, in the an ti-u top ias
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of Huxley and Zamyatin, the s itua t ion  is  more complex. Here the ru le rs  
aspire to control not merely h is to ry , but time i t s e l f .  This d i f f e ­
rence arises because the One State and the World State are designed as 
perfect states, and perfection must always be at the mercy o f time. 
Oceania is  founded upon no b luepr in t fo r  pe rfec t ion . I t  is  governed 
from day to day, according to the s h i f t in g  d ic ta tes  o f an impoverished 
R e a lp o l i t ik , H is to r ica l events continue to  occur. A l l  tha t is  required 
fo r  the preservation of state power, is  tha t the c it izen s  should be pre­
vented from perceiving and recording them c o rre c t ly ,  Oceania, as an 
imperfect s ta te , s t i l l  ex is ts  w ith in  the f lu x  o f time, and h is to ry  
pe rs is ts , under a patina o f l ie s .  But in the perfect states o f Zamyatin 
and Huxley, i t  is  the category of time i t s e l f  which is  problematical. 
Here the ru lers perceive a need to transcend the temporal a ltogether, 
and stem the flow o f h is to ry .
H istory records a progression o f events in time, but in the per­
fec t state there are no events. The perfect state is s ta t ic ,  whereas
h is to ry  is  necessarily dynamic. In Zamyatin's D-503 declares tha t
13'the ideal ex ists where nothing any longer happens'. H istory ceases
at the inception o f the perfect s ta te , since h is to ry  is  an account o f
change, and where perfection is  held to e x is t ,  a l l  change is  synonymous
with decay and degeneration, 'Every change is  a menace to  s t a b i l i t y ' ,
14as Mustapha Mond, the C on tro lle r o f Huxley's World State, remarks.
In the World State, 'ch a ra c te r is t ics  remain constant through- 
15out a l i f e t im e ' ,  Just as there can be no change or evolution fo r  
socie ty, so there can be no development fo r  the ind iv idua l c i t iz e n .
Old age has been conquered through the app lica tion  o f hormone t r e a t ­
ment, and sc ien t is ts  are seeking to secure means fo r  hastening the
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onset o f puberty fo r  the lower castes of soc ie ty , so tha t they may 
assume th e i r  state-appointed duties at the e a r l ie s t  possible age, 
C itizens are required to re ta in  an in fa n t i le  m enta lity  throughout 
l i f e ,  since i t  is recognized that any c i t iz e n  who developed mature 
c r i t i c a l  fa cu lt ie s  and asp irations could cons titu te  a th rea t to social 
s t a b i l i t y .  S im ila r ly ,  in Zamyatinas One State, the c i t iz e n  does not 
develop or mature once he ceases to be a c h i ld .  He merely becomes 
his a l lo t te d  r8 le in society. He is  unaffected by the passage of time, 
since there are no events in his l i f e ,  no experiences to be undergone, 
and no a lte ra t ions  in his environment which might arouse him from his 
in e r t ia .  For the orthodox c i t iz e n ,  each day is  as featureless as tha t 
which has preceded i t ,  and tha t which w i l l  come a f te r  i t .  D-503, 
looking forward to his routine appointment with his state-approved 
sexual partner, 0-90, is  p la c id ly  confident that the meeting w i l l  pro­
duce no surprises fo r  him: ^Everything w i l l  be simple, regular and
lim ited  - l ik e  a c i r c le
The ru le rs  o f the World State and o f the One State have modified 
the nature not merely o f h is to ry , but o f time. Whereas o rd in a r i ly  
time spans the development, evolution and decay o f  men and in s t i tu t io n s ,  
in the perfect state there are no beginnings, no periods o f maturation 
and change, and no endings. Men no longer re g is te r  epochs, or p lo t 
the course of eras, since there are no longer any d is t in c t  eras and 
epochs to delineate, No point in time is  endowed w ith any p a r t ic u la r  
s ign if icance , Time has become c irc u la r .
In Zamyatin's imaginary s ta te , time, the inexorable corrupter 
o f perfection, has at la s t  been denatured. The measurement o f time
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may serye quite d i f fe re n t  functions. I t  may be used fo r  the chrono­
log ica l ordering of a sequence o f unpredictable events, spanning 
eras, as in the world o f h is to ry , or i t  may be used fo r  the making o f 
precise calcu la tions o f time in te rva ls  between c a re fu l ly  con tro lled  
events, as in the science laboratory, I t  is  the s c ie n t is t 's  concep­
t ion  of time which is  promoted in the One State, since commitment to 
the ideal o f perfection , and therefore o f im m utab il ity , precludes the 
apprehension of time as the medium in which h is to r ic a l  events succeed 
one another in an unregulated sequence. D-503 speaks o f each c i t iz e n  
as having ‘ an inner metronome" which keeps him aware o f the time, 
and orders the rhythm of his d a i ly  l i f e .  But th is  metronome can do 
nothing to inform him o f the broader category o f time, which spans 
h is to ry . Time in the One State is  subject to precise computation. I t  
has been so exactly regulated that each hour of the day, w ith the excep­
tion  o f the Personal Hour, enfolds and circumscribes i t s  own s ta te - 
prescribed a c t iv i t y .  The ru lers  of the One State have drawn up a Table 
o f Hourly Commandments, under which every movement o f the members of the 
state is  regulated and synchronized. L ife  has become a protracted 
time-and-motion study exercise. D-503 w r ite s ,  ' I cannot conceive of 
a c i t y  tha t is  not g i r t  about by a Green Wall, I cannot conceive o f a 
l i f e  tha t is  not enrobed in the figured chasubles o f the Tables of 
Hourly Commandments'.^^ The c it izens  o f the One State are prisoners 
in time and space, immured w ith in  the r ig id  framework o f the Timetables 
as surely as they are w ith in  the Green Wall which surrounds the c i t y .
The substitu t ion  of s c ie n t i f ic  time fo r  h is to r ic a l  time in the
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One State has the e f fe c t  o f severely re s t r ic t in g  the v is ion  o f the 
c i t ize n s . But in Orwell's Oceania, ne ither s c ie n t i f ic  nor h is to r ic a l  
time has any place. Oceania is  a land of chronological chaos, in which 
the minds o f the c it izen s  are reduced to corporate insan ity .
The s ign if icance o f the category of time, in any speculation about 
the nature o f the world, has been recognised by philosophers, sc ie n t is ts  
and theologians a l ike .  As Russell w r ites , in the present century, 
since the publication of E ins te in 's  theories, sc ie n t is ts  have come to 
revise th e ir  view o f time, and also of matter and existence. The modern 
phys ic is t has come to apprehend the re a l i t y  o f events over time as 
surpassing the re a l i t y  o f matter i t s e l f .  Russell concludes, 'Events, 
not p a r t ic le s ,  must be the " s tu f f "  o f physics. What has beenthought o f 
as a p a r t ic le  w i l l  have to be thought o f as a series o f events. The 
series o f events which replaces a p a r t ic le  has ce rta in  important physi­
cal p roperties, and therefore demands our a t te n t io n ; but i t  has no 
more s u b s ta n t ia l i ty  than any other series o f events tha t we might a rb i ­
t r a r i l y  single out. Thus "matter" is  not part o f the u ltimate material 
o f the world, but merely a convenient way o f c o l le c t in g  events in to  
b u n d l e s ' , U n d e r  th is  view, existence is  events in time.
Conceptions o f the nature of time are always in t im a te ly  re lated 
to conceptions o f the nature o f existence, Man's apprehension o f  time 
is  as old as his apprehension o f death. In time is  movement and change, 
and therefore b i r th ,  growth, degeneration and death. But opposed to 
conceptions o f time are conceptions o f e te rn i ty .  Time, in the general 
sense, is  man's conscious experience o f duration, his subjective
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impression of pastness, presentness and f u t u r i t y ,  The mind is  aware 
o f a present sense experience, together with the remembrance o f e a r l ie r  
sense experience, and the an t ic ipa t io n  o f sense experience yet to come. 
Thus the experience o f time is  re lated to the experience o f events. No 
s ign if icance can be attached to the notion o f wholly 'empty' times, 
nor is  i t  possible to imagine d i f fe re n t  points in time fo r  which there 
is  no corre la te  in the world o f  events, nor o f points in  time which 
have no sequential re la t ionsh ip . Total emptiness belongs not in time, 
but in  e te rn ity .
The concept o f e te rn i ty  frees the human mind from the world o f 
ceaseless f lu x ,  and allows i t  to dwell upon the f ixed and motionless, 
the in co rru p t ib le ,  where there is  neither l i fe  nor death. I t  is  in 
the world o f motionless Eternal Being that the One State aspires to 
reside.
P lato, in the Timaeus, contrasts the Eternal, which is  accessible 
to pure knowledge, w ith the Temporal, which is  accessible to the senses 
and to reason. He describes how the Demiurge created the world, estab­
l is h in g  i t  in time, which he also created, and which is c i r c u la r .  Before 
the creation o f the world, Plato w r ites , there were no days, n igh ts , 
months or years. There was simply immobile pe rfec tion , the s ta t ic  
world o f Being, In the world o f Being there is  no past, present or 
fu tu re , fo r  such concepts describe 'the process of change in t im e '.  Our 
corporeal world o f Becoming is  only an imperfect copy o f e te rna l,
perfect r e a l i t y ,  and the time in which i t  ex is ts  is  also an image, which
19*in i t s  measurable cycles im itates e te r n i t y ' ,
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Russell explains the Greek idea tha t time is  connected w ith i l l u ­
s ion, while e te rn i ty  is  re lated to immutable t ru th ,  in the fo llow ing 
way; 'Mathematics is  , , ,  the ch ie f source o f the b e l ie f  in eternal 
and exact t ru th ,  as well as in a super-sensible world. Geometry deals 
w ith exact c i r c le s ,  but no sensible object is  exactly c i r c u la r ;  
however c a re fu l ly  we may use our compasses, there w i l l  be some imper­
fections and i r r e g u la r i t ie s .  This suggests the view tha t a l l  exact 
reasoning applies to ideal as opposed to sensible ob jects ; i t  is 
natural to go fu r th e r  and to argue tha t thought is  nobler than sense, 
and the objects o f thought are more real than those o f sense percep­
t io n ,  Mystical doctrines as to the re la t io n  o f  time to e te rn i ty  are 
also re inforced by pure mathematics, fo r  mathematical ob jects, such as 
numbers, i f  real at a l l ,  are eternal and not in time. Such eternal 
objects can be conceived as God's thoughts. Hence P la to ’ s doctrine 
tha t God is  a geometer , , , ,  R a t io n a l is t ic  re l ig io n  as opposed to apoca­
ly p t ic  re l ig io n  has been, ever since Plato, very completely dominated
20by mathematics and mathematical method'.
Such ' r a t io n a l is t ic  re l ig io n '  is  the dogma o f Zamyatin's One
State. In Zamyatin's a n t i-u to p ia ,  the abstract world o f mathematical
ca lcu la t ion  obscures the spatio-temporal world o f men. Humanity has
been l i f t e d  out o f the dimension o f time in to  e te rn i ty ,  and now s i ts
21'•side by side at the same tab le ' w ith God, Morta l, m a te ria l,  i n d iv i ­
duated men, in e v ita b ly  imperfect and changeable, have faded from s igh t. 
Man the abstraction, d iv ine and perfec t, survives foreever, transfixed 
outside the span of time,
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D-503 looks forward to the day when 'the c ry s ta l l iz a t io n  of
l i f e *  w i l l  be complete, to the day when f lu id  time w i l l  have been wholly
22transmuted in to  frozen e te rn i ty .  The metaphor o f c ry s ta l l iz a t io n  
and d isso lu tion  recurs frequently  in D-503 compares himself to 
a crysta l (see Part 11(1) note 47] and in his sudden unwelcome passion 
fo r  E-330, he seems to feel himself d isso lv ing in her, losing his 
s t i l l ,  immutable perfection. Elsewhere in his d ia ry , D-503 writes o f 
the 'blue blocks o f frozen a ir *  which are being loaded on to the In te ­
gral, the rocket in which the members o f the One State are to  set fo r th
23to colonize the universe. Again, the c ry s ta l l in e  blocks o f  which
the en t ire  c i t y  is  constructed appear to D-503 to be l ik e  'blocks 
24o f blue ic e ' ,  He experiences a sudden stab o f panic, when a momen­
ta ry  t r ic k  o f the l ig h t  lends to the hard, immobile glass the appear­
ance o f a swollen r iv e r ,  which is  about to burst through i t s  w inter 
layer o f ice. 'That's the way i t  happens in  s p r in g ',  he w r ite s , 'when 
you are standing on the r iv e r  bank, expecting everything to s ta r t  
cracking, surging, s w ir l in g ,  rushing at any moment; minute a f te r  
minutes passes, however, yet the ice remains s ta t iona ry , and you
yourse lf feel tha t you are sw e ll ing  A moment la te r ,  he is  ashamed
at th is  sudden access o f fea r. There is ,  a f te r  a l l ,  he comments, 'no 
icebreaker that could possibly break the most trans lucent, the most 
so lid  crysta l o f our l i f e ' , ^ ^
The image o f icy , immobile 'p e r fe c t io n ' also occurs in the 
Areopagitjca. Reflecting upon the p l ig h t  o f a society where every 
aspect o f human conduct was c lose ly regulated, and where ind iv idua l 
choice and conscience would have no part to play, M ilton w r ite s , in
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b i t t e r  irony, 'How goodly, and how to be wished were such an obedi­
ent unanimity as th is ,  what a f ine  conformity would i t  starch us a l l  
in to !  Doubtless as staunch and so lid  a piece of framework, as any
nr
January could freeze toge the r '.
While the ubiquitous glass o f the One State symbolises the insub­
s ta n t ia l i t y  o f the perfect world, i t  also represents the ice o f perfect 
psychological entropy. The One State is  destined by i t s  ru le rs  to 
become frozen in l i fe le s s  perfect ion , beyond time, e te rna lly  changeless, 
i t s  c i t izen s  locked in an everlasting present,
Zamyatin's fear o f entropy o f the mind is  matched by a fear o f 
entropy in the physical world on the part o f H.G. Wells and Aldous 
Huxley, both o f whom were influenced by T.H, Huxley. The spectre o f 
the Second Law o f Dynamics sta lks through the w r i t in g  o f Aldous 
Huxley, and is  perhaps a t the heart o f his utopia. Is land. In a 
le t t e r  which Aldous Huxley wrote to Gervas Huxley in 1963, he comments, 
'Growing old g race fu lly  - i t  i s n ' t  easy when the physiological machine
s ta r ts  to break down ___ One learns the Second Law o f Thermodynamics
27by d ire c t experience'. S im ila r ly ,  in  Is land , the central character. 
W ill Farnaby remarks, 'One th inks one's something unique and wonderful
at the centre o f the universe. But in fac t one's merely a s l ig h t  delay
28in the ongoing march o f en tropy '. Farnaby, describing the death o f 
a favourite  aunt, says, 'Instead o f f lo u t in g  i t ,  a l i t t l e  piece o f her 
body started to obey the Second Law o f Thermodynamics, And as her
29body broke down, the soul began to lose i t s  v i r tu e ,  i t s  very id e n t i t y ' .
H,G. Wells 's dread o f entropy is  less personal than tha t o f 
Aldous Huxley, From T, H, Huxley, who taught him at the Normal School,
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in South Kensington, Wells inherited  a b e l ie f  in the in e v i t a b i l i t y  o f 
cosmic catastrophe. The earth, he knew, was s te a d ily  cooling, and the 
time must come when entropy would re ign, and when l i f e  on earth would 
be extinguished fo re ve r . But Wells could not accept tha t humanity’ s 
unenviable p l ig h t  was w ithout remedy. Like T, H. Huxley, he believed 
that man should f ig h t  nature, and force i t  to work fo r  his bene fit .
He nursed a desperate b e l ie f  tha t i t  could be possible fo r  science 
to provide solutions fo r  man^s problems. He was not convinced tha t th is  
would happen, but he was convinced tha t man had a duty to t r y  to make 
i t  happen. Cosmic destruction, he suggested, could be avoided i f  men 
used science to enable them to escape to other planets, or to pass 
beyond the space/time confines. One o f the inhabitants o f Wells's 
A Modern Utopia confides in a v is i t o r  to the s ta te , ' I  th ink very much 
o f the "Night o f th is  World", the time when our sun w i l l  be red and 
d u l l ,  and a i r  and water w i l l  l i e  frozen together in a common snowfield 
where now the forests  o f the trop ics  are s t e a m i n g ' . H e  goes on to 
speculate'whether i t  is  God's purpose that our kind should end, and 
the c i t ie s  we have b u i l t ,  the books we have w r i t te n ,  a l l  tha t we have 
given substance and a form, should l i e  dead beneath the snows'. 'One 
n ig h t ' ,  he adds, ' I  sat up and to ld  the rascal stars very earnestly
31
how they should not escape us in the end'. By the time Wells wrote 
Men Like Gods, his confidence appears to have become stronger. In th is  
book, Mr, Barnstaple, the v i s i t o r  from Earth, remarks, ' I t  has been a 
b e l ie f  in our world tha t at la s t  there must be an end to l i f e  because 
our sun and planets are cooling and there seems no hope o f escape from
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the l i t t l e  world upon which we have arisen. We are born with i t  and 
we must die with i t .  That robbed many of us o f hope and energy; fo r  
why should we work fo r  progress in a world tha t must freeze and die?'
But the response o f the utopian c i t iz e n  to whom he addresses th is  
question is  reassuring. There is  no need fo r  e ith e r the human race
32or the utopian race to perish, he asserts, fo r  both 'have hardly begun! '
Mr, Barnstaple is  to ld  tha t fo r  centuries, Utopian philosophers and
s c ie n t is ts  have been ' c r i t i c i s in g ,  rev is ing and reconstructing th e i r
former in s t in c t iv e  and t ra d it io n a l ideas o f space and time, o f form
and substance', and in consequence, 'the l im ita t io n s  o f  space which
33had seemed forever insurmountable' are breaking down.
Wells 's fear o f entropy also finds expression in The War of 
the Worlds, where Martians are driven from th e i r  planet, as Wells 
believed we should u lt im a te ly  be driven from ours, by the inexorable 
power o f the Second Law o f Thermodynamics. S im ila r ly ,  fear o f cosmic 
d isaster also colours Wells 's The Time Machine. In th is  book, the 
Time T rave lle r f i n a l l y  reaches a po int on his chronological journey 
where l i f e  has almost e n t i re ly  ceased to e x is t .  Fearfu lly  he turns 
fo r  home. The la s t  l iv in g  thing he sees is  a bloated, tentacled 
creature, a d r i f t  in a blood-red sea. Here is  the image evoked by
T. H. Huxley in his Evolution and E th ics , o f the 'Protococcus o f red
. 34 snow'.
But while Wells feared the p r in c ip le  of maximum entropy in the 
physical world, Zamyatin feared 'psychological en tropy ', the death o f
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the mind, Zamyatinas analogy Is powerful: entropy operates in closed,
stable systems. As time passes, the amount o f free energy ava ilab le  
fo r  a c t iv i t y  in such a system is  gradually d issipated. For energy to 
be made ava ilab le , there must be certa in  physical d iffe rences, d i f f e ­
rences in temperature or density, fo r  instance, As entropy increases, 
a l l  these differences are smoothed away, u n t i l  u lt im a te ly  the system 
reaches a state o f unrelieved homogeneity, at a temperature barely 
above absolute zero. In Zamyatin's One State, absolute happiness, the 
goal o f the s ta te , is  equated w ith absolute entropy. I ts  temperature, 
D-503 remarks, is  -273 degrees. ' I s n ' t  i t  c lear to you ',  E-330 remon­
s tra tes , ' th a t  i t  is  only in differences - d iffe rences! -  in tempera­
tu re , only in thermal contrasts, tha t l i f e  l ies?  But i f  everywhere, 
throughout the universe, there are only equally warm - or equally cool
- bodies, they must be th ru s t out o f the way - so tha t there may be
35f i r e ,  an explosion, Gehenna',
Zamyatin held tha t ju s t  as the whole o f l i f e  in the physical 
world depends upon thermodynamic in s t a b i l i t y ,  so does the l i f e  o f the 
mind depend upon p o l i t ic a l  and social f lu x .  He also believed tha t human 
progress fo llows a d ia le c t ic a l  path, and tha t there can be no f in a l  
revo lu tion to end a l l  revo lu tions, since revo lu tion is  the means by 
which the world receives the new sources o f energy needed to  dispel men­
ta l entropy, 'The law o f revo lu tion  is  red, f ie r y ,  deadly, but th is  
death means the b i r th  o f new l i f e ,  a new s t a r ' ,  he wrote. 'And the 
law of entropy is  cold, ice blue, l ik e  the icy  in te rp laneta ry  i n f i ­
n i t ie s  , , , ,  The sun ages in to  a planet , , , ,  And i f  the planet is  to
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be rekindled in to  youth again i t  must be set on f i r e  When the flam­
ing, seething sphere , , , ,  cools, the f ie r y  magma becomes coated w ith 
dogma -  a r ig id ,  o ss if ie d ,  motionless c ru s t ' .
In Zamyatin's One State, even the sun i t s e l f  is  imprisoned; 
i t s  l ig h t  gleams pa le ly through the cold glass bricks o f the b u ild -
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ings, 'b lu is h ly  c ry s ta l l in e  and equable'.
E-330 t e l l s  D-503, 'There are two forces in  th is  world - entropy 
and energy. The f i r s t  leads to b e a t i f ic  quietism, to a happy e q u i l i ­
brium, the other, to the destruction o f equ il ib r ium , to excruciating
perpetual motion. I t  was entropy which our ancestors, the
38Chris tians, worshipped as a god'.
In the eternal c o n f l ic t  between God and the forces o f  order, 
un ity  and perfectionon the one side, and the Devil, w ith the forces o f 
freedom, in d iv id u a l i ty  and u n p re d ic ta b i l i ty  on the o ther, Zamyatin 
is  unhesita ting ly  on the side of the Devil. (See Part I ( i )  note 17)
The revo lu tionaries in the One State ca l l  themselves the ' Mephis' ;  
they jo in  with the p r im it ive  people beyond the Glass Wall in pagan 
r i t u a ls ,  and th e i r  symbol is  f i r e ,  the f i r e  o f Mephistopheles and Pro­
metheus conjoined. This f i r e  represents the energy which alone can 
drive out entropy. E-330 herse lf is  depicted as a demonic f ig u re .
Her eyebrows f l i c k  upwards at the outer corners, in the semblance of 
minute horns, and the symbolic f i r e  o f  the Mephis blazes always w ith in  
her eyes, (see Part I I  ( i ) note 36)
In Zamyatin's imagery, perfection and God are equated with inac­
t i v i t y  and timelessness, while the Devil represents energy, a c t iv i t y .
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l i f e  and change. S im ilar imagery is  employed by Dostoievsky, in  The
Brothers Karamazov, where the Devil appears to Ivan in a nightmare,
and claims tha t through his existence, as a contrary force, he is
responsible fo r  the existence o f l i f e ,  The Devil has been to ld  tha t
he must continue to  e x is t ,  since w ithout him 'there would be no events,
39and i t  is  imperative tha t there should be events ', The Devil is  also 
equated with a c t iv i t y  in Wells's The Undying F i re , Here Wells recounts 
a dialogue between God and Satan, in which Satan claims to be the 
bringer o f h is to ry  and adventure, 'the s p i r i t  o f  l i f e ' .  'Without me, time 
and space would freeze in to  c ry s ta l l in e  p e r fe c t io n ',  Satan argues.
This passage from The Undying Fire was read and admired by Zamyatin, 
who quotes i t  in his essay. Paradise, published in 1922. But Zamyatin's 
conception o f the human need fo r  contrasts in l i f e ,  fo r  energy and 
movement, was expressed very much e a r l ie r ,  by William Blake, in The 
Marriage o f Heaven and H e l l . Here Blake w r ite s ,  'Without contraries 
is  no progression. A ttra c t ion  and Repulsion, Reason and Energy,
Love and Hate, are necessary to human existence. From these contra­
r ies  spring what the re lig io u s  ca l l  Good and E v i l .  Good is  the passive 
tha t obeys Reason, Evil is  the active springing from Energy. Good is  
Heaven. Evil is  Hell Energy is  only l i f e ,  and is  from the body,
and Reason is  the bound and outward circumference o f energy. Energy 
is  eternal d e l ig h t '  For a l l  these four w r i te rs ,  the Devil is  seen
as the in truder who f i r s t  dares to shatter the perfect harmony o f 
paradise, d isrupting e te rn i ty ,  and introducing l i f e  and time. In Zam­
y a t in 's  E-330 is  the d iabo lic  force o f free energy which invades 
the closed, entropie perfection o f  D-503's world, transforming, fo r  a
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b r ie f  period, the useless stable system of the One State in to  a usefu l, 
unstable one. In d is tu rb ing the g lac ia l p u r i ty  o f  eternal paradise, 
E-330 re insta tes h is to ry ,  a progression o f events,
A sense o f the tension between the temporal and the eternal 
suffuses the thought o f Aldous Huxley, p a r t ic u la r ly  in his la te r  w r i ­
t ing s , Huxley^s growing acceptance o f mysticism led him to conclude 
tha t enlightenment l ie s  in the apprehension o f the re a l i t y  o f  Eternal 
Being, as opposed to the i l lu s io n  o f the spatio-temporal world. In 
both his utopia and his a n t i-u to p ia ,  the inhabitants o f the imaginary 
state are o ffe red , through the use o f drugs, the means to escape the 
confines o f time and sample a small experience o f e te rn i ty .  In 
Brave New World, a doctor explains to John Savage the benefits to be 
received from taking soma : ’ Soma may make you lose a few years in time
. . . .  but th ink o f the enormous, immeasurable durations i t  can give you
out o f t im e.. Every soma-holiday is  a b i t  o f what our ancestors used
42to ca l l  e te r n i t y ’ . At the time o f w r i t in g  Brave New World, Huxley 
was c r i t i c a l  o f those who e lec t to go ’ popping o f f  in to  e te r n i t y ' ,  as 
is  c lear from the Savage's condemnation o f the practice . Yet in the 
paradise o f Is land , the hallucinogenic drug, Moksha-medicine, too, 
bestows i t s  own g i f t  o f release from time and the physical world.
W ill Farnaby, when he takes Moksha, experiences a sense o f being d i f ­
fused in to  l i g h t ,  a l ig h t  tha t is  ’ i n f i n i t e l y  here and tim e less ly  
now’ . He loses a l l  sensation o f corporeal existence, and knows only 
a ’ luminous b l is s ,  only a knowledgeless understanding, only union with
un ity  in a l im i t le s s ,  und iffe ren tia ted  awareness’ . This, he concludes,
43is  ’the mind’ s natural s ta te ’ . The inhabitants o f  Pala also f ind
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release from the temporal world in mystical contemplation. Gazing
at the image of Shiva-Nataraja, the Lord o f the Dance, they sense
tha t he is  'dancing through time and out o f time, dancing eve r las t ing ly
and in  the eternal now. Dancing and dancing in a l l  the worlds at 
44once '•,
As he embraced mysticism, Huxley became convinced tha t man's 
highest desire should be to remove himself from 'the Wheel of B ir th  
and Death' (see Part I I ( i )  note 66) and escape in to  e te rn i ty .  This 
is  e x p l ic i t  in Is land. But the same conviction colours a much ear­
l i e r  work. Time Must Have a Stop, w r it ten  in 1945. Here a generous, 
se lf- in du lg en t character, Eustace Barnack, dies, and is  offered the 
choice of merging himself in to  the timeless Void o f perfect en lighten­
ment, or returning to the world o f l i f e  and death and physical sensa­
t io n . He chooses to accept re incarnation, even though he foreknows tha t 
his l i f e  on earth w i l l  include much tha t is  h o r r i f i c .  Huxley implies 
tha t through weakness, hedonism and c a rn a l i ty ,  Eustace Barnack has 
chosen to condemn himself on his own Judgment Day. He has de libe ra te ly  
renounced the impersonal b l is s  o f  e te rn i ty  fo r  the miseries o f the temp­
oral world o f the senses.
In Is land , Huxley o ffe rs  two utopias, one te r r e s t r ia l ,  one 
etherea l, the f i r s t  o f which has instrumental value only. Huxley's 
ideal o f ultimate perfection is  not embodied in the physical, temporal 
world o f Pala, with i t s  c a re fu l ly  devised social arrangements, i t s  
genetic management and i t s  t ra in in g  programmes; Pala is  no more than 
a base, from which the inhabitants can launch themselves in to  the true 
utopia o f the luminous, und iffe ren tia ted  Void which l ie s  beyond time.
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Part I I  ( i i i ) Utopia and the subjugation o f Nature and the body
In A Modern Utopia, H,G, Wells wrote tha t a good society must 
be founded upon notions o f ju s t ic e ,  but ‘ there is  no ju s t ic e  in 
N a tu re 'J  Wells, fo llow ing T.H, Huxley, considered Nature to be 
amoral, and in d if fe re n t  to man,. T, H, Huxley argued tha t so fa r ,  the 
forces o f evolution seemed to have been working in man's favour, and 
th is  had led some men to a b e l ie f  in the in e v i t a b i l i t y  o f human pro­
gress. But u lt im a te ly , evolution would work against man, and at 
la s t  come to discard him altogether. The world had evolved in a way 
which was haphazard, provisional and unstructured. Moreover, man's 
bra in, in s t in c ts ,  thought processes and language were a l l  o f a s im i­
la r ly  fo r tu ito u s  nature. Therefore, there was no natural foundation 
fo r  human m ora lity . Man must estab lish e th ica l systems fo r  the order­
ing o f human l i f e  in  defiance o f Nature,
Sharing T.H. Huxley's v is ion  o f the nature o f  the world and of 
mankind. Wells came to believe tha t man's only hope o f  redemption lay 
in the p o s s ib i l i ty  tha t science and technology might l ib e ra te  man from 
the random d is a b i l i t ie s  and imperfections with which Nature had encum­
bered him. He held tha t while evolutionism had cheated man o f his 
v is ion o f a mechanically ordered, purposive world, i t  was at least 
possible tha t science might restore something o f tha t v is ion . Men 
might attempt, w ith the too ls o f science, to impose ra tiona l order, 
precision and p re d ic ta b i l i t y  upon a world which was by nature pur­
poseless, subject to chance and change. Science might enable man to 
overcome the imperfections o f his own nature, and o f the world in 
which he found himself. I t  might also l ib e ra te  man from want.
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ignorance and f o l l y ,  and from tPie need fo r  ceaseless t o i l .  I t  might 
defeat Nature, and allow the establishment o f utopia, I t  is  Wells's 
brand o f s c ie n t i f ic  utopianism which is  parodied in Aldous Huxley's 
Brave New World (see Part I ( i i )  ) ,  although i t  is  apparent tha t 
Aldous Huxley, l ik e  H.G. Wells, was p o s it iv e ly  influenced by the 
ideas o f T.H. Huxley.
In the imaginary states o f Aldous Huxley, Wells and Zamyatin, 
man’ s physical environment, and the nature o f man h imself, have been 
tamed and perfected, stripped o f inconvenience and u n p re d ic ta b i l i ty .
I t  is  the purpose of the ru le rs  o f utopia to mould humanity according 
to a single pre-determined model. But Nature cannot be expected to 
co-operate with th is  design. Rather, i t  must be prevented from under­
mining the achievements o f organized human endeavour. The randomness 
of Nature must be replaced with the symmetry o f human planning. Where 
facets o f Nature are allowed to p e rs is t ,  th e i r  in trus ion  upon c iv ic  l i f e  
must be subject to the closest regula tion.
Only in O rwell’ s imaginary s ta te , Oceania, is  there no pos it ive  
design to exclude Nature. Whereas in Huxley's World State and Zam­
y a t in 's  One State, the ru lers recognize a need to defend the perfec­
t ion  they have created from the assaults o f Nature, in Oceania, there 
is  no perfection to pro tect, Human persona lit ies  are, of course, 
warped and mutilated by te r ro r ,  but the repression in Oceania is  
general, und iffe ren tia ted  and devoid of ideological commitment. I t ’ s 
sole purpose is  to sustain the ru le rs  in  power. The world o f Nature, 
there fore , is never s p e c i f ic a l ly  considered as an area fo r  p a r t ic u la r  
a tten t io n .
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In the perfect state o f Zamyatinas however. Nature in a l l  
i t s  manifestations is  excluded. The ru le rs  o f the One State exercise 
to ta l  control over the physical environment, and also over human nature
Both are transformed, as nearly as possible, in to  mechanical systems.
2
D-503 speaks o f 'the great Machine o f the S ta te ’ , He also refers 
to his own brain as 'a chrono log ica lly  tested, sparkling mechanism,
3
without a sing le speck o f dus t’ . The free energy o f Nature must be 
prevented from invading the enclosed, perfect mechanical system which 
is  the One State, and transforming i t s  character, since such an inva­
sion could only bring degeneration. Moreover, the perfect mathemati­
cal ra tiona lism  o f the human mind must be protected against invasion 
by man's emotional and sensual nature.
The entropy of the One State is  sustained by the devise o f the 
Green Wall, which surrounds the glass c i t y ,  is o la t in g  the perfect 
machine world from the ' i r r a t io n a l ,  hideous world o f trees, birds 
and an im als '.^  Zamyatin's wall stands between the natural and the 
a r t i f i c i a l ,  between the world o f senses and the world o f reason, and 
between man-as-animal and man-as-angel.
The symbol o f  the Wall is  also to be found in Dostoievsky's 
Notes From Underground. Here, the Wall represents the'laws o f nature*, 
an obstruction, a l im i ta t io n  upon human freedom, which is  to be re s is ­
ted, however hopelessly, 'What have the laws o f nature and arithm etic  
to do w ith me, when fo r  some reason I don 't l ik e  those laws o f twice 
two?' demands the narra tor of Dostoievsky's book. 'As i f  a stone 
wall re a l ly  were a soothing influence and re a l ly  did carry a message 
o f peace, simply because i t  is  twice two The point is  to
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understand everything, to rea lize  everything, every im p o s s ib i l i ty ,  
every stone w a ll;  not to reconcile you rse lf  to a single one o f 
the im p o s s ib i l i t ie s  and stone walls i f  the thought o f re co n c il ia t io n  
sickens you’ ,^ S im ila r ly ,  in the poet, R-13, t e l l s  D-503
tha t his knowledge is  nothing but a form of cowardice. D-503 wishes
to ’wall in the i n f i n i t e ’ ,^ He cowers behind a barricade o f fac ts ,  
a fra id  to look over and see what l ie s  beyond,
The Wall is  o f great s ign if icance to D-503. ’Walls are the 
basis o f everything human', he w rites , 'Oh the great, d iv in e ly  l im i t ­
ing wisdom of w a lls , o f b a r r ie rs ’ The wall is ,  probably, the greatest 
o f a l l  inventions, Man ceased to  be a w ild  animal only when he had
b u i l t  his f i r s t  w a ll,  Man ceased to be a w ild  man only when he had
b u i l t  the Green Wall . The Wall preserves the perfect ra tiona lism  
o f the One State, Without i t ,  D-503 remarks, man would be ' s t i l l  in
o
the savage state o f freedom’ .
But the free energy o f Nature is  not to be so eas ily  excluded. 
Small, symbolic fragments o f Nature continue to in trude . The fog comes 
down, b lu rr in g  the sharp contours o f the geometric bu ild ings , d isso lv ­
ing the gleaming glass, and lending fo r  a b r ie f  moment the sensation 
o f forbidden privacy. From beyond the Green Wall, in Springtime,
’ the honeyed yellow pollen o f certa in  f low e rs ’ comes d r i f t in g  in to  the 
s te r i le  c i t y ,  to s e t t le  on the l ip s  o f the c i t iz e n s ,  sweetening them, 
and ’ in te r fe r in g  with log ica l t h o u g h t A g a i n ,  in Autumn, insid ious 
filaments o f gossamer f lo a t  in v is ib ly  across the Wall on the s t i l l
9
a i r ,  to catch importunately against the sk in , d is tu rb ing  equanimity. 
Walking near the Green Wall one day, D-503 is  troubled by the sight o f
- 155 -
an animal, in the ‘ raging ocean o f greenery' beyond the glass b a rr ie r ,  
’ Tu rb id ly , d u l ly ,  the blunt muzzle o f some beast showed through the 
g lass t, he re c a l ls ;  " i t s  yellow eyes p e rs is te n t ly  kept repeating the 
same unvarying thought which was incomprehensible to me. For a long 
while we looked in to  each o th e r ’ s eyes, those shafts from the super­
f i c i a l  world in to  tha t other world under the surface. And a thought 
began s t i r r in g  w ith in  me: ‘ But what i f  tha t yellow-eyed creature,
l iv in g  i t s  uncalculated l i f e  among i t s  r id ic u lo u s , d i r t y  heaps o f 
leaves, is  happier than we are?" On another occasion, D-503 
is  about to go to the Bureau o f Guardians, to f u l f i l  his ob liga tions as 
a d u t i fu l  c i t iz e n ,  and report his i l l i c i t  re la t ionsh ip  with E-330.
But on the way he is  met by 0-90, who presents him with a sprig of 
l i l ie s - o f - t h e - v a l le y ,  which she has co llected from the Botanical 
Museum, The incongru ity  o f the flowers i r r i t a t e s  and d is turbs him.
He is  re ad ily  dissuaded from going to the Bureau o f  Guardians, but 
when la te r  the scent o f the l i l ie s - o f - th e - v a l le y  penetrates his 
senses, reminding him of his lapse from orthodoxy, he is  f i l l e d  with 
bewilderment and c o n f u s io n . S u c h  in tim ations o f the world of 
Nature are extraneous to the perfec t, mechanical system, ju s t  as fo r  
D-503, untidy passions and free , spontaneous thoughts are extraneous 
to the human mind.
The schism between the world o f reason and the world o f the 
senses is  re flec ted  w ith in  the c i t iz e n  himself, D-503 becomes aware 
th a t he contains w ith in  him two qu ite separate e n t i t ie s .  The f i r s t
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is  D-503, the p e rfe c t ly  log ica l mathematician, a passive, contented 
c i t iz e n  o f the One State, The second is  his sensual s e l f ,  non-rational 
and rebe ll ious . He w r ite s , 4  saw in to  myself, deep w ith in  me. There 
were two Is , One was my former s e l f ,  0^503, the number D-503, while 
the other , , ,  Up to now he had merely shoved his shaggy hands ju s t  a 
l i t t l e  out of the s h e l l ,  but now a l l  o f him was crawling out; the
12shell was cracking, any minute now i t  would f l y  in to  smithereens'.
D-503 is  permanently disturbed by the appearance o f his 'shaggy hands',
13which are, he says, 'a vestige o f a savage epoch'. They remind 
him o f the hidden an im ality  w ith in  him, which menaces his machine-like 
p e r fe c t io n .
Hair is  symbolic o f the animal side o f man's nature in Beyond 
the Green Wall o f the c i t y  l ives  the race of p r im it iv e ,  hair-covered 
people who have descended from the survivors of an e a r l ie r  epoch.
They have lo s t  the outward cha rac te r is t ics  o f c iv i l is e d  man, and l iv e  
as animals, in the world o f the senses. They are wholly a part o f 
Nature, while the inhabitants o f the One State e x is t  against Nature.
Of Zamyatin, Orwell wrote, ' I t  is  evident from ^  tha t he had 
a strong leaning towards p r im it iv is m '.^ ^  But here Orwell appears to 
have misread Zamyatin's imagery, (See also Part I I ( i )  note 54.) 
C erta in ly , in Zamyatin's the image o f the enclosed perfect Machine 
Of the One State is set up in opposition to the image o f the free 
world o f Nature. But Zamyatin's book is  not to be construed as a ca l l  
fo r  a return to some p re - in d u s t r ia l , natural existence. This option 
is  quite e x p l ic i t l y  excluded by Zamyatin, Although he stresses the
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importance o f that which is  animal in man, he nonetheless gives equal 
importance to the reasoning, non-sensual side o f human nature. D-503 
becomes f u l l y  human only once he has recognized the two d is t in c t  
halves o f his nature. With the resurgence o f his animal s e l f ,  he be­
comes aware o f  his capacity fo r  love, p i ty ,  hatred, jea lousy, happiness 
and despair. As a complete human being, ra t iona l and sensual, he 
experiences fo r  a b r ie f  period a state of heightened consciousness.
In fear and consternation, he discovers tha t he has -an incurable 
so u l ' .
At one po in t, D-503 urges E-330 to escape with him to l iv e  
w ith the fo res t people beyond the Wall, but E-330 re jec ts  th is  a l t e r ­
native. The survivors o f the pre-utopian race represent those elements 
in humanity which have been sacr if iced  in the p e rfe c t ly  ra tiona l One 
State, but they too are incomplete, she explains. They are creatures 
o f Nature, who have 'preserved warm, red blood under th e i r  h irsu te ­
ness', whereas the a r t i f i c i a l  c it izens  of the One State have become 
'overgrown with ci phers’ . B u t  they l iv e  a pre-moral, animal l i f e ,  
und iffe ren tia ted  from one another except by the colour o f th e i r  pe lts . 
They are free only as animals are free: tha t i s ,  they are fre e , as
the members o f the One State are not, to experience emotions, and to 
receive and in te rp re t  the evidence o f th e ir  senses. But they are not 
free to develop th e i r  minds. For man to become f u l l y  human again,
E-330 t e l l s  D-503, his reasoning s e l f  and his emotional s e l f  must 
become reunited. The fo res t people, she expla ins, 'are the h a l f  we 
have lo s t .  You have H2 and 0, but in order to have H^ O - streams,
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seas, w a te r fa l ls ,  waves, storms - i t  is  necessary fo r  these halves to 
u n i t e ' Z a m y a t i n  does not have the i l lu s io n  that man w i l l  discover 
his true s e l f  only i f  he returns to Nature. Man-as-animal and man-as 
ra tiona l-be ing are both less than man. Zamyatin is  not a p r im i t i v is t ,  
as Orwell supposes.
Orwell also suggests tha t Zamyatin's ' i s  in e f fe c t  a study 
o f the Machine, the genie tha t man has thoughtlessly le t  out o f i t s
b o tt le  and cannot put back again ___' Zamyatin is  attacking 'the
implied aims of in d u s t r ia l is a t io n ' ,  Orwell c o n s i d e r s . T h e r e  is some 
t ru th  in th is  suggestion: Zamyatin was indeed concerned to warn
humanity against 'the hypertrophic power o f the machine'. (See Part 
I ( i i )  note 1). In an ove r- indus tr ia l ized  soc ie ty , man is  wrested from 
the world o f nature, and becomes, in e f fe c t ,  a servant o f  the machine.
But at a deeper le v e l,  Zamyatin warns society against the 'hypertrophic 
power o f the s ta te ' ,  tha t i s ,  the power o f the state to determine the 
exact s tructure o f men' s l iv e s ,  to proclaim immutable t ru th s ,  and to 
mechanize the human mind, by transforming c rea tive , c r i t i c a l  thought 
in to  f ixed dogma.
Zamyatin's One State d i f fe rs  from the an ti-u top ian  states of 
Orwell and Huxley, in tha t o f f i c ia l  dogma p o s it iv e ly  demands the conquest 
of Nature. Because o f the ideal o f ra t io n a l,  mechanical perfection 
to which the One State is  committed, the defeat o f Nature is  necessarily 
enta iled in the construction of the s ta te . Any in trus ion  o f Nature 
is  a s ta in  on the p u r i ty  o f the s ta te 's  perfection . But the sup­
pression o f Nature in utopia can serve p ra c t ic a l ,  as well as ideo­
log ica l ends. The power o f Nature can be harnessed fo r  the service o f 
the s ta te . Thus in  We, D-503 boasts, 'The ancients permitted the sea
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to pound doltishly against the shore around the clock, while the 
millions of kilogrammetres imprisoned in the waves were utilized
merely to warm up the emotions of enamoured couples. Out of the 
enamoured susurration of the waves we have obtained electricity; 
from a feral beast spattering foam we have made a domestic 
animal ’.
In the utopias of Wells, the conquest of Nature is primarily 
intended to serve such practical ends. The controlled power of Nature 
is to eliminate hardship from men*s lives and expand the range of human 
possibilities. But in Men Like Gods, the suppression of Nature seems, 
in addition, to be related to matters of taste. Nature is not so much
excluded, or harnessed, as refashioned. New species of plants have been
bred, and old ones have been adapted or exterminated. Similarly, some 
species of animals have been adapted to the requirements and taste 
of the utopian society, and others have been rendered extinct. Car­
nivores have been refashioned as herbivores, to serve as domestic 
ornaments. Horses seem to have been disposed of altogether. Dogs 
have been debarked. Nature has had its claws pared, and has been made 
acceptable to man.
In Huxley's Brave New World, the suppression of Nature seems 
to rest entirely upon pragmatic considerations. There is no ideo­
logical reason why the inhabitants of the World State should not con­
tinue to enjoy the naural world.. There are however, economic 
reasons, Mustapha Mond explains that at one stage in the history of 
the World State, members of the lower castes were conditioned to enjoy
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the countryside, so tha t they would ‘ consume tra nspo rt ' to get there,
whenever possible. However, i t  was discovered tha t once in the
country, the c it izens  consumed nothing else. They were content with
the sigh t o f  the flowers and trees, 'Primroses and landscapes',
Mustapha Mond explains, 'have one grave defect; they are gra tu itous.
A love o f nature keeps no fac to r ies  busy. I t  was decided to abolish
19the love o f na ture '. Accordingly, the in fan ts  o f  the lower castes 
in the World State are conditioned to hate flowers. Instead they are 
encouraged to consume transport to trave l in to  the countryside to engage 
in expensive outdoor sports, requiring much elaborate and cos tly  
equipment. Mustapha Mond's discourse leaves no doubt in the mind 
tha t i f  means could be found fo r  making the c it ize n s  pay heavily 
fo r  the p r iv i le g e  o f looking at flowers and landscapes, a love o f 
Nature would soon be in s t i l le d  once again in to  the populace.
I t  is  Aldous Huxley's a n t i-u to p ia .  Brave New World, rather 
than Zamyatin's which is most c e n tra l ly  concerned w ith , in Orwell's 
phrase, the implied aims o f in d u s t r ia l iz a t io n ' .  (See 17 above) Certa in ly  
Zamyatin presents a p ic ture o f an ove r- ind us tr ia l ized  socie ty, where 
Nature is  f i rm ly  suppressed in the cause o f e f f ic ie n c y .  But Zamyatin's 
nightmare is  more complex than th is :  i t  is  a nightmare o f a to ta l  
state where the human mind is  constrained by the exigencies o f a s te r i le  
dogma, which pretends to perfect s c ie n t i f ic  accuracy, and proclaims 
i t s e l f  to be i r re fu ta b le .  Despite his evident sympathy fo r  Zamyatin's 
work, Orwell tends to coarsen Zamyatin's arguments, Orwell's  exegesis 
o f We is  at best incomplete,
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^  is  a statement o f condemnation o f the narrowness o f v is ion
which proceeds from a s te r i le ,  formal ra tiona lism , divorced from
sensib il ity,Zamyatin is n o 'p r tm it iv is t  ' ,  condemning s c ie n t i f i c  progress
as such. He was himself a s c ie n t is t ,  and the revo lu tion  in
s c ie n t i f i c  thought in i t ia te d  by the theories o f E instein excited him no
20less than the revolutions in the a r t i s t i c  and p o l i t ic a l  world.
But he considered tha t the imagination which could generate new thought
was rooted as f i rm ly  in emotional man as in reasoning man.
In reason is  set up in  opposition to the senses and the
emotions, which are thus excluded as sources o f human comprehension and
understanding. But Zamyatin considers tha t no such sharp d is t in c t io n
between man's in te l le c tu a l and his emotional capacities is  ju s t i f ie d .
The human functions o f cognition , perception, emotion and v o l i t io n  are
a l l  engendered by the same complex, in te rn a l ly  co-ordinated mental
s truc tu re . In th is  convic tion , Zamyatin has the support o f  the modern
21phys io log is t, J.Z. Young. Zamyatin holds tha t ra tiona lism  ceases to 
be ra tiona l when i t  in s is ts  upon excluding the evidence o f the senses 
and o f  the emotions from i t s  ca lcu la tions , and pretends, fo r  the sake 
o f  s im p l ic i ty ,  tha t the troublesome i r re g u la r i t ie s  o f human nature do 
not e x is t .  Only a fa lse ,  dogmatic ra tiona lism  in s is ts  on measuring the 
immensurable, or on forsaking the real fo r  the comfort o f a set o f 
neat abstractions.
Just such a fa lse ra tiona lism  appears to be the ta rge t o f c r i ­
t ic ism  in the mind o f  the s ta t is t ic ia n ,  M,J. Moroney, when he w rites .
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' I t  is  true tha t i t  is  extremely d i f f i c u l t  to in te rp re t  f igures when 
they re la te  to some concrete problem. I t  is  equally true tha t i t  is  
extremely easy to do a r ithm etic . Herein l ie s  the real d i f f i c u l t y .
Averages can be calculated to nineteen places o f decimals with astonish­
ing ease. When the job is  done i t  looks very accurate. I t  is  an easy 
and fa ta l step to think tha t the accuracy o f our a r ithm etic  is  equiva­
le n t to the accuracy o f our knowledge about the problem in hand. We 
su ffe r  from 'delusions o f accuracy'. Once an enthusiast gets th is  
disease, he and a l l  who depend on his conclusions fo r  th e ir  welfare are 
damned'. There is ,  Moroney considers, 'more than a germ o f t ru th  in 
the suggestion th a t ,  in a society where s ta t is t ic ia n s  th r iv e ,  l ib e r t y  
and in d iv id u a l i ty  are l i k e ly  to be emasculated. H is to r ic a l ly ,  S ta t is t ic s  
is no more than a State A rithm etic , a system o f computation by which
differences between ind iv idua ls  are eliminated by the taking o f an
22average'. Zamyatin's an ti-u topian state is  surely the s t a t i s t i c i a n ' s  
quintessential paradise.
While Zamyatin's One State is  founded upon 'delusions o f accuracy', 
the guiding p r in c ip le  o f Huxley's World State is  Fordism. This Huxley 
describes as a system o f thought which demands ' th a t  we should s a c r i­
f ic e  the animal man (and along with the animal, large portions o f  the 
th in k ing , s p ir i tu a l  man] not to God, but to the Machine, There is  no
place in , , ,  the modern in d u s tr ia l ize d  world fo r  animals on the one hand,
23or fo r  a r t i s t s ,  mystics, or even f in a l l y ,  ind iv idua ls  on the o th e r ' .
Huxley intended to warn society o f the threats to ind iv idua l freedom 
posed by over-organization and modern mechanization, and also by the
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irresponsib le use o f  applied science, especia lly  in the f ie ld  o f  the
b io log ica l sciences. The misuse o f the b io log ica l sciences could, he
contended, ’modify the natural forms and expressions o f l i f e  i t s e l f .
Brave New World, he wrote, was about ’ the advancement o f science as i t
24a ffec ts  human in d iv id u a ls ’ , His an ti-u top ia  is  a descrip tion o f  a
society where s c ie n t i f ic  techniques have been applied in such a way as
25to 'recre te  human beings in  the likeness o f te rm ite s '.
Huxley became convinced tha t modern to ta l i ta r ia n is m  would u l t i ­
mately come to  repress men, not by using the methods o f te r ro r ,  as Orwell 
presumed, but through the use o f  techniques o f persuasion and manipula­
t io n . He believed tha t the use o f Pavlovian condition ing procedures, 
together w ith the applications o f s t r i c t  eugenic contro ls  and the ju d i ­
cious use of drugs, would f in a l l y  force men to embrace th e i r  degrada­
t io n  with an in fa n t i le  joy .
But although Huxley feared the power o f  the b io log ica l sciences 
to a l t e r  the nature o f  human beings and o f th e i r  environment, and demon­
stra tes th is  fear w ith appalling c la r i t y  in Brave New World, he was never 
opposed to the concept o f  se lective  breeding. Here, Huxley's views l ie  
close to those o f H.G. Wells. Both w rite rs  appear to condemn the use 
o f eugenic techniques in th e i r  an ti-u top ian w r it in g s ,  yet both advocate 
a form of se lective breeding in th e i r  utopias.
Both Wells and Huxley would seem to be open to the charge of 
inconsistency. However, both would argue th a t they accepted the prac­
t ic e  of se lective breeding in p r in c ip le ,  while re jec t ing  i t s  misuse.
Both w rite rs  were agreed tha t unless science intervened, an inev itab le
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process o f genetic degeneration would degrade the human stock. Thus 
Wells condemns the eugenic measures taken in the an ti-u top ian world o f 
The Sleeper Awakes, but advocates eugenic programmes o f his own in A 
Modern Utopia and Men Like Gods, The d ifference fo r  him seems to l i e  
in the character o f the society which the eugenic practices are designed 
to support. In The Sleeper Awakes, Graham, the Sleeper, is  to ld  by his 
guide, 'The world is  no place fo r  the bad, the stup id , the enervated.
Their duty is  to d ie . The death o f fa i lu re !  This is  the path by which 
the beast rose to manhood'. The ' fa i lu re s '  in Wells 's an ti-u top ian  
state are prevented from breeding fo r  the good o f the species. In 
th is  book, se lective breeding is to be seen as an expression o f the bleak 
inhumanity o f the imaginary s ta te . Yet, stripped o f i t s  iro n ica l conno­
ta t io n s , the passage quoted above could equally well appear in A Modern 
Utopia. Here again, the ' f a i lu re s '  in society are forbidden to breed.
In a progressive socie ty. Wells says, prospective parents have to 
reach a 'ce r ta in  minimum o f personal e f f ic ie n c y ' .  In these circumstances, 
'the b ir th  o f  a ch i ld  to diseased or in fe r io r  parents and contrary to
the sanctions o f the State w i l l  be the rarest of d is a s te rs '.  The state
27w i l l  'exercise a r ig h t  o f forbidding or sanctioning motherhood'. The
women o f the modern Utopia are to be paid a wage fo r  c h i ld - re a r in g , by
the s ta te , th is  wage to be increased where a ch i ld  is  found to have
a b i l i t i e s  above the average. Wells w rites , ' In  the c iv i l iz e d  State, i t
is  now c le a r ly  possible to make the conditions o f l i f e  to le rab le  fo r
every l iv in g  creature, provided the in fe r io rs  can be prevented from
28increasing and m u lt ip ly in g ',
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Selective breeding in utopia is designed to protect perfection
against degeneration. Neither Wells nor Aldous Huxley seems to have
been able to understand the humanitarian and l ib e r ta r ia n  arguments
against such practices, Huxley shared with Wells a b e l ie f  that human
progress could only be maintained i f  'the hereditable q u a l i t ie s  o f
the progressing population were improved (or at any rate changed in a
29spec if ic  d irec tion ) by deliberate breeding'. This was asserted by 
Huxley in an essay w ritten  a year before he wrote Brave New World.
Despite his powerful defence o f 'the animal' in man, in Brave New World, 
Huxley, l ik e  Wells, possessed a utopian desire to  transform Nature, and
force i t  to produce predictable resu lts .
In his book. Brave New World Revis ited, Huxley expresses a fear
tha t 'inborn b io logica l d iffe rences' may u lt im a te ly  be sacr if iced  to
30cu ltu ra l un ifo rm ity . Employing the terminology o f W. H. Sheldon's 
theory o f physiological types, Huxley continues, 'The differences between 
ind iv idua ls  are so great . . .  An extreme endomorph . . . .  w i l l  re ta in  his
sociable v iscerotonic tendencies, an extreme mesomorph w i l l  remain ener­
g e t ic a l ly  somatotonic through th ick  and th in ,  and an extreme ectomorph 
w i l l  always be cerebrotonic, in troverted and o ve r-se n s it ive '.  In Brave 
New World, Huxley presents an admonitory v is ion o f  a society in which 
the natural var ia tions between people have been smoothed away. But 
by the time he wrote Is land, Huxley no longer seems to have been so 
concerned to preserve 'inborn b io log ica l d i f fe re n ce s ',
Huxley's in te res t in Sheldon's physiological types persisted, 
and is  a prominent feature in Is land , But in Is land , Huxley no longer 
seems to consider that human d iv e rs i ty  predicates a need fo r  a free
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society. Rather, he seems to consider tha t the existence o f ind iv idua l
d iv e rs i ty  lays a re s p o n s ib i l i ty  upon governments to provide an extensive
range of courses o f  remedial treatment. Somatotyping is  now the basis
fo r  determining a c h i ld ’ s basic physiological type, so tha t appropriate
treatment may be given. In Pala, each ch i ld  undergoes ’ blood te s ts ,
psychological tes ts , somatotyping, an E.E.G,’ to  determine his p a r t ic u la r
brand o f in d iv id u a l i ty ,  whereupon ’ appropriate treatment is  started 
31immediately’ , The mesomorphs (a type, in c id e n ta l ly ,  to which Helmholtz 
Watson, in Brave New World, indubitab ly  belongs) are regarded as con­
s t i tu t in g  a potentia l danger to society throughout l i f e ,  unless th e i r  
a c t ive , fo rce fu l temperament is  con tro lled  at an early  age. Their 
d r ive , dynamism and desire fo r  action must be system atica lly  sublimated 
fo r  the good o f society. Accordingly, they are set to wood-chopping, 
rock-climbing and other hard physical pu rsu its . Huxley seems to have 
accepted without question the l in k  between physiological and mental 
a t t r ib u te s  which Sheldon proposed. He seems also to have taken i t  as 
axiomatic tha t society is  most endangered by the energetic, aggressive 
type o f personality . His fear o f aggressiveness, however, is  not un i­
ve rsa lly  shared. Koestler considers tha t aggressiveness is  necessary 
to the ’ social reformer, s a t i r i s t ,  a r t i s t  and th in k e r ’ . He w rites , 'A 
well-meaning but woolly ideology, which has become fashionable on the 
rebound from the horrors o f the la s t  decades, would proclaim aggressive­
ness in a l l  i t s  forms as altogether damnable and e v i l ,  Yet w ithout a
moderate amount o f aggressive ind iv idualism  there could be no social or
32cu ltu ra l progress’ .
Another type o f  person deemed to be in need o f treatment in Pala
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is  the ’ Peter Panic' type. Children of th is  type reach maturity at a 
la te r  stage than the average c h i ld ,  and in consequence, they are regar­
ded as being p o te n t ia l ly  dangerous to socie ty, as the mesomorphic c h i l ­
dren are, unless adequately and promptly treated. Diagnosis o f the 
'Peter Pans' is  effected through the use o f w r is t  x-rays, presumably to
assess the rate a t which the c h i ld 's  o s s if ic a t io n  process is  taking
place. Once discovered, the 'Peter Pans' are given three pink cap­
sules a day, to speed up the maturation process, I t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to
maintain, in these circumstances, tha t 'inborn b io log ica l d iffe rences ' 
are valued and preserved in Huxley's utopian socie ty,
Pala is  a paradoxical paradise in many ways. D ivers ity  is  said 
to  be highly valued, yet certa in  physiological types o f person are 
judged to be in need o f modification from childhood onward. The claim is  
made tha t people o f a l l  leve ls o f a b i l i t y  are equally prized in socie ty, 
yet there is se lective breeding fo r  in te l l ig e n ce ; i t  is  said tha t men 
are free , yet a l l  are so ably conditioned from the school-room onward 
tha t they emerge uniformly m ystica l; i t  is  said tha t human re la tionsh ips 
are a t th e i r  most exalted, yet ch ildren are, in many cases, sired by 
a r t i f i c i a l  insemination from deep-frozen sperm stock, in order to improve
the race, and sexual re la tionsh ips are so depersonalized as to become
33the 'psycho-physical means to a transcendental end'.
The eugenic methods adopted in Pala would seem to introduce 
a measure of genetic un ifo rm ity , to re in force the cu ltu ra l un ifo rm ity
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provided by conditioning techniques and medical procedures. Aldous Huxley 
shared with his brother Ju lian a fear tha t the general level of i n t e l ­
ligence in the Western world was f a l l in g ,  owing to 'b e t te r  medicine, 
more congenital defic iencies passed on '.^^  Accordingly, in Pala, 
steps are taken to ha lt  th is  decline. Highly g i f te d  males are encour­
aged to bequeath th e ir  sperm to p o s te r ity ,  and the general in te l l ig ence  
level o f the populace is said to be r is in g  s tead ily  in consequence.
Couples can 'take a shot at having a ch ild  o f superior q u a l i t y ' ,  i f  they
choose, and most of them do. There is a centra l bank o f 'superior
35stocks , of every va r ie ty  o f physique and temperament'. Here Huxley 
l ie s  close to Wells, whose work he parodied in Brave New World. Wells 
considered human reproduction to be too important to be l e f t  to the ran­
dom whims o f Nature, while Huxley considered th a t the supposed decline 
in  human potentia l was the re su lt  not o f purposeless Nature, but of 
human in te rven tion  in the evolutionary process. But both reach the same 
conclusion: eugenic measures must be introduced as a pos it ive  means
fo r  improving the genetic pool. The Palanese are committed to ra is ing  
the general level o f in te l l ig e n ce . 'Give us another century, and our 
average I.Q. w i l l  be up to a hundred and f i f t e e n ' ,  one o f the Palanese 
t e l l s  W ill Farnaby, who rep lies  sourly , 'Whereas ours, a t the present 
rate o f progress, w i l l  be down to about e ig h ty - f iv e ' .  There is  no 
suggestion that the use of se lective breeding in Pala is  re s tr ic te d  
e n t i re ly  to those cases where there is  a r is k  o f genetic transmission 
o f abnormality or disease through the male l in e ,  Control o f genetic 
po ten tia l is an essential constituent in the utopian programme of 
Huxley, as o f Wells.
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Alone among the w rite rs  under review, Orwell makes no mention 
o f the need o f the ru le rs  o f the to ta l state to have control o f breeding. 
This is because, in Orwell's an ti^u top ia , a l l  tha t the ru le rs  desire 
is to wield absolute power. For th is  they need only to remove a l l  
p o s s ib i l i t y  o f ind iv idua l freedom from th e i r  c i t iz e n s . There is  no con­
comitant need forthem f i r s t  to secure power to determine the character 
and range o f the mental and physical a t t r ib u te s  o f those whom they are 
to repress, The c it izen s  o f Oceania are born as disparate in d iv id ua ls ,  
but they are soon repressed by te r ro r  in to  cowering un ifo rm ity .
While in Orwell's Oceania, the c it izen s  are standardized through 
fea r, in the World State o f Huxley’ s Brave New World and the One 
State o f Zamyatin’ s the c it izen s  are fashioned from conception fo r  
the l i f e  they are to lead. In Brave New World, se lective breeding is  
used fo r  the establishment o f a r ig id ly  h ierarch ica l socie ty. This 
s t r a t i f i c a t io n  is  designed to match the labour requirements o f the state. 
The c i t iz e n  is  no more than his rô le . S ignificance attaches not to the 
in d iv id u a l,  and his personal a tt r ib u te s  and id iosyncracies, but to the 
re la tionsh ips  between the s tra ta  o f society. Each man is  f ixed in his 
prescribed social category from conception to death. The lower ranks 
of society are completely und iffe ren tia ted  mass men, cloned, constrained, 
and conditioned to lead iden tica l l ives ,
In 1^, however, the One State uses se lective breeding to fu r th e r 
qu ite  d i f fe re n t  ends, Zamyatin’ s an ti-u top ian state is  not h ierarch ica l 
in s truc tu re , The dogma o f the One State proclaims tha t a l l  men are 
equal, interchangeable parts of a mechanical whole, Thus eugenic
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procedures are employed to secure the absolute un ifo rm ity  o f the 
c it iz e n s .  Paternal and Maternal Norms have been established, and 
only those members o f the state who conform to these Norms are allowed 
to reproduce. I t  is  hoped tha t eventually a l l  physical and mental v a r i ­
ations w i l l  have been bred out. D-503 looks forward to the day when
37’ even the noses o f a l l ’ w i l l  be id e n t ic a l .  With an irony which D-503
does not perceive, the poet, R-13, t e l l s  him, ’We are the most fortunate
arithm etica l mean. How do you fe llows put i t  - the in tegra tion  from
38zero to i n f i n i t y ,  from the c re t in  to Shakespeare...' I t  is  the con­
ten tion  o f the a rch itec ts  o f the One State tha t fo r  as long as in d iv i ­
dual d ifferences are allowed to p e rs is t ,  there w i l l  in e v ita b ly  be envy 
among men. Total perfection l ie s  at the po in t where iden tica l c i t iz e n s ,  
id e n t ic a l ly  reared, lead iden tica l l iv e s .  When th is  has been achieved, 
a l l  occasion fo r  envy w i l l  have been f i n a l l y  eliminated.
The problem of envy is  also recognized by the ru le rs  o f  Huxley's 
World State. Here the problem is  p o te n t ia l ly  a serious one, since the 
c it ize n s  are de lib e ra te ly  bred to have widely d i f fe r in g  capac it ies , 
and to lead wholly d i f fe re n t  l iv e s ,  according to the stratum o f society 
to which they are assigned. However, the members o f  each social cate­
gory are conditioned from b ir th  to consider th e i r  own pos it ion  in l i f e  
to  be the best possible one. ’ L ik ing what you’ ve got to do. A ll 
condition ing aims at tha t;  making people l ik e  th e i r  unescapable social
39
d e s t in y ',  Mustapha Mond remarks,
In Huxley's Pala, too, the problem o f envy might be expected 
to a r ise ,  since breeding in Pala, as in the utopias of Wells, is  designed 
fo r  the purpose o f ra is ing  the general level o f in te l l ig e n c e , and thus
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'the best' are reserved as the prime breeding stock. However, to  avoid 
the p o s s ib i l i t y  of envy, the c it izen s  are taught tha t a l l  are o f  equal 
value to socie ty, despite differences in in te l l ig ence  and a b i l i t y ,  and 
tha t those who lack in te l le c t ,  may well be endowed with a deeper s p i r i ­
t u a l i t y  in compensation, This argument is  unsa tis fac to ry , however, 
since i f  a l l  were t r u ly  deemed to be of equal worth, i t  would not be 
th o u g h t  necessary fo r  men of l im ited  in te l l ig e n ce  to have to consider 
fos te ring  the children of 'superio r ' genetic stock, instead o f fa thering 
th e i r  own ch ild ren.
Pala is  not, o f course, a to ta l  state in the sense tha t the a n t i ­
utopias o f Huxley, Orwell and Zamyatin are. The c it izen s  s t i l l  have 
privacy, and they s t i l l  have some element o f choice in th e ir  l iv e s ,  
even in the matter o f se lective breeding. They s t i l l  re ta in  some 
control over th e i r  own bodies. They may choose sexual partners, and 
they may bring up th e i r  own children.
In the an ti-u top ian states, however, the c i t iz e n  is  no longer 
the possessor of his own body. He is  merely i t s  trus tee . The state has 
control over his conception, his rearing, his eating and sleeping 
habits. The state has power to fa c i l i t a t e  or p ro h ib it  his sexual g r a t i ­
f ic a t io n ,  and to assess his s u i t a b i l i t y  or otherwise fo r  procreation. I f  
i t  so w i l l s ,  the state may submit his body to  degradation and to r tu re ,  
and decide the time and manner o f i t s  death,
I t  is ,  of course, commonplace fo r  the community to exert some 
control over the bodies o f i t s  ind iv idua l members, Laws against drug 
abuse, abortion, p ro s t i tu t io n  and suicide are common to many soc ie t ies . 
S im ila r ly ,  there are laws regulating matrimonial behaviour. The
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c i t iz e n  does not have absolute freedom to use his body at a l l  times as 
he deems f i t .  But in the imaginary an ti-u top ian states, the in d iv i ­
dual has no indefeasible r igh ts  over his own body. He merely has an 
absolute ob liga tion  to preserve his body as a p e rfe c t ly  function ing 
component o f  the corporate whole fo r  as long as the state requires him 
to do so.
The body of the c i t iz e n  o f the to ta l  s tate belongs to the com­
munity. His physical l i f e  may be one of enforced hedonism, as in Brave 
New World, o f featureless moderation, as in  or o f b ru ta l iz in g  asce­
t ic ism , as in Nineteen Eighty-Four, In each case, the ind iv idua l is  
deprived o f the r ig h t  to choose how he shall order his own physical 
l i f e .
The c i t iz e n  o f  Zamyatin's One State has an absolute duty not
to jeopardize his health in any way. 'A l l  numbers . . .  are duty bound
to sleep at n ight. This is  as much a duty as working during the day.
Sleep is  necessary i f  one is  to work in the daytime. Not to sleep
40at n ight is  c r im in a l ' .  Citizens are also forbidden to dream, since 
dreaming is  a sign of psychic disturbance,^^ Each c i t iz e n  must chew 
each mouthful o f food the requ is ite  number o f times, and a l l  eat the 
same food, an a r t i f i c i a l  substance, derived from naphtha. Citizens 
must eschew a l l  p o te n t ia l ly  noxious substances, on pain o f death:
'The One State is merciless to a l l  who poison themselves with n ico­
t ine  and, espec ia lly , w ith alcohol , , ,  The rapid destruction o f a few
is  more ra tiona l than g iv ing to the many the opportunity o f working 
42th e i r  own r u in ' .  A ll c i t ize n s  are compelled to jo in  in the Daily March
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o f the One State, so tha t they may obtain the requ is ite  amount of 
exercise. And i f  any member notices any symptoms in himself o f i l l -
40
health, he is obligated to report fo r  medical treatment.
While no c it ize n  of the One State may wantonly expose his body to 
r is k ,  neithermay he choose to w ithold his body from danger, i f  the state 
requires him to undertake hazardous work, His death or m u ti la t ion  in 
the course o f his work is o f  no consequence (see Part I I  ( i )  note 19), 
yet he has no r ig h t  to choose to undertake any enterprise which might 
resu lt  in  his bodily  harm. The rebels o f Zamyatin's One State d e l i ­
berately consume alcohol and n ico t ine , and expose themselves to danger 
in the w ild  world beyond the protective glass w a ll ,  as an expression 
o f re vo lt .  The most desperate expression o f rebe ll ion  against state 
control over the body occurs in Brave New World, where the Savage 
re jects the ob liga to ry hedonism of the World State in the bizarre and 
psychologically ambivalent act o f s e l f - f la g e l la t io n .
Since the body o f the c i t iz e n  of the to ta l state is  public 
property, he no longer has any r ig h t  of privacy. The actions o f his 
body are no longer personal actions; they form part o f communal action. 
S im ila r ly ,  his mind is public property. No priva te perceptions, b e l ie fs ,  
hopes, memories or judgments are permitted, Both mind and body must 
remain open to others.
The a b o l i t io n  o f privacy is  a constantly recurring theme in 
utopian w r i t in g ,  and is even apparent in Rousseau's descrip tion o f the 
i d y l l i c  world o f  the Wolmars at Clarens, in La Nouvelle Hëloise,
Ju l ie  takes care that the members o f her household s ta f f  l iv e  constantly
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in the public gaze, since, as she explains, 'Ce n 'e s t point dans les
assemblées nombreuses, ou tout le monde nous v o i t  et nous écoute, mais
dans des entretiens p a r t ic u l ie rs ,  ob régnent le secret et la l ib e r té ,
44que les moeurs peuvent cou rir  des r isques ', ( I t  is  not a t a l l  in large
congregations of people, where everyone observes and hears what we say,
but in private converse, where secrecy and freedom hold sway, tha t
morals are set at r is k ) ,  Ju l ie  regards with the deepest suspicion
any servant who shows a propensity to s l ip  away from the communal
a c t iv i t ie s  she arranges fo r  her household, and f in d  privacy.
In Zamyatin’ s transparent c i t y  there are l is te n in g  membranes
beneath the glass paving of the s treets . The Guardians, whose duty
i t  is  to conserve un ifo rm ity , move anonymously among the populace,
recording any deviations in speech or behaviour. In Orwell's Oceania,
secret po lice , informers, two-way te le v is io n  scanners and l is te n in g
devices are in s ta l le d  in every bu ild ing , so tha t any change o f hab its ,
any sign o f e c ce n tr ic i ty  or any ind ica tion  o f mental stress may be observed
Informing is  enjoined as a duty and a praiseworthy a c t iv i t y  in
both Oceania and the One State, S im ila r ly ,  in Rousseau's Clarens, the
servants are encouraged to denounce one another to th e i r  employers. I t
is  asserted that ’ M, et Mme. de Wolmar ont su transformer le  v i l  métier
d ’ accusateur en une fonction de z^ le , d ' in té g r i té ,  de courage, aussi
45noble ou du moins aussi louable q u 'e l le  l ' é t a i t  chez les Romains'-.
(M. and Mme, de Wolmar knew how to transform the v i le  trade of the
informer in to  a function of zeal, o f in te g r i t y ,  o f  courage, as noble,
or a t least as praiseworthy as i t  was among the Romans),
Although fo r  most utopian w r ite rs ,  as also fo r  Rousseau, privacy
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is  abolished in the cause o f preserving social co n tro l,  fo r  Wells, 
the question o f privacy is  seen d i f fe re n t ly .  C erta in ly , in the imaginary 
world o f Wells ’ s A Modern Utopia, privacy has been eroded in the cause 
o f e f f ic ie n c y , but Wells did not consider tha t re s t r ic t io n  o f privacy 
was a matter o f any great concern to man,. Simply, Wells did not consider 
privacy to be a fundamental human requirement. Privacy in former ages, 
he contended, did not e x is t ,  nor was i t  necessary, since men were homo­
geneous, and therefore f e l t  no embarrassment or d isqu ie t in one another's 
company. In the fu tu re , more advanced socie ty. Wells held, men would 
once again be at ease with one another, since eugenic breeding would have 
produced a race o f  men o f g reatly  enhanced in te l l ig e n ce  and social grace.
A desire fo r  privacy. Wells suggested, is  no more than a symptom o f
46fa u l ty  breeding and social d is loca tion .
In Zamyatin's We, the homogeneity among men which Wells believed 
to have ty p i f ie d  e a r l ie r  socie ties has once more been restored, a lb e i t  
in a very d i f fe re n t  form. Men perform, without embarrassment, the 
routine actions o f th e ir  iden tica l da i ly  l iv e s ,  under the unceasing, 
though in d i f fe re n t ,  gaze o f th e i r  fe llows. Only one concession is  made 
to the human desire fo r  privacy: during the Sexual Hour each day, 
those who have been a l lo t te d  permits fo r  sexual union are allowed to 
lower the blinds in th e ir  glass rooms. I t  i s ,  in c id e n ta l ly ,  during the 
temporary privacy of the Sexual Hour tha t the rebels frequently  conduct 
th e i r  acts o f re v o lt ,  and plan th e ir  insu rrec t ion . Within the context 
o f Zamyatin’ s One State, i t  is  strange tha t the sexual act alone should 
be singled out as an a c t iv i t y  worthy o f privacy, since i t  involves no
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true intimacy, and is  regarded by the ru le rs  o f the One State as being 
an act in every way comparable with other bod ily  acts, such as eating 
and ur ina ting .
In the imaginary to ta l s tates, the state exercises control over 
every aspect of human sexua lity . State control over the body begins 
at conception in the imaginary worlds of and Brave New World, The 
state predetermines the physical nature of the in d iv id u a l,  his capaci­
t ie s  and his l im ita t io n s .  A fte r b i r th ,  o f course, the use o f condi­
t ion ing  procedures re inforces the e f fe c t  o f the eugenic measures.
In Huxley's World State, conception and embryonic development 
take place w ith in  the laboratory, and in both the World State and the 
One State, as in the imaginary state of Wells 's The Sleeper Awakes, 
mechanical mother surrogates replace human parents during the c h i ld 's  
formative years. In the One State, once a ch ild  nas been born,no 
fu r th e r  l in k  exists between parent and c h i ld .  Parenthood, and conse­
quently fa m il ia l  love, have been abolished. When D-503 fee ls himself 
to have been betrayed by E-330, he yearns fo r  the comfort of maternal 
a ffec t ion . ' I f  only I had a mother - as the ancients d id : a mother
of my own - yes, prec ise ly , my own' ,  he c r ies  in anguish, 'And i f  
only I were, as fa r  as she was concerned, not the bu ilder o f the 
In teg ra l,  and not a number, D-503, and not a molecule of the One
State, but a b i t  o f  common humanity, a b i t  o f her own s e lf  . . .  i f  she
47would only hear what no one hears , , , '
While in Huxley's World State and Zamyatin's One State, parent­
hood has ceased to e x is t ,  in Orwell's Oceania, the fam ily  pe rs is ts .
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in a perverted form, but suspicion, hatred and fea r ty p i fy  a l l  fam ily 
re la tionsh ips , Children are taught, at an early  age, to despise th e i r  
parents, to  spy on them, and to betray them to the Party. In Oceania, 
love is  transformed in to  loa th ing , and married couples un ite  b r ie f ly  
and with mutual disgust, so le ly  fo r  the purpose o f producing the c h i l ­
dren required of them by the state.
Parenthood, in Zamyatin’ s is  of course, conditional upon 
the prospective parents having achieved the r ig h t  degree o f medio­
c r i t y .  0-90, D-503's s ta te -reg is te red  sexual partner at the beginning 
of the book, is  smaller than average, and is  therefore forbidden parent­
hood. Yet she longs to have a c h i ld ,  and f i n a l l y  decides, incbspera- 
t io n ,  to have a ch ild  by D-503, even though she is  aware tha t such an 
act o f defiance is punishable by death. Although i t  is  never recog­
nized by those around her, 0-90 is c o n s t i tu t io n a l ly  and irredeemably 
a he re tic , a fac t o f which she is he rse lf unconscious. She makes no 
pos it ive  decision to rebel, or to induce others to rebel, ye t in the 
One State she is by nature unorthodox, an outs ider. 0-90’ s decision 
to have a c h i ld ,  even though i t  should lead to her death, is  not 
‘ ra t io n a l ’ but emotional. I t  is  a bodily  imperative which she is  
powerless to re s is t .  She l ives  by emotion ra ther than by reason, 
knowing no other mode o f l i v in g ,  and she feels fo r  D-503 an inex tingu ish­
able love which is both unwelcome and also treasonable.
Sexual love, which, l ik e  parental love, could lead to a d iv is ion  
o f lo y a l t ie s ,  and undermine the to ta l power of the s ta te , is  outlawed 
in a l l  the an ti-u top ias , In Brave New World, mass sexua lity  is
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stimulated and then in s ta n t ly  g ra t i f ie d .  The sexual drive is  thus 
depersonalized, and assumes a r i tu a l  q u a l i ty .  Love becomes corporate 
sensuality. Promiscuity is  p o s it ive ly  encouraged, to avoid the develop­
ment of any serious emotional commitment. In Nineteen E ighty-Four, 
sexua lity  is wholly repressed, and in 1^, i t  is  c lose ly  regulated. In 
the One State as in Huxley's World State, a l l  are sexually ava ilab le to 
a l l ,  and no one has the r ig h t  to prefer one partner to the exclusion 
o f others, or to w ithold himself from another c i t iz e n .  But certa in  
fo rm a lit ie s  have to be completed before a sexual l ia is o n  may proceed, 
and the state informs the c it izens on which days they w i l l  be per­
mitted to conduct th e i r  sexual a c t iv i t ie s .
The ru lers o f the One State hold tha t 'Love and Hunger ru le the 
Universe', and tha t therefore , those who would govern the world must 
f i r s t  conquer both love and hunger. Having succeeded in vanquishing 
Hunger, the founders o f the One State turned th e i r  a tten tion  to Love,
D-503 w rites . ' In  the end th is  elemental force was likew ise conquered 
- i . e .  i t  was organized, mathematized - and . . . .  our h is to r ic  Lex 
Sexual is  was promulgated: "Every number has the r ig h t  o f  a v a i la b i l i t y ,
as a sexual product, to any other number". As fo r  the re s t o f i t  - w e l l ,
48that is  already mere technique'. Thus the Lex Sexual is  ra t iona lizes  
love, which has 'accounted fo r  countless and excessively s i l l y  trage­
dies' in past ages. Sexual a c t iv i t y  now consists in the enjoyment o f
49a 'harmonious and pleasantly useful organic fu n t io n ' .  Thus Love has 
been denatured, refashioned as a pe rfec t ly  regulated function o f the 
s ta te , devoid of d is rup tive  sexual passion. Moreover, ju s t  as the 
in s t i tu t io n  o f Paternal and Maternal Norms, and the consequent e lim ination
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o f physical and mental va r ia t ion s , is designed to eradicate envy from
socie ty, so too is  the Lex Sexual i s , since in former times, as D-503
says, 'the love o f some was s tr iven fo r  by many, while the love of
50others wasn't s tr iven fo r  by any'. Devoid o f the burden o f personal 
commitment, and the p o s s ib i l i t y  of pain, sexua lity  in the One State, 
as in Huxley's World State, is  reduced to the level o f simple, in fan­
t i l e  enjoyment,
In Zamyatin's One State, there is  no room e ith e r fo r  the ascetic 
or fo r  the l ib e r t in e .  While sexual love is  p roh ib ited , sexual g r a t i ­
f ic a t io n  is  included in the timetable as a mandatory a c t iv i t y .  The c i t i ­
zens of the One State are regarded as being isomorphic beings, endowed
with iden tica l bodily needs, to be met in the state-approved manner.
In the cause o f physical health and well-be ing, the c it iz e n  must copu­
la te  a t the required times, and a t no other times, ju s t  as he must eat 
and sleep at the ordained times. Standardized c i t iz e n s ,  w ith stan­
dardized appetites are accorded standardized s a t is fa c t io n .
The passion tha t D-503 fee ls  fo r  E-330 is  c r im in a l,  because i t  
is  a pa rt icu la r ized  emotion, because i t  is  'an ti- reason ' ,  and because 
i t  is an expression o f his en tire  s e l f ,  mind and body. He is  no longer 
an und iffe ren tia ted  and obedient molecule o f the One State. Sexual 
love accomplishes w ith in  him the fusion o f his two ' I s ' ,  Man-as- 
animal and man-as-poet un ite , D-503 is appalled by the emergence o f 
his h ith e rto  unrecognized, shaggy, animal s e l f ,  by the b i r th  o f his 
body, but he is also appalled by the growth of his poetic imagination 
under the influence of love,
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While in Zamyatin's conception o f sexual love, as expressed in 
We, body and mind f ind  expression, in Huxley's v is ion  o f love, the 
body is never f u l l y  accepted. The imperfect, corporeal, human e n t i ty  
is  judged unworthy as an object o f love in utopia and an ti-u top ia  
a l ike .  Huxley's philosophy o f non-attachment colours both Brave New 
World and Is land,
In Brave New World, two opposing conceptions o f sexuality  are 
presented. F i r s t ly ,  there is the mindless sensuality o f the inhabi­
tants of the World State, which Huxley c le a r ly  re je c ts ,  and secondly, 
there is  the f lesh less, abstract, inwardly-d irected romanticism of 
the Savage, fo r  which Huxley appears to have considerable sympathy.
The Savage expresses an ardent devotion to the ideal o f  love. He has 
no desire or capacity to accept the re a l i t y  o f another person, but only 
a curiously depersonalized need to experience the emotion o f love. The 
loved person is  no more than an ob ject, the fe t is h  to which he hopes he 
can attach his dreams.
In Is land , the body is  again re jected, as sexua lity  becomes a
force not fo r  personal commitment, but fo r  transcendental release, fo r
o b l i te ra t io n  o f the s e l f  in mystical union w ith the One. Physical love
is  recast as re lig ious  experience, In Pala, personal thought and
emotions, are considered ir re le v a n t,  'What I personally th ink is
beside the p o in t ' ,  Susila , one of the Palanese, explains to W ill Farna-
by, 'A l l  tha t matters is  what I may impersonally experience while I'm
51l iv in g ,  when I'm dying, maybe when I'm dead'. Yet where the personal 
is  held to be of so l i t t l e  account, how is  i t  possible to form human
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re lationships? The impersonal Palanese extends his cosmic love over 
a l l  others, fo r  the sake o f the eternal s p i r i t  present in a l l  men, and 
seeks to help them and himself to achieve man^s Final End o f d isso lu ­
t ion  in the Void, But the question must arise as to whether love has 
any pos it ive  meaning in a society where man has been so conditioned as 
not to be able to choose d is l ik e ,  or ind if fe rence , as an a lte rn a t ive  
response to love, or whether the highly se lective intimacy o f f r ie n d ­
ship could survive in a society awash with unremitting cha r ity .
In Pala, no one has to contend with the problems enta iled  in 
re la t ing  to disparate and diverse ind iv idual e n t i t ie s .  This is  so 
fo r  two reasons. F i r s t l y ,  the rough edges o f ind iv idua l temperament 
are a l l  f i l e d  away during the c h i ld 's  period o f education. There is  
no need fo r  true tolerance. Those who appear immature are given hor­
monal treatment to ass is t the ageing process; those who are considered 
to be too phys ica lly  robust and active are a l lo t te d  long periods of 
arduous physical exertion , fo r  fear they may use th e i r  surplus energy 
in aggressive acts. A ll children are conditioned by th e i r  educators to 
acquire a broadly s im ila r  view of the world. When W ill Farnaby arrives 
in Pala, he is  greeted on a l l  sides by the jo y fu l  pedagogy of eager 
mystics, in ten t upon sharing th e i r  enlightenment with him, I t  is  by no 
means c lear how such a society as that depicted in Pala would be able 
to meet the needs o f an ac tive , se lf-asse rt ive  humanist, fo r  whom 
transcendentalism had no meaning. Secondly, fo r  the c i t iz e n  o f Pala, 
the d i f f i c u l t i e s  which may attend any real and enduring human contact 
are removed, since there is  never any necessity fo r  anyone to have to 
persevere with a temporarily unsatisfactory re la t io n sh ip ,  and make i t
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work, The people o f  the is land are divided in to  Mutual Adoption Clubs, 
consisting o f some twenty to twenty-five fam ily  un its  each, At the f i r s t  
sign o f any c o n f l ic t  between parent and c h i ld ,  the ch i ld  leaves home, 
and is  fostered w ith in  a surrogate family more to his l ik in g .  Neither 
parent nor ch ild  has to learn to adapt to the changing needs o f the 
other. The personal commitment involved in fa m il ia l  re la tionsh ips  is  
o f  no great importance in Pala.
There is  a fu r th e r  reason why Huxley's idealized v is ion o f marita l 
and fa m il ia l  re la tionsh ips in Island is unsatis fac tory . As mentioned 
e a r l ie r ,  Huxley f a i l s  to consider the possible changes in human re la t io n ­
ships which might be expected to arise from the adoption o f eugenic 
techniques, In Is land , he describes a society supposedly ruled by 
enlightened love, yet the acceptance of se lective breeding programmes 
requires s c ie n t i f ic  detachment, rather than inter-personal commitment.
I t  is  hard to understand why the in s t i tu t io n  o f marriage has been pre­
served in Huxley's imaginary is land , since i t  seems to have ou tl ived  
i t s  functions, in generally accepted terms. Women e lec t to bear the 
ch ildren of men long dead, husbands fos te r these posthumous tr ib u te s  
to a dead man's su p e r io r i ty ,  and children are no longer the f r u i t  o f 
conjugal a f fe c t io n ,  but o f s c ie n t i f ic  c u r io s i ty .  ‘My baby might grow 
up to be a pa inter - that is ,  i f  tha t kind o f ta le n t  is  inherited .
And even i f  i t  i s n ' t ,  h e ' l l  be a lo t  more endomorphic and viscere.tonic 
than his brothers or e i th e r o f his parents, which is  going to be very 
in te res ting  and educative fo r  everyone concerned^, declares the mother 
o f one o f these l i t t l e  l iv in g  r e l i c t s ,  with the c l in ic a l  detachment
o f an experimental s c ie n t is t ,  ra ther than the tender acceptance o f a
 ^ 53 parent.
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Sexual re la tionships in Pala are also ty p i f ie d  by an a t t i tu d e  
o f detachment, Sexual a c t iv i t y  is therapy fo r  the soul, to be lea rn t 
jo y fu l ly  and expertly  at school, as part o f the normal curriculum.
Slower pupils are a l lo t te d  an older in s tru c to r ,  who w i l l  teach the 
necessary techniques.
In i t s  most exalted form, love-making evolves in to  maithuna, 
a r i tu a l iz e d  form of s e l f - re s t ra in t  in the cause of s p i r i tu a l  e n l ig h t ­
enment. Maithuna is  the 'yoga o f lo v e ',  and is  considered, a t least 
among the female Palanese, to be fa r  superior to sexual union, Radha, a 
young Palanese nurse, declares, 'For women - a l1 women, and I don 't care 
what you say about sweeping generalizations - the yoga o f love means
perfec tion , means being transformed and taken out of themselves and 
54completed'. I f  Radha's heroic assertion is  to be taken as represent­
ing the t ru th ,  then condition ing in Pala must indeed be e f fe c t iv e ,  to 
produce such unblemished unanimity among an e n t ire  sex.
For Huxley, the 'yoga o f love' replaces the 'yoga o f resentfu l 
addiction . . .  o f lu s t  and se lf - lo a th in g  tha t re inforces the s e l f  and
makes i t  yet more loathsome', which he seems to suggest ty p i f ie s  sexual
55re la tionships in the non-utopian world, Palanese love is  fa r  removed 
from the ea rth ly ,  compulsive passion fo r  another ind iv idua l person, 
which Huxley appears so to dread and despise, Essence has f i n a l l y  
overcome ape in Is land , and the body is f i rm ly  re jected,
In Orwell's work, there is no mystical re jec t ion  o f the body, 
but acceptance o f the physical nature of man does not appear to be 
complete, Orwell's apprehension o f the body is  clouded by ambiguities.
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Sexuality, in Nineteen E ight-Four, is presented as an anarchic 
force, as a power fo r  p o l i t ic a l  l ib e ra t io n ,  u lt im a te ly  des truc t ive , 
rather than creative. The sexual act is  p r im a ri ly  an act o f r e t r ib u ­
t io n ,  Winston confides in Ju lia  that he had at f i r s t  suspected her o f 
being a member o f the Thought Police. ' I hated the s igh t o f  you . . .  I 
wanted to rape you and then murder you afterwards. Two weeks ago I 
thought seriously o f smashing your head in w ith a cobblestone', he 
a d m i t s , H e  is  exu ltan t when Ju lia  te l l s  him tha t she has had many
lovers. -Listen. The more men you've had, the more I love you . . . .  I
don’ t  want v ir tu e  to ex is t  anywhere. I want everyone to be corrupt
to the bones’ , he t e l l s  her. The fa c t that J u l ia  enjoys the sex act in
i t s e l f  de lights Winston. ’ That was above a l l  what he wanted to hear.
Not merely the love o f one person but the simple und iffe ren tia ted
57desire: that was the force tha t would tear the Party to p ieces '.
Love, fo r  Winston and J u l ia ,  is  rebe ll ion  against the Party. Winston 
re f le c ts  that he 'would g ladly in fe c t  the whole lo t  of them with leprosy 
or s y p h i l is ’ i f  he could. 'Anything to ro t ,  to weaken, to undermine!. 
Just such an apprehension o f the p o te n t ia l ly  destructive power o f the 
sexual act is apparent in GUnter Grass’ s Dog Years, where the central 
character, Walter Matern, as a self-appointed Angel o f Vengeance, con­
ducts a priva te campaign o f  insurrect ion  against the Nazi regime through
59the dissemination o f 'a n t i - fa s c is t  gonorrhea',
O rwell’ s Winston Smith gradually comes to love J u l ia ,  and to 
feel tenderness towards her, yet fo r  Orwell, as fo r  Grass, sexua lity  
in the to ta l state is to be seen as a power fo r  defilement, as much 
as fo r  fu l f i lm e n t ,
-  185 -
The body is ,  fo r  a time, useful to Orwell's Winston Smith, as an 
instrument fo r  revenge, but u lt im a te ly  is  an ine v itab le  source of 
degradation, an obstacle to human d ig n ity  and in te g r i t y ,  a burden 
upon the mind and upon the w i l l .
Orwell draws a radica l d is t in c t io n  between the physical and the 
mental in his w r i t in g .  In Nineteen Eighty-Four, he seems to suggest 
tha t in the la s t  analysis there is  no moral strength which may outweigh 
the weakness o f the body, and tha t th is  must always be a source o f 
shame. I t  is the body's v u ln e ra b i l i ty  to pain which leaves the mind 
u lt im a te ly  defenceless, to be moulded in to whatever shape an oppressor 
may desire. Man may delude himself fo r  a while tha t his w i l l  is  free , 
but human m ora lity  is  only as strong as bodily f r a i l t y  w i l l  allow. 
F in a l ly ,  the body w i l l  succumb to pain, dragging the mind down with i t .  
Of Winston Smith, Orwell w r ite s , 'He thought w ith a kind o f astonish­
ment o f the b io log ica l uselessness o f pain and fea r,  the treachery o f 
the human body which always freezes in to  in e r t ia  at exactly the moment 
when a special e f f o r t  is  needed . . . .  I t  struck him tha t in moments o f 
c r is is  one is  never f ig h t in g  against an external enemy, but always
against one's own body . . . .  Even now ........  the du ll ache in his be lly
made consecutive thought impossible. And i t  is  the same, he perceived, 
in a l l  seemingly heroic or t ra g ic  s i tua tions . On the b a t t le f ie ld ,  
in the to r tu re  chamber, on a sinking ship, the issues that you are 
f ig h t in g  fo r  are always fo rgo tten , because the body swells up u n t i l  i t  
f i l l s  the universe, and even when you are not paralysed by f r ig h t  or 
screaming with pain, l i f e  is  a moment-to-moment struggle against
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hunger or cold or sleeplessness, against a sour stomach or an aching 
tooth '
In Nineteen Eighty^Four, the body is  portrayed as the enemy o f 
the soul, Despite his atheism, Orwell is  a d u a l is t .  But whereas the 
Christian ascetics whom he seems at times to resemble equate moral 
f r a i l t y  with voluptuousness, Orwell suggests tha t man's u lt im ate moral 
weakness arises not from his in a b i l i t y  to control his desires, but from 
his in a b i l i t y  to control his aversions. M ora lity  may be lea rn t in 
childhood through the experience of pleasure and pain, but pain becomes 
the most e ffe c t ive  tool whereby his m ora lity  may be destroyed, Orwell's 
Winston Smith finds the desire to avoid pain to  be stronger than love, 
or the regard fo r  t ru th .  Under pain, he discovers, there is  no moral 
p r in c ip le  which may not be surrendered. Only the in s t in c t  to preserve 
the body from pain, which is  the strongest in s t in c t  in man, as in a l l  
other sentient beings, is  unconquerable. Where there is  pain, Orwell 
s tates, there are no heroes. Man's only hope o f  preserving his m ora lity  
l ie s  in his being able to  avoid s itua tions  where his weakness may be 
exploited.
Orwell's conception of the 'treachery o f the human body' is  open 
to c r i t ic is m . Neither pain nor fear is  'b io lo g ic a l ly  useless'. The 
capacity fo r  se lf-preservation in man, as in any animal, depends upon 
th e i r  existence. Neither man nor Nature is  to blame. The true enemy 
of the tortu red man is  his to r tu re r ,  not his own body, and the mind o f 
the to r tu re r  is  surely more culpable than the body o f the v ic t im .
The to r tu re r  is  e xp lo it ing  and misusing man's natural mechanism fo r
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su rv iva l,  and forc ing i t  to function in ways unintended by Nature, or 
by any conjectural Creator,
I t  is l i k e ly  tha t Orwell's personal experience o f pain and i l l -  
health coloured his v is ion . Towards the end of his l i f e  he became 
impatient with his body, There were many ideas which he s t i l l  wished 
to express in books and a r t ic le s ,  yet physical d e b i l i t y  and pain preven­
ted him from doing so. I t  is  perhaps s ig n if ic a n t  tha t Orwell portrays 
Winston Smith as a man not unlike himself - a man o f f r a i l  bu i ld ,  with 
a chronic cough. Winston is  also tormented by a varicous leg u lcer 
and an in d if fe re n t  d igestive system. He is  permanently aware o f 
his body as an obstruction. During periods o f intense mental e f f o r t ,  
the importun ities o f his body constantly threaten his powers of 
concentration.^^ Winston regards his body w ith mild d isgust, and at 
f i r s t  expects Ju lia  to share th is  d is tas te . ' I 'm  th i r ty -n in e  years 
old. I 'v e  got a wife tha t I can 't get r id  o f.  I 'v e  got varicose 
veins. I 'v e  got f iv e  fa lse te e th ' ,  he t e l l s  her. 'Can you s t i l l  bear 
to look at me?'^^
But fo r  J u l ia ,  the body is  paramount. She can enter in to  a phy­
sica l re la t ionsh ip  without reserve. I t  is  the drive to exert one's 
mental energies which she cannot comprehend. She is  incapable o f 
sharing Winston's mental anguish. Of J u l ia ,  Orwell w r i te s ,  ' In  the rami­
f ic a t io n s  o f Party doctrine she had not the fa in te s t  in te re s t ,  Whenever 
he (Winston) began to ta lk  o f  the pr inc ip les  o f Ingsoc, doublethink, 
the m u ta b i l i ty  of the past, and the denial o f ob jective r e a l i t y ,  and to 
use Newspeak words, she became bored and confused and said tha t she
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never paid any a tten tion  to tha t kind o f rubbish ____ I f  he persisted
in ta lk ing  o f such subjects, she had a disconcerting habit o f  f a l l in g
asleep ' Winston recognizes that mental orthodoxy presents no real
problems fo r  Ju l ia .  ' In a way, the world-view o f the Party imposed 
i t s e l f  most successfully on people incapable o f  understanding i t .  They 
could be made to accept the most f lag ran t v io la t io n s  o f r e a l i t y ,  
because they never f u l l y  grasped the enormity o f what was demanded o f 
them, and were not s u f f ic ie n t ly  interested in public events to notice 
what was happening. By lack o f understanding they remained sane. They 
simply swallowed everything, and what they swallowed did them no harm,
because i t  l e f t  no residue behind  Ju lia  remains sane. Her
memory o f  past events is  so imperfect tha t she is  unaware o f  the con­
stant revis ion o f h is to r ic a l  records, and is  unaware o f the inconsis­
tencies o f Party dogma. She cannot jo in  w ith Winston in constructing 
any reasoned c r i t iq u e  against the state. Her capacity fo r  c r i t ic is m  
l ie s  so le ly  in an innate, animal shrewdness, which enables her to 
recognise tha t the Party de libe ra te ly  represses sexua lity  in order to 
induce the war hysteria and adulation o f Big Brother, which holds the 
state together.
I t  is  evident tha t Orwell has a certa in  contempt fo r  the charac­
te r  o f  Ju l ia .  She is ,  Winston te l l s  her, 'a rebel from the waist down­
wards'.^^ J u l ia 's  heresy is  merely physical, whereas Winston Smith's is  
o f  the mind. I t  is Winston’ s constant pursu it o f r a t io n a l i t y  which 
t r u ly  threatens the state. O'Brien dismisses J u l ia 's  re be ll ion  as of 
l i t t l e  account. Questioned by Winston Smith about the fa te  o f J u l ia ,  
he rep lies  contemptuously, 'She betrayed you, Winston. Immediately - 
unreservedly. I have seldom seen anyone come over to us so promptly
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■It was', O'Brien comments, 'a perfect conversion, a textbook case', 
J u l ia 's  case is simple because there is no mental rebe ll ion  to suppress, 
but with Winston, 'conversion' is  much harder to achieve. He is  
f i n a l l y  defeated only when unreasoning, unbearable physical panic robs 
him of his mind, and leads him to betray both love and ra t io n a l i t y  
i t s e l f .
In both ^  and Nineteen Eighty-Four, the body is  oppressed by 
the s ta te , in the cause o f  the maintenance o f to ta l  power. But the 
conception of the nature of tha t oppression offered by the two authors 
is  very d i f fe re n t ,  as is  th e i r  conception o f the nature o f the body, and 
o f sexual love. In Zamyatin's 1^, subjugation o f the body is  primary, 
in  Nineteen Eighty-Four, i t  is  only secondary. In the One State, the 
ru le rs  suppress man's an im ality  fo r  fear tha t passion may cloud the 
perfect ra t io n a l i t y  o f the s ta te . But in Oceania, the body is  oppressed 
so that ra t io n a l i t y  may w ither. I t  is  the subjugation o f Winston's 
mind, rather than his body, which is  O 'Brien's supreme task.
For Zamyatin's D-503, i t  is  the arousal o f  the body which quickens 
and sustains love, and allows human development. The body is  c ruc ia l 
in since Zamyatin holds tha t human consciousness is  born o f a syn­
thesis o f mind and body, of reason and passion. In the One State, love 
is  an incongru ity ; i t  is  an i l ln e ss  to be eradicated, D-503 
experiences, the growth o f love as an unexpected flowering, which f i l l s  
him with ecstasy and pain, He w rites , ' I 'm  not prudent. I'm a i l in g .  I'm 
a f f l i c te d  with a soul , , , .  But then, i s n ' t  a l l  florescence an ailment? 
I s n ' t  i t  painful fo r  a bud to b u r s t ? L o v e  in We is  defeated only 
when D-503 has been purged of his an im ality , fo llow ing the destruction
'“ 1 9 0 ’“
o f his imagination, With love and an imality  is  sac r if ice d  humanity.
But in Nineteen Eighty-Four, the s itua t ion  is  reversed, Love is  betrayed 
by the body which formerly acted as i t s  medium o f expression. So too is  
ra t io n a l i t y  Man's body is revealed as an inescapable source o f weak­
ness and moral corruption,
R. D. Charques wrote, in his ob ituary o f Orwell, th a t 
Orwell 'believed in the re a l i t y  o f "the worst th ing in the world".
I t  was, he was inc lined  to th in k , the ex tinc t ion  o f the human s p i r i t  by 
te r ro r ,  which he knew to be a commonplace o f to ta l i t a r ia n  ru le ' . ^ ^  
Zamyatin feared tha t in the to ta l s ta te , man would become no more than 
a machine, without thought or fee ling , his actions wholly d irected accord­
ing to the tenets of some o f f i c ia l  dogma. But Orwell feared tha t in the 
to ta l state the human mind would f i n a l l y  succumb to the te r ro r  and pain 
o f the body.
Here there is  a f le e t in g  s im i la r i t y  between the thought o f Orwell 
and that o f Aldous Huxley. Huxley re fers repeatedly in  Island to the 
p o te n t ia l ly  corrupting e ffec ts  of physical pain. W ill Farnaby re ca lls  
the death through cancer o f a favourite  aunt, whose personality  was 
warped and d isfigured through the experience o f pain and physical degen­
e ra tion ,^^  Yet Huxley does not consider tha t th is  state o f a f fa i r s  is  
irremediable. There is ,  he suggests, a so lu tion to the problem of 
man's bod ily  f r a i l t y ,  In one of the most important scenes in Is land, 
the death is described o f a Palanese woman, who, l ik e  Farnaby's aunt, is  
su ffe ring  from cancer, but who is  nonetheless transfigured by mystical 
enlightenment and self-transcending joy . Asked i f  her pain is  severe.
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the dying woman re p lies , ' I t  would be bad, i f  i t  were re a l ly  my 
pain. But somehow i t  i s n ' t .  The pain 's here; but I ’m somewhere else. 
I t ’ s l ik e  what you discover with the moksha-medicine. Nothing re a l ly  
belongs to you, Not even your pa in ’ .^^
The c it ize n  o f Huxley's perfect state is  somehow d iffused in to  
Nature, so tha t his ' I ' and his 'n o t - I '  are in te rtw ined, and ne ither is  
of independent s ign if icance . Thus the inhab itant o f Pala escapes the 
l im ita t io n s  and d is a b i l i t ie s  of ordinary mortal man. In Huxley's 
temporal paradise, the nature o f  man and o f the world is  regulated fo r  
the attainment of certa in spec if ic  goals but in his ethereal utopia, 
there is  no d is t in c t io n  between man and the cosmos. Ind iv idua l con­
sciousness o f separateness is  an i l lu s io n .  Thus man need no longer 
fear conquest through pain, or through the inexorable power o f the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics. He is One with a l l  the physical processes 
o f the natural world, and with the timeless s p ir i tu a l  world beyond 
Nature.
Such a so lu tion to the problem of man's v u ln e ra b i l i ty  to pain 
and fear as that offered by Huxley, is ,  however, w ithout s ign if icance 
to a Western humanist, such as George Orwell.
Orwell's conception of human love, v u ln e ra b i l i ty  and m ora lity  
is  informed by his b e l ie f  that 'Man is the measure of a l l  th ings , and 
tha t our job is  to make l i f e  worth l iv in g  on th is  earth, which is  the 
only earth we h a v e ' , F o r  Orwell, man is in e v ita b ly  an ea rth ly  
creature, whose imperfections, l ik e  his v ir tu e s ,  are part o f his 
humanity, But Huxley believes i t  is  possible to transcend the l im i ta ­
tions of ea rth ly  l i f e ,
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The world which Huxley describes in Island seems u lt im a te ly  to 
be a world beyond pain, degeneration and death, but a world also beyond 
love, fr iendsh ip  and humanity, as envisaged in Western thought. Pala 
is  an is land o f sa in ts,
Huxley's ideal o f impersonal love appears to resemble tha t o f 
Gandhi, whom Huxley much admired. As I have argued e a r l ie r  in th is  
section, i t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to see how fr iendsh ip , or sexual or fa m il ia l  
love could have any deep sign if icance in Pala. This absence o f close 
personal attachment is  probably, however, c ruc ia l to Huxley's ideal o f 
pe rfec t io n .
In th is  Reflections on Gandhi, Orwell w r ites , 'For the seeker 
a f te r  goodness there must be no close fr iendships and no exclusive loves 
whatever. Close fr iendsh ips, Gandhi says, are dangerous, because 'fr iends  
react on one another' and through lo y a lty  to a fr ie nd  one can be led 
in to  wrongdoing. This is  unquestionably true . Moreover, i f  one is  to 
love God, or to love humanity as a whole, one cannot give one's prefe­
rence to any ind iv idua l person. This again is  true , and i t  marks the 
point at which the humanistic and the re lig ious  a tt itudes  cease to be 
reconcilab le, To an ordinary human-being, love means nothing i f  i t  
does not mean loving some people more than others Gandhi's
a t t i tu d e  to human re la t ionsh ips , Orwell considers, ' i s  perhaps a 
noble one, but, in the sense which - I th ink  - most people would give 
to the word, i t  Is inhuman, The essence o f being human is  tha t one does 
not seek perfect ion , tha t one 1_s sometimes w i l l in g  to commit sins fo r  
the sake o f lo y a lty ,  tha t one does not push asceticism to the po int
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where i t  makes f r ie n d ly  intercourse impossible, and tha t one is  prepared 
in the end to be defeated and broken up by l i f e ,  which is  the in e v i t ­
able price o f fastening one’ s love upon other human in d iv id u a ls ’ ,
’ No doubt', Orwell concludes, ’ a lcohol, tobacco and so fo r th  
are things tha t a sa in t must avoid, but sainthood is  also a th ing tha t 
human beings must avo id ’ ,
The target o f Orwell’ s c r i t ic is m  here seems to be not so much 
the Christian conception o f sainthood, as the Eastern ideal o f the holy 
man, non-attached, liberated from personal love, experiencing only the 
anxie ty-free emotion o f goodwill to a l l .  When Orwell w rites tha t one 
should be ’ prepared in the end to be defeated and broken up by l i f e ,  
which is  the inev itab le  price o f fastening one’ s love upon other human 
in d iv id u a ls ’ , he does not mean that love ’ in e v i ta b ly ’ leads to s u f fe r ­
ing, but rather tha t anyone who loves, in Western terms, o ffe rs  host­
ages to fortune. The person loved may f a l l  i l l ,  or d ie , or may decide 
to re jec t one's love, in which case anguish w i l l  in e v ita b ly  fo llow . The 
only way to avoid th is  p o s s ib i l i ty  is  to have no one fo r  whom one t r u ly  
'ca res ’ . In the Western Christian t ra d i t io n ,  caring fo r  others, and 
su ffe r ing  on th e i r  behalf, is  f u l l y  accepted, at least by many th inkers . 
But fo r  Gandhi, and fo r  Aldous Huxley, th is  type o f ind iv idua l commit­
ment is  regarded as being in fe r io r  to a sentiment o f generalized c h a r i ty ,  
which leaves the ’ lo v e r ’ non-attached and free from care, Huxley’ s 
utopia seems to be founded prec ise ly  upon th is  way o f th ink ing , and 
from th is  i t  fo llows tha t he is  able to countenance such practices
as selective breeding and in fa n t condition ing - practices which are 
repugnant to a Western in d iv id u a l is t  such as Orwell.
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Part I I  ( i v ) Utopia and the subjugation o f  the ind iv idua l w i l l
■What a man needs is  simply and so le ly  independent v o l i t io n ,  
whatever tha t independence may cost and wherever i t  may lead 
declares Dostoievsky's Underground Man, ' I f  the formula fo r  a l l  our 
desires and whims is  some day discovered - , , ,  what they depend on, 
what laws they re su lt  from, how they are disseminated, what sort o f  
good they aspire to in a p a r t ic u la r  instance, and so on - a real math­
ematical formula, tha t is ,  then i t  is  possible tha t man w i l l  at once 
turn from a man in to  a barrel-organ sprig or something o f the s o r t ;  
fo r  what is man without desires, without w i l l ,  w ithout v o l i t io n ,  but 
a sprig on the cy linde r o f a barre l-organ?' ^
Dostoievsky's v is ion o f a mechanically perfect world, where the 
p o s s ib i l i ty  o f ind iv idua l v o l i t io n  is  elim inated, has c le a r ly  i n f l u ­
enced Zamyatin, but a l l  the w rite rs  under review consider tha t the con­
s truc tion  of the to ta l  state w i l l  e n ta i l ,  in some form, not only the 
subjugation o f the human body, but also the subjugation o f the human 
mind, tha t is ,  the suppression o f the human w i l l ,  and consequently, 
the destruction o f the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f moral action. The success o f the 
to ta l  s ta te , they maintain, depends upon i t s  power to o b l i te ra te  
ind iv idua l e n t i ty .
Such fears are recognized, and re jected, by Skinner, who w rites , 
in Beyond Freedom and D ig n ity , 'We are to ld  tha t what is  threatened 
is  "man qua man", or "man in his humanity", or "man as Thou not I t " ,  or 
"man as a person not a th in g " ,  These are not very helpful expressions, 
but they supply a clue. What is  being abolished is  autonomous man - 
the inner man, the homunculus, the possessing demon, the man defended 
by the l i te ra tu re  o f freedom and d ig n ity .
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’ His ab o li t io n  has long been overdue. Autonomous man is  a device 
used to explain what we cannot explain in  any other way. He has been 
constructed from our ignorance, and as our understanding increases, 
the very s tu f f  o f  which he is  composed vanishes. Science does not de­
humanize man, i t  de-homunculizes him, and i t  must do so i f  i t  is  to  pre­
vent the a b o li t ion  o f the human species. To man qua man, we read ily  
say good riddance. Only by dispossessing him can we turn to the real 
causes of human behaviour. Only then can we turn from the in fe rred
to  the observed, from the miraculous to the na tu ra l,  from the inacces-
2
s ib le  to the manipulable’ ,
For Skinner, then, anti-u top ian fears fo r  the loss o f autonomy 
are misconceived, since man deludes himself when he claims to be the 
possessor o f free w i l l ,  Skinner, who holds tha t man is  simply an 
agglomeration o f conditioned reflexes and responses to external s tim ­
u l i ,  can contemplate with equanimity the in s t i tu t io n  o f new and more 
inc lus ive  programmes o f condition ing. For him, manipulation is  in e v i­
tab ly  the very s tu f f  o f social l i f e ;  a l l  tha t ma ters is  tha t i t  should 
be directed by those who know what is  best fo r  society (see Part I ( i )  ).
In the One State of Zamyatin's autonomous man has indeed 
been abolished. The One State is  a homoeostatic organism, in which 
man and machine are programmed to perform in perfect un ity . Human 
action is  automatic, resembling mechanical ac tion , as is  i l lu s t ra te d  
in D-503's ta le  o f the ’Three Manumitted Ones’ (see Part I I ( i )  note 18). 
A ll opportunity fo r  d e l ib e ra t io n , and fo r  choice, has been eliminated 
In the One State, in the name of perfect order and precis ion. Thus the
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human w i l l  has been rendered nugatory, since i t  is  the function o f the 
w i l l  to determine upon a course o f action , a f te r  reviewing competing 
options.
The c it ize n  o f the One State is  no more than 'a sprig on the 
cy linder o f a barre l-organ ' ,  He serves without question the perfect 
mechanism of which he is a part. His mind is  in to ta l repose. Recall­
ing the s igh t o f the men and machines in his fac to ry , D-503 remarks, 
'A l l  th is  was ju s t  one u n it :  humanized machines, machine-perfect
humans. This was the l o f t i e s t ,  most staggering beauty, harmony, 
music . . . .  I was shoulder to shoulder with them, welded with them, 
caught up in the steel rhythm. Their motions were measured,..........
3
th e i r  foreheads mirror-smooth, unclouded by the insan ity  o f thoughts '.
V irtue in the One State l ie s  in  self-effacement. At f i r s t ,
D-503 is  content with his ro le as an id e a l ly  function ing part o f a 
harmonious whole. He describes the sensations he has f e l t  during the 
Daily March o f the One State with awe and hu m il i ty :  'We walked along,
a s ing le , million-headed body, and w ith in  each o f us was tha t meek jo y ­
fulness which probably constitu tes the l i f e  o f molecules, atoms or
phagocytes'.^ Following the b ir th  o f his imagination, however, D-503 
comes to wonder whether he is ,  a f te r  a l l ,  not a d u t i fu l  phagocyte, 
protecting the vast organism of the state from in fe c t io n ,  but rather a
microbe, menacing the health o f the system.
As mentioned e a r l ie r ,  in Part 1(11), Zamyatin considers the 
imagination to be the fount o f ind iv idual freedom, Under i t s  Influence
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D-503 becomes conscious o f himself as an e n t i t y ,  d i f fe re n t ia te d  from 
a l l  other e n t i t ie s ,  having a d iscrete existence and fo llow ing a unique 
course through l i f e .  This self-consciousness is  so new to him tha t 
he believes i t  to be a form o f i l ln e s s ,  and th is  impression is  con­
firmed when he is to ld  tha t he has contracted -an incurable so u l '.
In Zamyatin's view, there is  an ind isso lub le  bond between the soul 
and the imagination,
D-503 is  confused and embarrassed by his sudden self-awareness. 
He becomes acutely conscious o f his own body, o f  his arms swinging 
awkwardly at his sides, and o f the sound o f his fo o t fa l l  on the glass
5
pavement. He becomes sensitive  to the pain and e la t ion  o f v io len t 
emotion, o f love and p i ty  and anger and despair. And in anguish and 
in c re d u l i ty ,  he recognizes in himself the capacity fo r  heretica l 
thought and action. A ll th is  seems strange and unnatural to him. I t  
leaves him exposed and unprotected. In his d ia ry , he w r ites , ' I was 
conscious o f myself. But then, consciousness o f  s e l f ,  awareness o f 
in d iv id u a l i ty ,  pertains only to an eye with a speck o f something in i t ,  
to an infected f in g e r ,  to an aching too th; when an eye, a f in g e r ,  a 
tooth is  sound each seems non-existent, as i t  were. Is i t  not c lear 
tha t consciousness o f s e l f  is only a disease?
In his conception o f the necessary l in k  between imagination and 
the human consciousness which gives r ise  to conscience, Zamyatin is 
fo llow ing an e a r l ie r  t ra d i t io n ,  In A Defence o f Poetry, Shelley 
w r ites , 'A man, to be grea tly  good, must imagine in tensely  and 
comprehensively; he must put himself in the place o f another and o f
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many others; the pains and pleasures o f his species must become his 
own. The great instrument o f moral good is  the imagination 
The corruption o f socie ty, in Shelley's view, proceeds through the 
i n i t i a l  corruption of the imagination, ' I t  begins at the imagination 
and the in te l le c t  as a t the core, and d is tr ib u te s  i t s e l f  thence as a 
paralysing venom, through the a ffec tions  in to  the very appetites,
o
u n t i l  a l l  becomes a to rp id  mass in which hardly sense surv ives '.
I t  is  possible tha t Zamyatin read Shelley 's Defence o f Poetry, and 
was to some extent influenced by Shelley's v is ion , Zamyatin read 
widely in English l i te r a tu r e ,  and c e r ta in ly  there are a f f in i t i e s  be­
tween Shelley's conception o f the unique s ign if icance of the facu lty  
o f imagination and Zamyatin's own. S im ila r ly ,  both w r ite rs  a t te s t  
the value of the a r ts ,  in th e i r  capacity to m in is te r to the imagina­
t io n ,  and thus to nourish human s e n s ib i l i t y  and moral awareness. This 
w i l l  be discussed fu r th e r  in the fo llow ing section {Part I I  (v) ).
Rousseau also t e s t i f ie s  to the s ign if icance o f the imagination 
in  the development o f human consciousness, but his work reveals a 
marked equivocation. Rousseau both e x to l ls  the v ir tu e  o f imagination 
as the source o f human c re a t iv i t y ,  and condemns the capacity o f 
imagination to engender social discord. In the Rêveries, Rousseau 
describes his years o f re trea t from the constra in ts and ob ligations 
o f social l i f e ,  Here he suggests tha t the world o f in trospection and 
s o l i ta ry  fantasy is  the f in e s t  o f a l l  possible worlds, Lost in imagi­
native contemplation, Rousseau f e l t  himself freed to experience the 
uniqueness o f his own mind, secure from the encroachments o f the 
minds o f others. S im ila r ly ,  in La Nouvelle Heloise, Ju l ie  asserts
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tha t ' le  pays des chimères est en ce monde le seul digne d 'ê tre  habité ___ '
g
(The land o f fancy is the only place worthy o f hab ita t ion  in th is  world). 
Ju l ie  f i n a l l y  decides to die because her 'imagination has nothing l e f t  
to do '. But here, o f course, there is  ambiguity. The neatly ordered, 
prosaic world from which Ju l ie  is  escaping is  a world created in 
Rousseau's own imagination. In Emile, the ambiguity is  even more
s t r ik in g .  I t  is  suggested, at one po in t, tha t the p e rfec t ly  reared,
eponymous hero may choose, l ik e  Rousseau, to  immerse himself in s o l i ta ry
fantasy. Here Rousseau appears to suggest once more tha t 'the land o f
fancy is  the only place worthy o f h a b ita t io n '.  Yet elsewhere in Emile, 
the inference to be drawn is  very d i f fe re n t .  Emile is  to marry a g i r l  
ca lled Sophy, who is  to m in is te r to his needs, and act as the protector 
o f his psychic perfection. Sophy has been indoctrinated from infancy 
fo r  a l i f e  of self-abnegation, force-reared l ik e  a Strasbourg goose fo r  
Emile's personal de lecta t ion . Her education has been designed to 
in h ib i t  the development o f  her pe rsona lity , and prevent her from acquir­
ing tastes and desires unsuitable to her ro le . Yet unaccountably, 
at the la s t  moment, Sophy threatens to re je c t the rô le fo r  which she has 
been cast. Against a l l  expectations, her imagination has survived, to 
preserve in her a vestige o f the power of choice. Sophy conceives o f 
the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f f ind ing  someone other than Emile, a lover o f her 
own choosing, who w i l l  more f a i t h f u l l y  re f le c t  her own thoughts and 
desires. Here the contrad ictions inherent in Rousseau's thought are 
a t th e i r  most apparent. In order to preserve his narra tive l in e ,
Rousseau intervenes in his own s c r ip t ,  to redesign the importunate 
f igu re  o f Sophy. 'Let us give Emile his Sophy', Rousseau w rites , ' l e t  
us restore th is  sweet g i r l  to l i f e  and provide her with a less v iv id
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imagination and a happier fa te . I desired to pa in t an ordinary 
woman, but by endowing her with a great soul, I have disturbed 
her reason. I havegone astray. Let us retrace our steps’ .
Thus Sophy’ s s ing le , i l l i c i t  spasm o f autonomy is  s t i l l e d  by fa n t ie -  
sectomy. I t  i s ,  in c id e n ta l ly ,  in te res ting  to note that fo r  Rousseau, 
as fo r  Zamyatin, there is  an ind isso luble bond between the imagina­
t ion  and the sou l.
Rousseau is  f u l l y  conscious o f the importance o f the imagination, 
and fo r  the reason tha t he values i t ,  he fears i t .  In his view, fo r  
the s o l i ta ry  man o f genius, imagination, and the capacity fo r  independent 
moral judgment which springs from i t ,  are to be prized. But fo r  the 
c i t iz e n  o f the pe rfe c t ly  regulated s ta te , imagination is  o tiose, and 
even perhaps pernicious.
Just as Rousseau’ s Sophy is  purged o f w i l l  and imagination at 
one blow, so too is  Zamyatin’ s D-503. Through the fo rc ib le  excision 
o f his imagination, he is  cured o f  soul and w i l l  forever. Automatic 
v ir tu e  is  restored, and consciousness and conscience are destroyed.
D-503, l ik e  Sophy, is  now merely the pe rson if ica t ion  o f his r^ le .
As fa r  as he can t e l l ,  he is  e n t i re ly  happy.
The to ta l  state o f Zamyatin’ s is  founded upon the premise 
tha t man requires above a l l  to be rescued from the agony o f choice and 
compelled to be happy. The Benefactor, who ru les over the One State, 
asks D-503, ’ What have men, from th e i r  swaddling clothes days on, been 
praying fo r ,  dreaming about, tormenting themselves for? Why, to have 
someone t e l l  them, once and fo r  a l l ,  ju s t  what happiness is ,  and then 
weld them to happiness with chains ........  The ancient dream o f Heaven
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  Remember, in Heaven they no longer know anything o f desires, or
p i ty ,  o f love; there you w i l l  f ind  only the b e a t if ie d  ones, with 
fantiesectomy already performed on them (tha t is  the only reason they 
are be a t if ied ) - the angels, the servants o f God'
The influence o f  Dostoievsky upon Zamyatin is  here very appa­
rent. Dostoievsky's Grand In q u is i to r ,  in The Brothers Karamazov, 
describes how 'men were given paradise, they wanted freedom, and they 
s to le  f i r e  from heaven, knowing pe rfec t ly  well that they would become 
unhappy . . . .  Man has no more agonizing anxiety than to f in d  someone
to whom he can hand over with a l l  speed the g i f t  o f freedom with which
12the unhappy creature is  born'.
The orthodox c i t iz e n  o f  Zamyatin's One c i t iz e n  has g ladly sur­
rendered his w i l l  and embraced the servitude o f paradise. As mentioned 
in Part I ( i )  note 17, and Part I l ( i i )  note 39, fo r  Zamyatin, as fo r  
Dostoievsky, man became t r u ly  man only a f te r  he had re jected perfect 
order and unthinking rectitude fo r  freedom, and t ^  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f 
e rro r.  The Devil is  the bringer of the knowledge o f  Good and E v i l ,  
and therefore o f m ora lity . Before the D ev il 's  in te rven tion , the passive 
v ir tu e  o f man te s t i f ie d  merely to his lack o f the fa cu lty  o f imagina­
t io n . He was innocent only in the sense tha t he could envisage only 
one course o f action. The c it izens of the One State are 'simple o f 
heart and innocent l ik e  Adam and Eve'. There is  'none o f  tha t crazy,
jumbled s tu f f  about Good and E v i l ;  everything is  ------  c h i ld is h ly ,
13parad is iaca lly  s im ple '. The One State has given 'God a helping hand 
in overcoming the Devil fo r  Good and a l l .  For i t  was the Devil who
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impelled mortals to transgress against the in te rd ic t ,  to taste of
14pernicious freedom’ .
I f  Zamyatin’ s Devil stands as a symbol o f freedom and m ora li ty ,
so too, according to Shelley, does M il to n ’ s Devil, in Paradise Lost.
Shelley w rites , ’M i l to n ’ s Devil as a moral being is  as fa r  superior to
his God as one who perseveres in some purpose which he has conceived
to be excellent in sp ite  o f adversity and to r tu re ,  is  to one who in
the cold security o f  undoubted triumph i n f l i c t s  the most ho rr ib le
revenge upon his enemy, not from any mistaken notion o f inducing him
to repent o f a perseverance o f enmity, but with the alleged design
15of exasperating him to deserve new torments'. Blake has a s im ila r  
perception of the moral sup e rio r i ty  of M i l to n ’ s Devil, and o ffe rs  the 
fo llow ing explanation: 'The reason Milton wrote in fe t te rs  when he
wrote o f Angels and God, and at l ib e r ty  when o f  Devils and H e ll ,  is  
because he was a true Poet and of the D e v i l ’ s party w ithout knowing 
i t ' C e r t a i n l y ,  M ilton , l ik e  the an ti-u top ians, was content to l iv e  
in a world where Good and Evil necessarily co -ex is t,  since Good can only 
be recognized by contrast w ith E v i l ,  and c e r ta in ly  he valued above 
a l l  the freedom to make moral choices. In the Areopagitica, he wrote 
’ Give me the l ib e r ty  to know, to u t te r ,  and to argue fre e ly  according 
to conscience, above a l l  l ib e r t ie s '
Zamyatin's Devil stands emphatically fo r  ind iv idua lism . D-503 
comments that the Christians o f ancient times r ig h t ly  perceived tha t 
consciousness of s e l f  proceeds from m orb id ity , and tha t ’meekness 
is  a v ir tu e  while pride is  a v ice; they also understood tha t We is
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from God while I is  from the D e v i l ' D - 5 0 3  regards his new-found
self-awareness as a sin against the d iv ine perfection o f the s ta te .
He believes tha t i t  w i l l  be his lo t  to 'burn fo re v e r ' ,  and ye t,  to
19his horror, he is  conscious that he does ' not want to be saved' .
Like Dostoievsky, Zamyatin despises the s ta t ic  b l iss  o f per­
fe c t  order. He contends tha t man is  f u l l y  human only in the dynamic 
world o f change and choice. The ind iv idua l must be free to perceive 
the world through his own eyes, and to make whatever choices may seem 
appropriate to him, whether those choices should contribute to his 
well-being or to his misery. In j ^ ,  E-330, l ik e  Dostoievsky's
Underground Man, asserts her r ig h t  to act according to her own w i l l ,
no matter what her chances o f success. 'What is  i t  to you ',  she
c r ie s , ' i f  I do not wish to have others do my wishing fo r  me, i f  I
20wish to do my own wishing - i f  I wish fo r  the impossible?' The 
orthodox c it iz e n  o f  the One State chooses to accept the bondage o f 
corporate happiness. Thereafter there are no choices fo r  him to 
make. But E-330 refuses to surrender the anguish o f conscious choice
fo r  the ataraxia o f utopia.
For both Zamyatin and Dostoievsky, the exercise o f free w i l l  is  
an end in i t s e l f ,  requiring no t e l i c  ju s t i f i c a t io n .  Through the 
exercise o f ind iv idua l v o l i t io n ,  man aff irm s his humanity, they con­
s ider, In the perfect s ta te , every act o f the ind iv idua l w i l l  is  
automatically an act o f re b e l l io n ,  and though at times i t  may appear 
wanton, perverse or destruc tive , yet i t  is  va l id  in i t s e l f .  The act 
of rebe ll ion  in the p e rfec t ly  ra tiona l state removes i t s e l f  beyond 
the requirements o f formal ra t io n a l i t y .
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In the World State o f Huxley's Brave New World, as in Zamyatin’ s 
One State, corporate consciousness has replaced ind iv idua l conscious­
ness, and self-determ ination is  an empty concept. The s e l f  in t h ^ o r ld  
State is  made in the test-tube and in the state nursery. The c i t iz e n  
enters the world as a socia lized being. He has no choice as to how 
he shall develop. The in te l l ig ence  le v e l,  hab its , physique and 
tastes o f each stratum o f society are f ixed  by the eugenics specia­
l i s t s  and the social conditioners. No c i t iz e n  may choose to re je c t  
his rô le ,  and seek to develop his own personality  as he sees f i t .
Among the lower orders o f human l i f e  in the World State, the unique­
ness o f the ind iv idua l is  wholly sac r if ice d , 'N ine ty -s ix  iden tica l
twins work n in e ty -s ix  iden tica l machines ___  standard Gammas, unvary-
21ing Deltas, Uniform Epsilons '. Workers are cloned in batches from 
a sing le egg. The resu ltan t ' tw ins ' are mere re p lica t ion s  o f one 
another. They l iv e  th e i r  l ives  in unison, tending the same machines and 
sharing the same programmed pastimes.
When he wrote Brave New World, i t  was Huxley's in ten tion  to 
describe a society in which science had been used in such a way as to 
'recreate human beings in  the likeness o f te rm ite s '.  (See Part I I  
( i i i )  Note 25). The c it iz e n  of the World State is  bred and conditioned 
fo r  d o c i l i t y  and compliance. He is  equipped to perform only tha t narrow 
rangeof duties fo r  which the state has fashioned him. Like a te rm ite , 
he has no w i l l  o f his own, but merely contributes to the expression 
of the corporate w i l l  o f  the community. In the World State, the c it iz e n  
performs his a l lo t te d  tasks autom atica lly , having no capacity to do 
otherwise. He experiences no desire to  escape the narrow confines o f 
his existence, since he has been programmed to be content w ith his 
'inescapable social d e s t in y '.  (See Part 1 1 ( i i i )  Note 39).
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In the World State, the mind o f the c i t iz e n  is  wholly fashioned 
by the state. From e a r l ie s t  infancy, the c h i ld ’ s capacity fo r  inde­
pendent judgment and therefore independent v o l i t io n  is  eroded through 
the pers is ten t assault upon his developing mind of the condition ing 
slogans o f the social engineers. The c i t iz e n 's  conception o f him­
s e l f  and o f his re la tionsh ip  to others is  remorselessly moulded by 
the external suggestions which he receives in childhood, u n t i l  f i n a l l y  
there is  no space l e f t  in his mind fo r  o r ig in a l thought. As Mustapha 
Mond explains to a group o f students, 'At la s t  the c h i l d ’ s mind 
these suggestions, and the sum of the suggestions i_s the c h i ld 's  
mind. And not the c h i ld ’ s mind only. The a d u l t ’ s mind too - a l l  his 
l i f e  long. The mind that judges and desires and decides - made up
of these suggestions. But a l l  o f these suggestions are our sugges-
22t ions! ........  Suggestions from the S ta te '.
In Brave New World, behavioural psychology is  used wholly fo r  
the subjugation o f the human w i l l  , but in w r i t in g  Is lan d , Huxley 
sought to describe an imaginary world where the b io log ica l sciences 
would no longer be used fo r  the hum ilia tion  and repression o f man, 
but fo r  his enrichment. Just as, in Pala, eugenic techniques are 
used not to provide s t u l t i f i e d  machine-minders and consumers, but to 
improve the q u a l i ty  o f the human stock, so also in Pala, Pavlovian 
condition ing procedures are used not to force men to embrace th e i r  
’ inescapable social des tiny ’ , but to imbue them with love o f humanity. 
Yet the use o f condition ing techniques, even fo r  the most beneficent 
o f motives, must surely raise e th ica l questions, since i t  en ta i ls  the 
diminution o f human freedom. I t  constitutes an attempt to modify
-  209 -
humanity, and to control the shape o f i t s  fu ture development. Thus
man's opportunity fo r  se lf-determ ination is  re s tr ic te d .  In Pala, as
in the World State, there is  an assault on the s e l f .
For Huxley, th is  is  o f  no great consequence. The s e l f ,  however
i t  may be defined, is  o f  small s ign if icance . As noted in  Part I I ( i ) ,
Huxley considered consciousness o f selfhood to be rooted in delusion.
(See note 67). The c i t iz e n  o f Pala desires to 'catch a glimpse of
the world as i t  looks to someone who has been l ibera ted  from his bond- 
23age to the ego'. Positive consciousness gives way to passive
receptiveness. For the ind iv idua l thus conceived, self-enactment
and self-expression are empty concepts. The s e l f  is  dissolved in
transcendental union with the universe. In Pala, i t  is  explained,
the c i t iz e n  is  'mainly concerned with what people are on the level
2dth a t 's  beyond in d iv id u a l i t y ' .
In w r i t in g  Is lan d , Huxley attempted to e f fe c t  a re co n c i l ia t io n
between social happiness and ind iv idua l freedom, yet an examination
o f the book raises doubts as to whether th is  're c o n c i l ia t io n ' would
have been possible had Huxley adhered to his e a r l ie r  conception o f the
nature o f the in d iv id u a l,  and o f independent v o l i t io n ,  as expressed
in Brave New World. In the World State, the c it izens  are deprived
o f th e i r  capacity fo r  independent judgment in the cause o f o rder ly
social conformity. The ru le rs  o f the World State expel a l l  those who,
despite th e i r  t ra in in g ,  have become 'too se lf-consciously ind iv idua l
to f i t  in to  community l i f e  ___ who a re n 't  s a t is f ie d  w ith orthodoxy.
25Who've got independent ideas o f th e i r  own'. Of the three dissidents
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in Brave New World, the one whom Huxley seems most to admire is  Helm­
holtz Watson, yet Watson, as argued in Part I l ( i i i ) ,  is  unquestionably 
a mesomorph, and thus o f the physiological type which is  deemed to 
require early  remedial treatment in Huxley's Pala. Watson is  very 
a c t i v e ,  with a powerful physique, strong personal lo y a l t ie s ,  an aggres­
sive in te l le c t ,  and a temperament which leads him to  act spontaneously 
and phys ica lly  in an emergency. His desire is  not fo r  ease and s ta ­
b i l i t y ,  but fo r  hardship and u n p re d ic ta b i l i ty .  He needs the stimulus 
o f 'a thoroughly bad c l im a te ',  to encourage him to use his energies
to th e i r  best advantage, He longs fo r  a world whichiwill o f fe r  him
'r id ic u lo u s ,  mad s i tu a t io n s ' ,  which w i l l  insp ire  him to v r i te  great
26l i te ra tu re .  He desires to do something 'intense and v io le n t ' .
From the utopia o f the World State, he goes with enthusiasm, not to 
a pe rfec t ly  organized socie ty, regulated according to p r inc ip les  o f 
love, harmony and mystical union, but to a haphazard community o f 
b r i l l i a n t  m is f i ts ,  where he may at la s t  be surprised out of the boredom 
o f programmed b l is s ,  to a tta in  unimagined leve ls o f personal f u l f i l ­
ment. In th is  new environment, Huxley seems confident, Watson's 
in d iv id u a l i ty  w i l l  f in d  f u l l  expression.
Whatever Huxley's in tentions in w r i t in g  Is land , he fa i l s  to guaran­
tee the ind iv idual freedom o f those who, l ik e  Helmholtz Watson, are 
'too self-consciously ind iv idua l to f i t  in to  community l i f e ' .  For those 
who are impatient with any form o f orthodoxy, there can be no approp­
r ia te  utopia. Only a modified Watson would be suffered to survive in 
Pala. This would be o f l i t t l e  s ign if icance , were i t  not tha t Huxley
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had such obvious admiration fo r  the independent-minded Watson, when 
he created the character in 1932,
As mentioned in Part I l ( i i i ) ,  by the time Huxley wrote Is land , 
he seems to have come to an unquestioning acceptance o f Sheldon's 
theory o f  physiological types (see note 30), and under th is  theory, 
Helmholtz Watson, as an undoubted mesomorph, -would be diagnozed in 
childhood as con s t itu t in g  a potentia l th reat to society. There­
a f te r ,  his l i f e  would be one of imposed physical hardship, o f 's trenu­
ous and v io le n t ta sks ',  and the mandatory p e r i l  o f hazardous rock- 
climbing courses. He would have no choice but to confront danger, and 
to involve himself in arduous physical a c t iv i t y .  'B e tte r court the 
dangerof k i l l i n g  yourse lf than court the danger o f k i l l i n g  other 
people, or at least making them miserable. Hurting them because 
you're na tu ra l ly  aggressive and too prudent, o r too ignorant, to work
o f f  your aggression on a p re c ip ic e ',  as one o f the a rch itec ts  o f Pala-
27nese society explains. But in Helmholtz Watson, Huxley has created 
a character fo r  whom self-determ ination is  of paramount importance. 
Watson, escaping from a world o f s lo th fu l hedonism, de lib e ra te ly  
chooses a l i f e  of physical hardship and possible danger, but how would 
he react i f  such a course were to be imposed upon him by others, as 
in Pala, as an essential ingredient o f his condition ing programme? 
Would there be any savour l e f t  in state-approved daring and ob liga to ry  
recklessness? Might not the t r u ly  independent-minded mesomorph choose 
to re je c t  the s ta te 's  plans fo r  him, deciding perhaps tha t to p i t  
his energies against the state would be more agreeably audacious than 
to p i t  them against the forces o f nature? Surely, the p e r i ls  which
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Watson faces must be o f his own choosing, since i t  is  fundamental to 
his nature that he has ’ independent ideas o f  his own?’ There is  a 
f in a l  point which Huxley seems not to have considered: might not the
automatic assumption tha t every mesomorph is  ipso facto a po tentia l 
murderer arouse in men such as Watson a resentment which would actu­
a l l y  cause them to become a possible threat to society?
Helmholtz Watson’ s self-awareness and w i l l  fo r  se lf-determ ination 
render him an unsuitable c i t iz e n  e ith e r fo r  the World State or fo r  
Pala. In both utopias, the s e l f  is  absent. In the World State, the 
ego is  repressed, and in Pala i t  is  disregarded. There is  no place fo r  
the concept o f ind iv idua l v o l i t io n  in the perfect world o f Is land, 
ju s t  as there is  none in the negative utopia o f Brave New World, 
fo r  how is  i t  possible to exercise one's w i l l ,  when one is  ’ released 
from bondage to the ego'? In Huxley’ s Pala, the boundaries o f the 
s e l f  have become dimmed; there can be no act o f w i l l ,  since there
is  no actor.
In Orwell’ s Oceania, as in the to ta l states o f Huxley and 
Zamyatin, the s e l f  has been defeated. But whereas in the World State 
and the One State, the s e l f  has been traded against the prospect o f 
eternal ease and secu r ity , in Oceania, the c it izen s  receive no com­
pensatory rewards fo r  th e i r  subjection. Indeed, the subjection o f 
the c it izens  is  the only purpose fo r  which the state has been con­
s t i tu te d .  The sole in te re s t o f the ru le rs  o f Oceania is  in wielding 
power,
Orwell constantly sought an explanation as to why men should 
continue to desire power over others when they no longer had any
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economic motive fo r  doing so, In Orwell's review o f the work of 
James Burnham (see Part I ( i i )  note 26], he wrote, 'Drudgery pe rs is ts , 
class d is t in c t io n s  are probably re -estab lish ing themselves in a new 
form and ind iv idua l l ib e r t y  is  on the down-grade: but as these
developments are now techn ica lly  avoidable, they must have some 
psychological cause . . . .  The question we ought to ask is :  Why does
the lu s t  fo r  naked power become a major human motive exactly now,
28when the dominion of man over man is  ceasing to be necessary?'
Orwell rejected as fa c i le  Burnham's assumption tha t socialism is  
unrealizable because the desire fo r  power in an innate human q u a l i ty ,  
and because some vague h is to r ic a l  law decrees tha t human socie ties 
shall always be arranged h ie ra rch ica lly .  Orwell believed tha t 
socialism was possible, yet fo r  some reason the drive fo r  power 
seemed to be stronger than the drive fo r  equa lity .
In Nineteen Eighty-Four, Winston Smith is  troubled by the same 
question. He understands very well how the Party has established i t s  
reign o f te r ro r ,  yet he cannot understand why they have chosen to do 
so. Under in te rroga tion , he is  challenged by O'Brien to o f fe r  a 
reason why the Party should be so determined to maintain i t s e l f  in 
power. Winston believes tha t O'Brien w i l l  t e l l  him tha t the Party 
ru les fo r  the good of the masses, who do not want freedom, and cannot 
endure the anguish of uncerta in ty , re s p o n s ib i l i ty  and choice . He 
believes tha t O'Brien w i l l  assert tha t the Party leadership has con­
sciously renounced i t s  own hopes o f happiness in the cause o f wielding 
dominion over the weak fo r  th e i r  true bene fit .  Such is  the argument
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o f Zamyatin's Benefactor, o f Dostoievsky’ s Grand In q u is i to r ,  and o f
Huxley's Mustapha Mond, 'You are ru lin g  over us fo r  our own good',
Winston suggests te n ta t iv e ly .  But O'Brien qu ick ly  and b ru ta l ly
undeceives him: 'The Party seeks power e n t i re ly  fo r  i t s  own sake.
We are not interested in the good of others; we are in terested so le ly
in power. Not wealth or luxury or long l i f e  or happiness: only power,
pure power .........  We are d i f fe re n t  from a l l  the o ligarch ies o f the
past, in tha t we know what we are doing ___ The German Nazis and the
Russian Communists came very close to us in th e i r  methods, but they
never had the courage to recognize th e i r  own motives. They pretended,
perhaps they even believed, tha t they had seized power u n w il l in g ly
and fo r  a l im ited  time, and that ju s t  around the corner there lay a
paradise where human beings would be free and equal. We are not l ik e
tha t.  We know that no one ever seizes power with the in ten tion  o f
re linqu ish ing i t .  Power is  not a means, i t  is  an end, One does not
establish a d ic ta to rsh ip  in order to safeguard a revo lu tion ; one makes
a revo lu tion in order to establish the d ic ta to rsh ip . The ob ject o f
persecution is  persecution. The object o f  to r tu re  is  to r tu re .  The
29object o f power is  power , . . . '
O'Brien describes the Party 's goal thus: a world where horror
and pain w i l l  become d a i ly  more intense, a 'world o f v ic to ry  a f te r  
v ic to ry ,  triumph a f te r  triumph: an endless pressing, pressing upon
the nerve o f power . . . ,  Always there w i l l  be the in to x ica t io n  of 
power, constantly increasing and constantly growing s u b t le r ' .
Although, in his essay on Burnham's work, w r it te n  in 1946, and c ited 
above, Orwell had repudiated the notion that desire fo r  power is  an
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innate and Ineradicable human d r ive , in Nineteen Eighty-Four, he 
seems to suggest that the lu s t  fo r  power is  perhaps the most profound 
and the most enduring o f a l l  human drives.
In order to share in the co l le c t iv e  power o f the s ta te , the 
c i t iz e n  o f Oceania must lose himself in the corporate body o f the 
Party, The orthodox c it iz e n  is  no longer an e n t i t y ,  capable o f 
exercising reason and judgment. He is  the creature o f the s ta te . 
Winston is  to ld  by O'Brien, 'The command o f the old despotisms was 
"Thou sha lt not". The command o f the to ta l i ta r ia n s  was "Thou 
sh a lt" .  Our command is  "Thou a r t " . '^ ^
O'Brien explains to Winston that a l l  ru le rs  ever desire is  
power - power over human minds and bodies, and thence power over 
matter, since once the ru le rs  have gained control over the minds o f 
th e ir  subjects they can create th e i r  own laws o f nature. The c i t i ­
zen o f Oceania ex is ts  only through the Party. He thinks with the 
Party 's  corporate mind, accepting and supporting the Party 's s h i f t in g  
vis ion o f r e a l i t y .  Devoid o f self-hood, the orthodox c it iz e n  aban­
dons independent judgment and v o l i t io n ,  and enters the schizoid world 
o f doublethink. During the course o f Winston's in te rro ga t io n , O'Brien 
demonstrates to him his own capacity to believe or d isbe lieve, forget 
or remember, e n t i re ly  at w i l l .
The w i l l  in Oceania bears l i t t l e  resemblance to the concept 
o f the w i l l  as i t  is  normally defined. F i r s t l y ,  the w i l l  is  corporate, 
ra ther than in d iv id u a l,  serving only the purposes o f the state. 
Secondly, b e l ie f  appears to be wholly susceptible to  control by the
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w i l l  In Oceania; the w i l l ,  in e f fe c t ,  ex is ts  fo r  no other purpose 
than to regulate b e l ie f .  T h ird ly ,  the w i l l  is  wholly detached from 
reason, being no more than an instrument fo r  se lf-de lus ion . Fourth ly, 
the w i l l  appears to control the action both o f the conscious mind, and 
o f the unconscious mind, which are brought in to  elaborate in te rp la y  
in the complex process o f doublethink. Doublethink involves on the 
one hand conscious d iscr im ina tion , as the mind adjusts to accommodate 
new a r t ic le s  o f fa i t h ,  re jec ting  or repressing c o n f l ic t in g  evidence, 
and on the other hand, automatic c re d u l i ty ,  unquestioning acceptance, 
which reg is ters  no inconsistencies, and accepts as eternal tru ths  
the ephemerae o f Party dogma.
The heretic  in Oceania is  the man who, l ik e  Winston, is  
incapable o f doublethink. The heretic must be so emptied o f his former 
s e l f  tha t he w i l l  surrender to the Party o f  his own free w i l l ,  out o f 
love fo r  Big Brother. Winston is  to ld ,  'What happens to you here is  
fo r  ever . . . ,  Never again w i l l  you be capable o f  ordinary human fe e l ­
ing, Everything w i l l  be dead inside you ........  You w i l l  be hollow.
32We shall squeeze you empty, and then we shall f i l l  you w ith ourselves '.
I t  is  in the an n ih i la t io n  o f  heretics that the state expresses i t s  
power.
The paradox o f power in Oceania arises from the fa c t tha t fo r  
the Party the wielding o f power is  g ra t i fy in g  only when i t  is  accom­
panied by coercion, repression and b ru ta l i t y .  The ru le rs  need to bring 
populace to to ta l submission, to automatic acceptance o f Party ru le .
They need to exercise to ta l  control overthe w i l l  and over the thought
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processes o f the people, Yet once th is  has been accomplished, the 
concept o f power loses i t s  meaning,
O’ Brien explains to Winston Smith tha t power expresses i t s e l f  
in the continuing suppression o f a l l  resistance. One man asserts his 
power over another by making him su ffe r. This is  the only sure t e s t i ­
mony tha t power is  being exercised. ’ Obedience is  not enough.
Unless he is  su ffe r ing , how can you be sure tha t he is  obeying your
33w i l l  and not his own? Power is  in i n f l i c t i n g  pain and h u m il ia t io n '.
The desire of the Party is  to te r ro r iz e  the populace in to  u t te r  
subjection, to leech them o f w i l l  and ind iv idua l consciousness. Yet 
once th is  is  achieved, the psychic pleasure o f  the oppressor ceases.
The d u t i fu l  c i t iz e n ,  in  embracing his subjection, and in becoming 
a mere receptacle fo r  the w i l l  o f the Party, ceases to be a v ic t im  
of oppression. He becomes diffused in to  the s ta te , partaking of i t s  
corporate power. As O'Brien explains, ’The ind iv idua l only has power
in  so fa r  as he ceases to be an ind iv idua l ___ alone - free - the
human-being is  always defeated , . . .  But i f  he can make complete, u t te r  
submission, i f  he can escape from his id e n t i ty ,  i f  he can merge him­
s e l f  in the Party, so tha t he the Party, then he is  a ll-powerfu l 
and immortal
I t  is  the to ta l l y  submissive, w i l l - le s s  c i t iz e n  who sustains the 
power o f the state. Without his com p lic ity , the state as an instrument 
o f to ta l  oppression would cease to e x is t .  Yet i t  is  the heretic  who 
breathes l i f e  in to  the concept o f power, who invests i t  with meaning.
He creates power in becoming i t s  un w il l ing  v ic t im . I f  the w i l l  o f 
a l l  were to  be captured by the Party, then there would be none to
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oppress. Coercion would cease to e x is t ,  I f  a l l  were to be absorbed 
in to  the body o f the Party, losing a l l  sense o f ind iv idua l d is t in c t io n ,  
then there would be no fu r th e r  need o f persecution or surve il lance.
Such a s itu a t io n  would be acceptable in Huxley's World State, or in 
Zamyatin's One State, where the prime aim is  to maintain a stable, 
perfect s ta te , but in Oceania, where the w i l l  o f the state can express 
i t s e l f  only in acts o f sadism and oppression, i t  would be in to le ra b le .
In a l l  the to ta l s ta tes, the here tic  is  repressed, but in the 
One State, and in the World State, repression is  not an end in i t s e l f .  
Zamyatin's Benefactor and Huxley's Mustapha Mond look forward to the 
time when heresy w i l l  have been to t a l l y  expunged. But in  Oceania, 
the Party requires the presence o f the h e re t ic ,  whose mind is ,  fo r  a 
time, his own. The heretic  is  the necessary object o f repression.
The protean mind o f the d u t i f u l ,  w i l l - le s s  orthodox Party member is  
impervious to mental assault. O'Brien t e l l s  Winston tha t 'the here­
t i c ,  the enemy o f socie ty, w i l l  always be there, so tha t he can be 
defeated and humiliated over again ........  Goldstein and his heresies
w i l l  l iv e  fo r  ever. Every day, at every moment, they w i l l  be defeated,
35d iscred ited , r id ic u le d , spat upon - and yet they w i l l  always survive.
The re la t ionsh ip  between the to r tu re r ,  O'Brien, and the v ic t im , 
Winston Smith, is  complex and ambiguous. In some ways, i t  is  a fa r  
more intense and intimate re la t ionsh ip  than tha t which exists between 
Winston and J u l ia ,  O'Brien has strength, in te l l ig e n ce  and a depth 
o f understanding which arouses Winston's respect, Ju l ia  can insp ire  
love in  Winston, but never respect, and, as mentioned in Part I I ( i i i ) .
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i t  is  evident tha t Orwell himself had l i t t l e  respect fo r  the charac­
te r  o f J u l ia ,  whereas in O^Brien he has created a character worthy o f 
both respect and hatred.
I t  is  perhaps a fa u l t  o f Orwell's Nineteen Eighty-Four tha t 
Winston's love fo r  J u l ia ,  which is  so c ruc ia l to the p lo t ,  is  never 
wholly cred ib le . Winston's greatest anguish arises from his sense 
o f mental is o la t io n ,  but th is  Ju lia  can never f u l l y  comprehend. She 
can o f fe r  him physical warmth and comfort, but she cannot assuage his 
pain. But when Winston meets with O'Brien, he is  a t once conscious 
o f  ' a l in k  o f understanding between them, more important than a ffec tion  
or pa rt isansh ip '.  Most s ig n i f ic a n t ly ,  the d ia ry  in which Winston 
expresses his most secret, heretica l thoughts, is  w r it te n  not fo r  J u l ia ,  
who would f a i l  to perceive the nature o f his miseries, but f o r  
O'Brien - O ' B r i e n ' , W i t h  J u l ia ,  Winston can experience the com­
munion o f bodies, but O'Brien o ffe rs  the prospect o f the communion o f 
minds. Winston needs another mind which is  capable o f  encompassing 
the same thoughts as his own, so that he need no longer su ffe r  alone 
the burden o f sanity in an insane world. O'Brien alone understands 
him, and he needs above a l l  to be understood, even i f  tha t under­
standing should be used fo r  his destruction. O'Brien has the power 
to destroy him, a power which Ju lia  could never possess.
One o f  the most abhorrent and d is tu rb ing  features o f Orwell's 
account of Winston's degradation at the hands o f O'Brien, is  the 
fee ling  o f love, g ra titude and admiration fo r  O'Brien, which, through 
psychic necessity, Winston re ta ins , even while he is  undergoing 
to r tu re .  Of Winston Orwell w r ites , 'He opened his eyes and looked
- 220 -
up g ra te fu l ly  at O'Brien, At s igh t of the heavy, lined face, so ugly
and so in te l l ig e n t ,  his heart seemed to turn over, I f  he could have
moved he would have stretched out a hand and la id  i t  on O 'Brien's arm.
He had never loved him so deeply as at th is  moment The old fe e l in g ,
tha t at bottom i t  did not matter whether O'Brien was a fr iend  or an
enemy, had come back. O'Brien was a person who could be ta lked to .
Perhaps one did not want to be loved so much as to be understood. O'Brien
had tortured him to the edge o f lunacy, and in a l i t t l e  w h ile , i t  was
ce r ta in , he would send him to his death. I t  made no d iffe rence . In
some sense tha t went deeper than fr iendsh ip  they were in timates:
somewhere or other, although the actual words might never be spoken,
37there was a place where they could meet and ta lk  . . . '  From th is  
passage, i t  seems c lear tha t Winston's love fo r  O'Brien, however 
grotesquely inappropriate i t  must seem, is  the f r u i t  o f  his passion 
to be understood, and fo r  th is  reason fa r  o u ts tr ips  a l l  other loves.
Is i t  not then dramatically implausible th a t the act which heralds 
Winston's ultimate defeat should be his renunciation o f his love fo r  
Julia? Ju l ia  has at th is  point come to appear ir re le v a n t .
Winston has the impression that the mind o f O'Brien contains 
and surpasses his own. I t  can accommodate the Party orthodoxies 
along with an understanding o f Winston's heresies, the Party ra t io n ­
a l i t y ,  along with Winston's heretica l ra t io n a l i t y .  I t  contains both 
san ity  and insan ity , O'Brien is  able to fo llow  Winston's thought 
processes p e r fe c t ly ;  he can absorb them, pervert them, and overlay 
them with the Party log ic  in such a way tha t Winston is  incapable o f
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f ind ing  his way back to lu c id i t y ,  Like an implacable god, O'Brien 
reads a l l  Winston's thoughts, and foresees his fa l l in g s .  Indeed, 
O'Brien perceives the heretica l nature o f Winston's mind almost before 
Winston himself is  aware o f i t ,  and he de lib e ra te ly  ensnares Winston 
in to  acts o f re vo lt .  Here there is  perhaps an echo o f Paradise Lost, 
where the heretic  Satan is ,  in Shelley's words, 'exasperated to  deserve 
new torments' at the hands o f M ilton 's  God. (see note 15 above.)
S u p e r f ic ia l ly ,  Nineteen Eighty-Four appears to be the most pro­
foundly pessimistic o f the an t i-u to p ias , since i t  depicts a world 
where pain, hatred, squalor and b r u ta l i t y  have annih ila ted the human 
w i l l .  Yet i t  may be that i t s  very lack o f redeeming features makes 
i t  u lt im a te ly  less menacing than e ith e r Brave New World or l ^ .
The c it izens  o f Oceania are quite w ithout l ib e r t y ,  but th is  is  
because the state has taken possession o f th e i r  w i l l  by force. But 
the c it izens  o f Zamyatin's One State and o f Huxley's World State have 
gladly surrendered th e i r  freedom in the cause o f ease and s ta b i l i t y .  
They have long since ceased to recognise the fac t o f th e i r  own 
slavery.
There is ,  w rites Rousseau, 'no subjection so complete as that
which preserves the forms o f freedom; i t  is  thus that the w i l l  i t s e l f
38is  taken cap t ive '.  The World State and the One State bear w ith in  
them the seeds of d u ra b i l i ty ,  because the mass o f c it ize n s  have no 
sense o f being coerced. S tu l t i f ie d  by mindless contentment, the c i t i ­
zens presume tha t the desires o f th e ir  ru le rs  n a tu ra l ly  re f le c t  
the true nature o f th e i r  own desires. Only the d iss ident is  troubled
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by his loss o f l ib e r ty ,  For the orthodox c i t iz e n  o f Zamyatin's
One State, the Guardians insp ire  only reverence and g ra t itude . They
are 'guardian angels^, whose 'onerous and exalted work' i t  i s ,  to d ire c t
the steps o f the p o te n t ia l ly  f a l l i b l e  c it ize n s  along the path to per- 
39fec t io n , In the to ta l states o f  both Zamyatin and Huxley, the people 
have a l l  th e i r  wants supplied, they are spared the bother o f having 
to cope with complex human re la tionsh ips , and they are absolved from 
the re s p o n s ib i l i ty  o f moral judgment. The c it izens  of the World 
State are enslaved through th e i r  hedonism, and those o f the One 
State, through moral and in te l le c tu a l indolence. Both embrace th e i r  
servitude without question. But the c it izen s  of Oceania are enslaved 
and s p i r i t u a l l y  mutilated by fear alone. Every human in s t in c t  is  
repressed but the in s t in c t  to wield power, and only those who by nature 
have a pathological love of power can hope to f in d  any s a t is fa c t io n .
Even fo r  them, l i f e  is  dingy and insecure, and there is  the constant 
p ro b a b i l i ty  tha t they themselves w i l l  become the victims o f the next 
wave o f oppression. A society which o ffe rs  nothing but unmitigated 
despair and te r ro r  to the vast m a jo rity  o f i t s  members cannot, sure ly, 
remain viable forever?
Moreover, the la rgest section o f society in Oceania, the 
Proles, are excluded from the Party. No e f fo r t  is  made to control 
th e i r  minds through the methods o f doubleth ink, since i t  is  presumed 
tha t they have not the capacity to rebel. Yet the Proles e xh ib it  
a s to l id i t y  and an endurance which may enable them to o u t la s t the 
t e r r i f i e d  and disorientated mental cr ipp les o f whom the Party is  
composed.
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I t  is  not certa in whether Orwell himself considered tha t the
type o f society he described in Nineteen Eighty-Four was capable of
su rv iva l,  Within the book i t s e l f ,  O'Brien says tha t Winston Smith
is  ’ the la s t  man', 'the guardian o f the human s p i r i t ' ,  and he asserts
that once Winston has been brought to inev itab le  defeat, humanity w i l l  
40die with him. Yet th is  statement of O 'Brien 's c o n f l ic ts  strangely 
w ith his claim, minutes e a r l ie r ,  tha t the heretic  is  an eternal f igu re  
in socie ty, who, once vanquished, w i l l  always re-emerge, only to be 
vanquished yet again (see note 35 above). I f  Winston's defeat is 
intended to imply the f in a l  defeat o f the human s p i r i t ,  then the 
surviva l o f Oceania is ,  o f course assured.
However, in his other w r i t in g s , Orwell indicated tha t he con­
sidered tha t the type o f society which he described in Nineteen
Eighty-Four must u lt im a te ly  f a i l .  Writing o f the theories o f James 
Burnham, Orwell concluded, 'Certain rules o f conduct have to be
observed i f  human society is  to hold together at a l l  ........  The huge,
in v in c ib le  slave empire o f which Burnham appears to dream w i l l  not 
be established, or i f  established, w i l l  not endure, because slavery
is  no longer a stable basis fo r  human society
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Part I I  (y ) Utopia and the subjugation o f the arts  and sciences
I f  dominion over the minds o f the c it ize n s  o f utopia is  to be 
complete, then the state must undertake to control human c re a t iv i ty  
in  a l l  i t s  forms. I t  is  recognized by the ru le rs  o f utopia th a t,  
l e f t  to themselves, the arts  and sciences may undermine dogma, and 
serve as a force fo r  social d is rup tion . Men have been constructing 
systems o f censorship fo r  as long as they have been devising perfect 
states. The censor is  a fa m i l ia r ,  and perhaps an in e v ita b le ,  f igu re  
in Utopia, although his presence may not always be consciously ack­
nowledged. Even in the gentle paradise o f  William M orris 's  News 
From Nowhere, f ine  a r t  is  excluded. There is  an abundance o f beauty, 
and c ra f t  f lourishes on every side, but the decision has been made 
tha t the a r t  o f the perfect society must always serve u t i l i t y ,  and 
somehow the creative a r t i s t  has withered away.
Utopian c r i t ic ism s  o f a r t  f a l l  in to  three main categories.
F i r s t l y ,  a r t  is  considered to  be against reason, secondly i t  is  
considered to be against u t i l i t y ,  and th i r d ly ,  a r t  is  held to be against 
public order. I f  a r t  is  to be permitted to  survive in utopia, i t  must 
therefore be wholly transformed.
One o f P la to 's  major c r i t ic is m s  o f the arts  centres around the 
immensurability o f a r t i s t i c  creations. That which cannot be measured 
offends against both reason and order, and cannot therefore be s a t is ­
fy ing  to man's highest fa c u l t ie s ,  Plato considers. 'Measure and 
proportion are everywhere connected with beauty and v i r t u e ' ,  Plato 
declares in the Philebus, but these q u a l i t ie s  are lacking in the a r t s J
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Plato seems to detach beauty wholly from the a r ts ,  a l ly in g  i t  instead 
with harmony, precis ion, im m utab il ity , reason and necessary t ru th .
' I f  ar ithm etic  and the sciences of measurement and weighing were taken 
away from a l l  a r ts ,  what was l e f t  o f them would be, so to speak, 
p re tty  w orth less ', P la to 's  Socrates comments. A r t i s t i c  creation gener­
a l l y ,  he says, employs only man's lower fa c u lt ie s  -  the a b i l i t y  ' to  
conjecture, to d r i l l  the perception by practice and experience'. 
'M usic ', Socrates maintains, is  f u l l  o f conjecture; ‘ i t  a tta ins  har­
mony by guesswork based on prac tice , not by measurement; and f lu te  
music throughout t r ie s  to f ind  the p itch  o f each note as i t  is  pro­
duced by guess, so tha t the amount o f uncerta inty mixed up in i t  is
2
great, and the amount o f ce r ta in ty  sm a ll ' .
I t  is  in Zamyatin's ^  tha t the utopian desire fo r  ra t io n a l ly  
perfect a r t  is  most ap tly  s a t ir iz e d . Music, in the One State, is  
produced by the 'musicometer', I t  consists o f 'c ry s ta l l in e  chro­
matic scales converging and diverging in endless series - and the 
summarizing chords o f the formulae o f Taylor, o f McLauren; the 
fu l l - to n e d ,  squarely massive passages o f the Pythagorean theorem; the 
pensive melodies o f an expiring o s c i l la to ry  movement; v iv id  cadences, 
a lte rna ting  with the pauses of Frauenhofer's l ines - the spectral 
analysis of planets 'What grandeur! ' D-503 muses, 'And how
s e l f -w i l le d  the music o f  the ancients, restra ined by nothing save w ild
fan tas ies  ' ^
The imaginary world which Zamyatin portrays in 1^, is  a world 
the lineaments o f which were already perceived by Shelley in 1821, 
when he wrote his Defence o f  Poetry. 'To what but a c u l t iv a t io n  o f
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the mechanical arts in a degree disproportioned to the presence o f 
the creative fa cu lty ,  which is the basis o f  a l l  knowledge, is  to be 
a tt r ib u te d  the abuse of a l l  invention fo r  abridging and combining 
labour, to the exasperation of the inequa lity  of mankind?' Shelley 
asks. We lack imagination, and the 'poetry o f l i f e ' ,  he suggests, 
and thus 'our ca lcu la tions have outrun conception*, we have eaten more 
than we can digest. The c u l t iv a t io n  o f those sciences which have 
enlarged the l im i ts  o f empire o f man over the external world, has, 
fo r  want o f the poetical fa c u lty ,  p ropo rt iona lly  circumscribed those 
o f the in terna l world ; and man, having enslaved the elements, remains 
himself a s lave '.  The human mind is  now attempting ' to  exa lt over the 
d ire c t  expression o f the inventive and creative fa c u l t y ' ,  the 'a p p l i ­
cation o f ana ly tica l reasoning to the aberrations o f so c ie ty '.  Thus 
' i t  has arisen that the discoveries which should have lightened, have 
added a weight to the curse imposed on Adam'.^
Shelley, l ik e  Zamyatin a century la te r ,  challenged the utopian 
assumption that a r t  is  without value to  man. 'Poets have been cha l­
lenged to resign the c iv ic  crown to reasoners and mechanists . . . .  I t  
is  admitted that the exercise o f imagination is  most d e l ig h t fu l ,  but 
i t  is  alleged tha t tha t o f reason is  more u s e fu l ' ,  he wrote. But 
poetry can serve a higher u t i l i t y  fo r  Shelley, since 'whatever strengthens 
and p u r i f ie s  a ffec t ion s , enlarges the imagination, and adds s p i r i t  to 
sense, is  usefu l' in th is  higher sense. Shelley considered th a t the 
lower u t i l i t y  is best served by reasoners and mechanists, who are
important w ith in  th e i r  proper sphere: ' ___ they have th e i r  appointed
o f f ic e  in society -----  They make space and give time. Their exertions
are o f the highest va lue '. They serve ' th a t  which banishes the
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importunity o f the wants o f our animal nature, the surrounding men 
with security  o f l i f e ,  the dispersing o f the grosser delusions of 
supe rs t i t io n , and the c o n c i l ia t in g  such a degree o f mutual forbearance 
among men as may consist with the motives of personal advantage'.
But the 'reasoners and mechanists', Shelley held, ought not to 'deface 
the eternal tru ths  charactered upon the imaginations of men'.
He believed tha t the influence o f the 'mechanist', whose task is  to 
abridge labour, and o f the 'p o l i t ic a l  economist', who seeks to com­
bine labour, should be m itigated with the influence o f imagination, 
or paradoxically , even greater inequa lity  would a r ise , as, he considered,
5
was already the case in England,
'The c u lt iv a t io n  o f poetry is  never more to be desired than at 
periods when, from an excess o f the s e lf is h  and ca lcu la t ing  p r in c ip le ,  
the accumulation of the materials o f external l i f e  exceed the quantity  
o f the power of ass im ila ting  then to the in te rna l laws o f human nature*. 
For Shelley, poetry is  the type o f thought which must inform a l l  other 
modes o f th ink ing , ' i t  is  tha t which comprehends a l l  science, and 
that to which a l l  science must be re fe r re d '.^  For Shelley, as fo r  
Zamyatin, the human fa c u lt ie s  o f reason and o f  imagination must always 
ex is t in combination. As stated in Part I I ( i v )  o f th is  thes is , there 
exists no proof tha t Zamyatin ever read Shelley 's Defence o f Poetry, 
but Zamyatin's v is ion o f the nature o f man is  c e r ta in ly  c lose ly 
re lated to that o f Shelley. There is ,  moreover, an in te res t in g  con- 
g ru i ty  in the imagery employed by the two w r i te rs :  fo r  both Shelley
and Zamyatin, the creative imagination is  symbolised by a glowing
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ember, Shelley w rites , 'The mind in creation is  as a fading coal, 
which some in v is ib le  influence, l ik e  an inconstant wind, awakes to 
tra n s ito ry  brightness’ . This brightness is  ' in s p i r a t io n ' ,  and i f  i t  
could be preserved ' in  i t s  o r ig in a l p u r i ty  and force, i t  is  impossible 
to predict the greatness o f the re s u l ts ' . ^  And in Zamyatin's 
the symbol o f the Mephis, those who have kept imagination a l iv e ,  is  
f i r e .  Beyond the Green Wall, etched upon a rock, is  the emblem o f 
the Mephis 'a crude depiction: tha t o f  a winged youth with a 
transparent body, and in the place usually occupied by the heart'
Q
there is 'a dazzling ember, smouldering w ith a dark red glow'.
The same f i r e  burns w ith in  the eyes o f E-330: D-503 sees 'an oven
flaming, sparks, tongues o f flame l ic k in g  upward', when he looks at 
her.^ (See also Part I I ( i )  notes 36 and 37),
The creative imagination which is  prized by Shelley and Zamya­
t in  arouses grave d isquiet in the utopian. Plato was much disturbed 
by the nature o f the a r t i s t i c  d r ive . Art is  engendered by in s p ira ­
t ion  ra ther than by reason, Plato wrote, and though th is  insp ira t io n  
may be d iv ine , yet i t  is  possibly also insane. (See note 26 below.)
In the Apology, Socrates describes how he has asked eminent a r t is ts  
to explain the nature o f th e i r  most profound works, but discovered 
tha t none is  able to do so, 'So I learned ', Socrates concludes,
'th a t  not by wisdom do poets w rite  poetry, but by a sort o f genius 
and in sp ira t io n ;  they are l ik e  d iv iners and soothsayers, who also say 
many f ine  th ings, but do not understand the meaning o f them'.^^
For P lato, the a r t i s t  constitu tes an especial danger to society because 
he creates in freedom, by a process which cannot be ra t io n a l ly
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u n d e rs to o d ,  nor t h e r e f o r e  a d e q u a te ly  c o n t r o l l e d .  I f  the  
a r t i s t  is  not to be altogether banished from the perfect s ta te , the 
nature o f his work, and of i t s  genesis, must be e n t i re ly  a lte red , 
so tha t his a r t  presents only a corroboration o f the common v is ion  
of the world endorsed by state dogma. He must o f fe r  no personal 
in s ig h t ,  no unique in te rp re ta t io n  o f the human cond it ion , no su rp r is ­
ing, ex tra -ra t iona l reve la tion.
I t  is  the personal element in a r t  which is  not to be to le ra ted 
in utopia. The a r t i s t  may arouse emotions and aspirations which are 
dangerous to the s ta te . He may stimulate inconvenient desires and 
d issa t is fa c t io n s . A r t ,  no less than h is to ry ,  may provide a standard 
o f comparison, thus undermining social s t a b i l i t y  by promoting doubt 
and questioning. At the simplest le v e l,  the a rt is t may undermine the 
au thority  o f the state by presenting facts whch be lie  state dogma.
' I  have always maintained that every a r t i s t  is  a propagandist', 
Orwell wrote. ' I  don 't mean a p o l i t ic a l  propagandist. I f  he has any 
honesty and ta le n t at a l l  he cannot be tha t. Most p o l i t ic a l  propaganda 
is  a matter o f t e l l in g  l ie s ,  not only about the facts but about your 
fee lings . But every a r t i s t  is  a propagandist in the sense th a t he is 
t ry in g ,  d i re c t ly  or in d ir e c t ly ,  to impose a v is ion  o f l i f e  th a t seems 
to him des irab le ' . ^  ^ In the view o f Orwell, Zamyatin, and the a n t i -  
utopian Huxley, the a r t i s t  presents a unique and personal v is ion o f 
the world. He can never be wholly assimilated in to  his socie ty. In 
the to ta l s ta te , where independent thought is  judged to be h e re t ica l,  
his presence is impermissible.
Since the ru lers o f the to ta l  state perceive a r t  as a potentia l
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th reat to social order, they seek e ith e r to  banish i t ,  o r else to 
harness i t  to the service o f the state. But i f  a r t  is  to be used to 
enhance, ra ther than to undermine, social s t a b i l i t y ,  i t  must f i r s t  be 
removed e n t i re ly  from the personal sphere, and taken in to  the c o l le c t iv e  
sphere. Art as free self-expression must cease to  e x is t ,  and the state 
must establish r ig id  c r i t e r ia  to define the area o f acceptable a r t .
Art is  depersonalized in the to ta l  s ta te . At the intermediate leve l, 
i t  emerges as fo lk  a r t ,  or c ra f t ,  the work o f the anonymous many, rather 
than the work o f the known in d iv id u a l.  Visual a r t  is  reduced to  formal 
design. Verbal a r t  is inva r iab ly  ed ify ing . Music is  simple, t ra d i t io n a l 
and restrained. Such is  the a r t  o f  Huxley's utopia, Pala; i t  is  the 
a r t  prescribed by Plato - h ie ra t ic ,  d id a c t ic ,  useful and worthy.
Another p o s s ib i l i t y  is  tha t a r t  may be taken over by bureaucrats, as in  
Brave New World. The u ltimate depersonalization occurs where a r t  is  
no longer the product o f men at a l l ,  but o f machines. A l l  elements 
of freedom and u n p re d ic ta b i l i ty  are here extinguished. Such a s i t u ­
ation is  described in Nineteen Eighty-Four, where books are constructed 
by machine in the state F ic tion  Department, and in 1^, where music 
is  mechanically produced in the Music Factory.
For both Orwell and Zamyatin, there is  an intimate connection
between a r t  and freedom. The a r t i s t i c  imagination, Orwell wrote,
12' l i k e  certa in  w ild  animals, w i l l  not breed in c a p t iv i t y ' .  I t  is  
the imagination which, in Zamyatin's One State, is  seen as con s t itu t in g  
the major th reat to social order. Art is  not only engendered by 
imagination, i t  also stimulates the imagination. In the One State 
imagination, which frees the mind from the confines o f the world o f 
observable fa c t ,  is  regarded as being an in f i r m i t y .  The a r t  o f the
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One State has therefore been reconstitu ted , devoid o f imaginative 
elements.
Yet although Orwell and Zamyatin both set a high value on the 
imaination, and contrast the freedom o f a r t  w ith the slavery o f  dogma, 
they do not share a common conception o f the nature o f the a r t i s t i c  
d r ive , ne ither is  there agreement between them as to what properly 
constitu tes a r t .  For Orwell, a r t i s t i c  imagination emanates from the 
in te l le c t ,  but fo r  Zamyatin i t  is  esse n tia l ly  non-ra tiona l.
'There are two priceless fountainheads in man: brain and sex ',
Zamyatin wrote. 'From the f i r s t  proceeds a l l  science, from the second
- a l l  a r t .  And to cut o f f  a l l  a r t  from you rse lf ,  or to force i t  in to
your brain would mean to cut o f f  -----  w e l l ,  yes; and to remain with
13only a pimple'. In Zamyatin describes a state where a r t  has 
been wholly 'forced in to  the b ra in ' .  Consequently, i t  has ceased to 
be a r t ,  as defined by Zamyatin.
For Zamyatin, then, a r t  is  the product o f transformed sexual 
energy, (Here there are echoes o f Freud). A rt  is  e sse n tia l ly  non- 
ra t io n a l,  and poetry is  perhaps the most pure and potent art-fo rm  of 
a l l ,  Zamyatin pays poetry the same t r ib u te  as tha t paid by Plato: 
both recognise i t  as a prime force fo r  the destruction o f the estab­
lished order. 'There i s ' ,  Plato remarks, 'a long standing quarrel 
between poetry and philosophy'. Poetry has the power to charm men 
in to  the ways o f passion and disharmony. I f ,  Plato s ta tes, ‘you admit 
the honeyed muse in epic or l y r i c  verse, then pleasure and pain w i l l  
usurp the sovereignty o f law and o f the p r inc ip les  always recognized 
by common consent as the bes t, '^^
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I t  is  the poetic imagination which is  most harshly repressed
in Zamyatin's One State, 'We have gentled and saddled th a t once w ild
element o f poesy’ , D-503 writes in his d ia ry . 'Nowadays, poesy is
no longer the unpardonable s h r i l l  clamour o f a n ightinga le  -  poesy
15is  service to the s ta te , poesy is  u t i l i t y ' .  E-330 remarks tha t 
the poets o f ancient times were more powerful than the princes o f 
th e i r  age. 'Why weren't they iso la ted , exterminated?' she asks i r o n i ­
c a l ly .^ ^  Poetic language possessed a unique power in Zamyatin's view. 
For him, the form o f language was as s ig n i f ic a n t  as i t s  content. He 
considered tha t the language proper to his own generation was essenti­
a l l y  poetic. 'The o ld , slow, creaking descriptions are a th ing o f the 
p a s t ' ,  he wrote. 'Today the ru le is b rev ity  - but every word must be 
supercharged, high-voltage. We must compress in to  a s ingle second 
what was held before in a sixty-second minute. And hence, syntax 
becomes e l l i p t i c a l ,  v o la t i le ' . ^ ^
Yet while Zamyatin was concerned w ith  the emotive power o f a r t i s -
18t i c  language, w ith 'the enormous, magnificent force o f a r t i s t i c  words' 
Orwell was p r im a r i ly  concerned with language as communication, tha t is ,  
w ith  the ra tiona l power o f words. Orwell believed tha t i t  was the 
duty o f the w r i te r  to impart his p a r t ic u la r  v is ion  o f the t ru th  with 
in te g r i t y  and c la r i t y .  He was impatient o f obscure or enigmatic 
language, and was ru th less ly  c r i t i c a l  o f pretentious or evasive prose. 
But he seems a t times to have been unable to perceive tha t language 
can be c ry p t ic ,  a l lu s ive  and in d ire c t  w ithout being empty or mere­
t r ic io u s .  In p a r t ic u la r ,  he seems to show scant appreciation o f the 
character and capacity o f poetic language, and o f the v a l id i t y  of
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poetic imagery. For th is  reason, he comes to the s ta r t l in g  conclusion
tha t poetry could well survive, in  a to ta l i t a r ia n  age, whereas prose
w rit in g  ce r ta in ly  could not. The prose w r i te r ,  Orwell wrote, 'would
have no choice between silence and death. Prose l i te ra tu re  is  the
product o f ra tiona lism , o f the Protestant centuries, of the autonomous 
19in d iv id u a l ' .  Orwell seems not to have made any very c lear d is t in c ­
t io n  between poetry verse and fo lk  ba llad. 'Good verse ', he wrote,
'un like  good prose, is  not necessarily an ind iv idua l product ___
Verse - and perhaps good verse o f i t s  kind, though i t  would not be of 
the highest kind - might survive under even the most in q u is i to r ia l  
régime. Even in a society where l ib e r ty  and in d iv id u a l i ty  had been 
extinguished, there would s t i l l  be a need e ith e r fo r  p a t r io t ic  songs 
and heroic ballads celebrating v ic to r ie s ,  or fo r  elaborate exercises 
in f la t t e r y :  and these are the kinds o f poem tha t can be w r it te n  to
order, or composed communally, w ithout necessarily lacking a r t i s t i c  
value. Prose is  a d i f fe re n t  matter, since the prose w r i te r  cannot
20narrow the range o f his thoughts w ithout k i l l i n g  his inven tiven ess .. . '  
The weakness in Orwell's position here is  obvious. F i r s t l y ,  he denies 
to the poet the sense o f  honour and in te g r i ty  which he assumes to be 
ch a ra c te r is t ic  o f the good prose w r i te r .  He seems to assume tha t the 
poet can become a venal apologist fo r  a despotic régime without com­
promising his a r t .  This is  because he considérés poetry to be basic­
a l l y  without content. 'A poem is  an arrangement o f sounds and 
associations, as a pa inting is  an arrangement o f brushmarks, For 
short snatches, indeed, as in the re fra in  o f a song, poetry can even 
dispense with meaning a lto g e th e r ',  Orwell comments. ' I t  is  easier
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fo r  a poet than fo r  a prose w r i te r  to feel a t home in an au tho rita r ian
society. To begin w ith , bureaucrats and other "p ra c t ic a l ’'men usually
despise the poet too deeply to be much in terested in what he is  saying.
Secondly, what the poet is  saying - tha t i s ,  what his poem "means" i f
translated in to  prose -  is  re la t iv e ly  unimportant even to himself.
21The thought contained in a poem is  always s im p le , , . . '  I t  does not, 
apparently, occur to  Orwell tha t i t  is  unreasonable to  suppose tha t 
the ' t r u th '  contained in a poem can necessarily be conveyed through 
the medium o f prose. Moreover, he ignores the h is to r ic a l  fa c t  tha t 
poetry, visual a r t  and even music, none o f which can have a prose 
equivalent, have a l l  been subject to proscrip t ion  in au tho rita r ian  
soc ie ties . I t  must fo l lo w , then, tha t the "sense" conveyed by non­
prose a r t  forms is  s u f f ic ie n t ly  apparent to the censors fo r  them to 
be able to determine which works shall be allowed to survive, and which 
shall be suppressed.
Orwell's v is ion o f  poetic language is  re s tr ic te d .  He is  sensi­
t iv e  to  a l im ited  range o f the spectrum o f poetic expression only.
Thus, in his review of Zamyatin's Orwell f a i l s  to recognize the 
esse n t ia l ly  poetic idiom o f the book. He merely remarks tha t ^  
is  badly constructed, and unduly complex, w ith ' a ra ther weak and ep i­
sodic p lo t ’ ,^^
In Orwell’ s view, poetry is  not necessarily to be regarded as 
a part o f a r t  at a l l ,  since a r t  is  ’ the product o f ra t io n a l ism '.  He
23couples poetry with 'ce r ta in  arts or h a l f -a r ts ,  such as a rch ite c tu re ’ . 
For Orwell, prose l i te ra tu r e  is  re a l ly  the whole o f a r t .  I t  is  the 
in te l le c tu a l force o f language which he values, and in Nineteen
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Eighty-Four, i t  is  language as a medium fo r  c ry s ta l l iz in g  ra tiona l 
thought which is  destroyed. But fo r  Zamyatin, i t  is  the emotive power 
o f language which is  o f prime importance. A rt  in Zamyatin's One State 
has been drained o f a l l  emotional content, and taken wholly in to  the 
realm o f the in te l le c t .  Thus i t  has become emasculated. The c i t i ­
zens o f Zamyatin's One State are emotionally cripp led because th e ir  
ru le rs  have destroyed the dangerous force o f beauty, and substituted 
mere u t i l i t y .  The a r t  which is  destroyed in the One State is  tha t 
same a r t  which Plato banished from his Republic - imaginative, 
imprecise, l im i t le s s ,  tu rbu lent and free . And the a r t  which survives 
in the One State: a r t  as u t i l i t y  and a r t  as moral exhorta tion , is  of
the same order as tha t which is  allowed to survive in  the Republic.
In his conception of the nature o f a r t ,  Zamyatin fo llows the 
premisses o f the Platonic t r a d i t io n ,  although, o f course, his f in a l  
conclusions are d iam e tr ica l ly  opposed to those o f P lato. A r t ,  Zam­
ya t in  agrees w ith P lato, is  against reason. I t  is  also against per­
fec t order and harmony. But i t  is  fo r  precise ly th is  reason tha t 
Zamyatin wishes to preserve a r t  as a weapon against entropy.
Plato excludes from his perfect world the a r t  which is  the 
product o f the emotions and o f  the senses; as such i t  is in fe r io r  
to the products o f the ra t iona l mind. A r t ,  Plato considers, is  
i l lu s io n  and t r ic k e ry .  I t  conjures up images and fan tas ies, and thus 
obscures the t ru th .  Any work o f a r t ,  whether visual or verbal, is  
in e v ita b ly  in fe r io r  to the material objects which i t  represents.
S im ila r ly ,  in Zamyatin’ s One State a r t  is  regarded as mere id le  fancy.
24The One State prizes ’ facts o n ly ' .  Only tha t which can be measured
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has existence, Art belongs beyond the Green Wall, in  the world o f 
the emotions. I t  is  otiose in the p e rfe c t ly  ra tiona l One State.
In the Republic,Plato comments, -Every so rt o f  confusion . . .  is  to be 
found in our minds, and i t  is  th is  weakness in  our nature tha t is  
exp lo ited , w ith a quite magical e f fe c t ,  by many t r ic k s  o f  i l lu s io n ,
l ik e  scene-painting and conjuring -----  Paintings and works o f a r t
in general are fa r  removed from r e a l i t y ,  a n d   the element in
our nature which is  accessible to  a r t  and responds to i t s  advances 
is  equally fa r  from wisdom', P la to 's  Socrates goes on to explain 
tha t man need no longer be led in to  delusion by the a r ts .  'We are no 
longer at the mercy o f apparent d ifferences o f  size and quantity  and 
weight; the fa cu lty  which has done the continual measuring and weigh­
ing takes control instead. And th is  can only be the work o f the ca l-
25cu la ting  or reasoning element in  the s o u l. '  This higher 'c a lc u la t ­
ing or reasoning element' has taken to ta l control o f  a r t  in Zamyatin's 
One State,
In the One State, as in P la to 's  Republic (see note 10 above), a r t
is  condemned because i t  is  held to be engendered by some kind of
insane in tu i t io n ,  a ltogether opposed to reason. In the Ion Plato 
suggests tha t poetic in sp ira t io n  is  d iv ine in o r ig in ,  but i t  is  none­
theless madness. Poetry is  inva r iab ly  the f r u i t  o f some holy insa n ity ,
and can never be engendered by the reasoning mind. ' . . .  A ll good
poets, epic as well as l y r i c ,  compose th e i r  beautifu l poems not by 
a r t ,  but because they are inspired and possessed. And as Corybantian 
re ve l le rs ,  when they dance, are not in th e i r  r ig h t  minds so the l y r i c
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poets are not in th e i r  r ig h t  mind when they are composing th e i r  
beautifu l s tra ins : but when fa l l in g  under the power o f music and metre
they are inspired and possessed; l ik e  Bacchic maidens who draw milk 
and honey from the r ive rs  when they are under the influence o f Diony­
sus but not when they are in th e ir  r ig h t  mind. And the soul o f the 
ly r i c  poet does the same, as they themselves say; fo r  they t e l l  us 
tha t they bring songs from honeyed founta ins, c u l l in g  them out of 
the gardens and de lls  of the Muses; they, l ik e  the bees, winging 
th e i r  way from flower to flower. And th is  is  true. For the poet is  
a l ig h t  and winged and holy th ing , and there is  no invention in  him 
u n t i l  he has been inspired and is  out of his senses, and reason is  
no longer in him: no man, while he retains tha t fa c u lty ,  has the
oracular g i f t  o f poe try '.
Plato is  acutely sensitive to the beauty o f poetry, yet poetry
remains fo r  him a menace to the well regulated socie ty. The inspired 
poet can know no reason or re s t ra in t ,  and his a r t  is  not susceptible 
to ra tiona l con tro l.  I t  is  w ithout measure or order. S im i la r ly ,  in 
Zamyatin's perfect s ta te , the ru le rs  have taught men to regard 
the f l ig h ts  o f free , a r t i s t i c  insp ira t ion  experienced by the a r t is ts  
o f former times as being i r r a t io n a l ,  inexp licab le , and therefore dan­
gerous. A le c tu re r  in the Music Auditorium o f the One State exclaims 
with pride, 'By merely turning th is  handle any one o f you can produce 
up to three sonatas an hour. Yet what t o i l  and moil your ancestors 
had to go through to a tta in  th is  sort of th in g ' They could create only
by working themselves in to  seizures o f in sp ira t io n  - some unknown form 
27o f epilepsy And D-503, gazing at the 's t e r i le ,  irreproachable'
- 240 -
cloudless sky, is  moved to remark, 'How extremely p r im it ive  in  matters 
o f taste were the ancients, since th e i r  poets could f in d  insp ira t io n
28in  those absurd, s lo p p ily  shaped, fo o l is h ly  jostling masses o f vapour'.
In the One State, a cloud may be o f s c ie n t i f i c  relevance, but i t  can
never arouse the imagination o f the poet.
The w ild  force o f in sp ira t io n  has been s t i l l e d  in  Zamyatin's
perfect world, since the mathematician has replaced the composer as
the fa b r ica to r  o f music, and poetry has been safe ly taken in to  the
hands o f the state. State Poets 'poetize death sentences', and w rite
29Odes to the Benefactor, Their poetry is  no more than s te r i le  dogma, 
devoid o f a r t  or o r ig in a l i t y .  Such, fo r  Zamyatin, is  the poetry o f 
the to ta l s ta te , poetry which Orwell seems to suppose can possibly 
yet re ta in  ' a r t i s t i c  va lue '. (See note 20 above). One o f the most 
poignant iron ies o f Zamyatin's book is  tha t D-503 wholly f a i l s  to 
perceive the rebe ll ious misery o f the State Poet, R-13, a poet who 
appears to D-503 to be performing his o f f i c ia l  functions w ith f a u l t ­
less e f f ic ie n c y  and perfect dedication.
Art in the One State, as in P la to 's  Republic, is  held to be 
against order and harmony. A r t ,  l ik e  v ice , is  restless and energetic, 
while d iv ine r e a l i t y  is  motionless and externa l. For P lato, as fo r  
the ru le rs  o f the One State, 'the ideal ex is ts  where nothing any longer 
h a p p e n s A r t ,  the re fo re , i f  i t  is  to be permitted to e x is t  at a l l ,  
must be subject to r ig id  con tro l.  Dramatic poetry, Plato asserts, / 
'waters the growth o f passions which should be allowed to w ithe r away, 
and sets them up in con tro l,  although the goodness and happiness o f
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our l ive s  depend on th e i r  being held in subjection , , , , ,  One who lends
an ear to i t  should ra ther beware o f endangering the order established 
31in his so u l '.  A r t ,  then, is  by nature a menace to s t a b i l i t y .  In 
Zamyatin’ s perfect s ta te , too, the ru le rs  recognize th is  danger. 
Accordingly, they have conditioned the c it izen s  o f the One State in 
such a way tha t they are incapable o f responding to the dramatic and 
emotional power o f the a r t  o f former times. The creative works o f 
e a r l ie r  generations are presented to the c it izens  as objects worthy
only o f deris ion . Thus div ine harmony is  preserved.
Plato and Zamyatin agree, then, tha t a r t  has power to under­
mine the established order, both w ith in  the mind o f the ind iv idua l 
c i t iz e n ,  and w ith in  the s ta te . But while fo r  Plato th is  is  good rea­
son fo r  attempting to protect man and society from the power o f the 
a r ts ,  fo r  Zamyatin, i t  is  the best possible reason fo r  determining 
to preserve and promote the a r ts . Within Zamyatin's symbolism, the 
a r t i s t i c  imagination is  the source o f free energy which alone has power
to banish psychological entropy. Zamyatin holds tha t i t  is  the
a r t i s t ' s  duty to f i r e  the imagination o f others, and thus to shatter 
the complacent c i r c u la r i t y  o f the closed perfect system. 'Harmful 
l i te ra tu re  is  more useful than useful l i t e r a t u r e ' ,  Zamyatin wrote,
' f o r  i t  is  a n t i -entropie. I t  is  a means o f combating c a lc i f ic a t io n ,
32sc le ros is , crust; moss, quiescence’ . In the One State, a r t  has been 
deprived o f i t s  an t i-en trop ic  function . Instead, i t  has been rede­
signed so as to become i t s e l f  a force fo r  complacency,for s tasis and 
fo r  quiescence. Beauty, in Zamyatin’ s perfect s ta te , is  held to l i e
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in ’ unfreedom', in the rhythmic, inhuman precision o f machines, in
mathematical exactitude and in  the pe rfec t ly  predictable cadences which
issue from the Music Tower, during the d a i ly  March of the One State.
'Only tha t is  beautifu l which is  ra tiona l and u t i l i t a r i a n ;  machines,
33boots, formulae, food e t c , ' ,  D-503 declares. He is  lo s t  in admira­
t io n  a t the sight o f the regular sequence o f rhythmic movements per­
formed by the machines in his workshop. I t  appears to him as 'a 
grandiose mechanical b a l le t ' .  He decides tha t the dance is  beautifu l 
in tha t i t  is  ' non-free ' m otion ', and the 'profound meaning of the 
dance' l ie s  'p rec ise ly  in absolute, aesthetic submissiveness, in  ideal 
‘ non-freedom' . And he concludes tha t 'the in s t in c t  fo r  nonfreedom is  
organ ica lly  inherent in man from times o f o ld ' . ^ ^  For D-503, the purest
a r t  is  to be found in the 'd iv ine  beauty' o f mathematics, and in the
35'wondrous universe' o f the m u lt ip l ic a t io n  tables. A rt in the One 
State is  the f r u i t  not o f the emotions and o f the imagination, but o f
the 'ca lcu la t ing  or reasoning element' in the human bra in. I t  pro­
ceeds from d iano ia , not e ika s ia . I t  is  no longer image-ridden and 
magical: i t  is  o rder ly , ra t io n a l,  impersonal and usefu l.
The a r t  of utopia is  t r a d i t io n a l ly  use fu l, ra tiona l and d id ac t ic .  
Such is  the a r t  o f Huxley's Is land . In Pala, f in e  a r t  has been banished, 
since a r t  which has the power to arouse unpredictable emotions is  not 
to be countenanced in utopia. The great store o f c lass ica l l i te ra tu re  
has e ith e r been repressed or revised. Thus the tragedy o f Oedipus 
has been purged o f i t s  t ra g ic  elements, and reappears as a vehicle 
fo r  the moral ins truc t ion  o f ch ildren. The play is  performed by 
puppets, rather than by human actors, since Huxley, l ik e  Plato,
-  243  -
considers that i t  is  harmful fo r  one man to im ita te  the thoughts and 
fee lings of another. The only a r t  which survives in Huxley's Pala, 
apart from educational a r t ,  is  fo lk  a r t ,  the product not o f ind iv idua l 
insp ira t io n  but o f co l le c t iv e  t ra d i t io n .  In Is land , Huxley condemns 
a l l  a r t  which is  not conducive to inner harmony and to social s t a b i l i t y .
But Huxley is  ambivalent in his conception o f the nature of 
acceptable a r t .  The condemnation o f f ine  a r t  which appears in Is land, 
where a r t  is  proclaimed to be incompatible w ith philosophical t ru th  
and with social s t a b i l i t y  and welfare, had appeared in s a t i r ic a l  form 
in  Huxley's Brave New World. In Huxley's an t i-u to p ia ,  the Savage laments 
the eclipse o f  the f in e  arts  in the World State, but he is  to ld  by 
Mustapha Mond, 'You can 't  make tragedies without social i n s ta b i l i t y .
The world 's stable now. People are happy ___ You've got to choose
between happiness and what people used to ca l l  high a r t .  We've s a c r i­
f iced high a r t ' .  I t  is  iron ica l tha t Huxley himself was w i l l in g  to 
make such a sa c r if ic e  t h i r t y  years la te r ,  when he wrote Is land .
While f ine  a r t  is  abolished in both the World State and Pala, 
the nature o f the a r t  which remains in the World State is  qu ite  unlike 
tha t which survives in Pala. The a r t  o f Pala, fo llow ing the t r a d i ­
t iona l model, is  designed to promote high moral values. I t  is  state 
propaganda. In th is  way, i t  d i re c t ly  serves social s t a b i l i t y .  But 
the a r t  o f the World State, while s t i l l  serving social s t a b i l i t y ,  
is  not o f a moral nature. In the World State a r t  is  an instrument 
fo r  the arousal and control o f human emotion, ra ther than fo r  i t s  
suppression. Pornography is  the new a r t  o f the World State.
S im ila r ly ,  in Orwell's Oceania, mechanically produced pornography
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is  used as an instrument fo r  the control o f  the Proles. I t  is  the 
a r t i s t i c ,  rather than the l ib id in o u s , which has the power to corrupt 
and unsettle the c i t ize n  o f utopia, Consequently, ’ high a r t '  becomes 
the new pornography, to be locked away from curious eyes. The a r t  
o f Huxley’ s World State and of Orwell's Oceania is fa r  removed from 
tha t o f the t ra d it io n a l utopia. The m ora lity  o f  Huxley's World State 
is  nowhere d i re c t ly  served by a r t .  Didactic a r t  l in g e rs ,  perhaps, 
in a ve s t ig ia l form, in the slogans o f the social conditioners o f 
the s ta te , but there are no m o ra lis t ic  ta les and poems, as there are 
in the One State and in Pala. In Orwell's Oceania, the state has no 
ideals and no higher moral purpose which a r t  could serve. Conse­
quently, there can be no d idac tic  act.
Art is  banished from Orwell's Oceania fo r  reasons o f R e a lp o l i t ik , 
because the state cannot to le ra te  the dissemination o f t ru th .  There 
is  no attempt, as there is  in  the One State and in Pala, to trans la te  
a r t  in to  a more noble, ra tiona l and useful form. Orwell's  Oceania does 
no, o f course, pretend to be a perfect s ta te . I t  is  merely a to ta l 
state. As such, i t  is  t o ta l ly  unrelated to the P latonic model. I ts  
ru le rs  ru le by simple oppression. They do not u t i l i z e  the persuasive 
powers o f language to sustain th e i r  dominion. Instead, they destroy 
language as a vehicle fo r  t ru th .  Newspeak is  designed to r e s t r i c t  
communication and pare down thought to the level o f dogma, I t  is  a 
language so impoverished and d is to rted  tha t only the sentiments o f 
state orthodoxy can be expressed. I t  is  the perfect instrument fo r  
the prevention o f l i te r a tu r e ,  and fo r  the destruction o f freedom and 
tru th .
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Both Orwell and Zamyatin hold that truth is the first concern
of the writer. They do not share Plato's view that art obscures
truth. Art, they maintain, reflects and illuminates truth. It is
not, they consider, in a free, imperfect society, where a multitude
of opinions and beliefs is allowed to flourish, that art acts as a
force for deception and obfuscation, but in a closely regulated,
repressive society, where the shape and content of literature is
determined by the censors. In the Republic, Plato's Socrates assures
Adeimantus that in the ideal state they will allow only 'the poets
and story-tellers of the more austere and less attractive type, who
will reproduce only the manner of a person of high character, and in
37the substance of their discourse 'conform' to the rules laid down.
In this way, Socrates believes it will be possible to protect the 
eternal, immutable truth inherent in the structure of the state from 
the corrupting powers of the feckless, beguiling artist. But the 
anti-Utopians consider that there is no piece of state orthodoxy, no 
officially accepted pronouncement about the nature of man and society, 
or about the nature of perfection, which should remain immune from 
the critical assessment of the artist. It is the personal apprehen­
sion of truth which concerns the anti-utopians. The writer must always 
express the truth as it appears to him, that is, his inner truth. He 
must not be silenced through fear of offending against established visions 
of reality. Today's generally accepted truth is tomorrow's lie,
Zamyatin maintains. In his essay. The Day and the Age, Zamyatin 
comments, 'Truth is the first thing that present day literature lacks.
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The w r i te r  has drowned himself in l ie s ;  he is  too accustomed to  speak 
prudently, w ith a careful look over the shoulder. This is  why our 
l i te ra tu re  f u l f i l s  so poorly even the most elementary function assigned 
to i t  by h is to ry  - the task o f seeing our astonishing unique epoch,
with a l l  i t  contains of the revo lt ing  and the b e a u t i fu l ,  and record-
38ing i t  as i t  i s ' .  Plato considered tha t a r t is ts  should be employed
by the s ta te ; in th is  way, the t ru th  could be safeguarded. But the
anti-utopians hold tha t once an a r t i s t  becomes a h ire l in g  o f the s ta te ,
t ru th  w i l l  be destroyed. No state w i l l  employ a man to t e l l  the t ru th .
‘ Writing o f  any consequence can only be produced when a man fee ls  the
t ru th  o f what he is  say ing ', Orwell wrote. 'Without th a t,  the cre-
39ative  impulse is  lacking*. For Orwell and Zamyatin, a r t  must be a 
personal statement.
I t  is  not merely the ob jective t ru th  o f the jo u rn a l is t  and the 
h is to r ian  which is sac r if ice d  in the to ta l  s ta te , the anti-utopians 
maintain. I t  is  also the a r t i s t i c  in te g r i ty  o f  the imaginative w r i te r .  
Orwell wrote, 'So fa r  as freedom o f expression is  concerned, there is  
not much d ifference between a mere jo u rn a l is t  and the most 'u n p o l i t ic a l '  
imaginative w r i te r .  The jo u rn a l is t  is  unfree, and is  conscious of 
unfreedom, when he is  forced to w rite  l ie s  or suppress what seems to 
him important news: the imaginative w r i te r  is  unfree when he has to
fa l s i f y  his subjective fee lings , which from his po int o f view are 
fac ts . He may d is to r t  and caricature re a l i t y  in  order to make his 
meaning c lea re r, but he cannot misrepresent the scenery o f his own 
mind: he cannot say with any conviction tha t he l ike s  what he
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d is l ik e s ,  or believes what he d isbelieves. I f  he is  forced to do so, 
the only re su lt  is  tha t his creative fa c u lt ie s  dry u p , '^^  As Sartre 
wrote, the allegiance o f the professional w r i te r  must be to 'the d ig n ity  
o f words’ , and not to the dogma o f a p o l i t ic a l  system, which d is to r ts  
language fo r  i t s  own ends. The v a l id i t y  and in te g r i t y  o f  words as 
bearers o f meaning must be preserved i f  l i te ra tu re  is  to su rv ive ’ .
Orwell, l ik e  Sartre, believed tha t every work o f a r t  expresses some 
form o f commitment on the part o f the w r i te r ,  and tha t th is  commit­
ment must always proceed from the inner convictions o f the a r t i s t .  Art 
must never be the servant o f dogma. 'You cannot re a l ly  s a c r if ic e  your
in te l le c tu a l in te g r i ty  fo r  the sake o f a p o l i t ic a l  creed - or a t least
42you cannot do so and remain a w r i t e r ' .  Orwell stated.
Samyatin and Orwell share a common regard fo r  the preservation 
o f t ru th  in a r t ,  but there are, o f course, d is p a r i t ie s  in th e i r  con­
ceptions o f the nature o f a r t ,  and o f i t s  demise in the to ta l  s ta te .
Orwell envisages, in Nineteen Eighty-Four ,  a world where bruta l 
repression, savage censorship and the state control o f language crush 
l i te ra tu r e  out o f existence, and society is  awash w ith l ie s .  Zamyatin, 
on the other hand, envisages a pe rfe c t ly  regulated world, where 
c re a t iv i ty  and o r ig in a l i t y  are driven out, p a r t ly ,  indeed, by censor­
ship, but mainly by the pervasive apathy and narrowness o f v is ion  which 
inform the society which he describes. The c it izen s  of the One State 
are oppressed by the p re d ic ta b i l i t y  o f th e i r  world, and by i t s  fea ture­
less un ifo rm ity . They have lo s t  the capacity to generate the a r t  which 
would l ibe ra te  them from th e i r  immutable paradise. V ir tue , in the One 
State, l ie s  in to ta l conformity, ' I t  is  c le a r ’ , E-330 remarks i r o n i ­
c a l ly ,  ' th a t  to be o r ig in a l means standing out from others. Consequently,
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to be o r ig in a l means v io la t in g  un ifo rm ity . And what in the id io t ic  
language of the ancients was called being banal means among us only 
the fu l f i lm e n t  of one’ s du ty ’ ,
Zamyatin's conception o f the fundamental importance to humanity 
o f a r t i s t i c  expression, and also o f the human need fo r  the stimulus 
o f the unexpected, is  endorsed by the phys io log is t, J.Z. Young,
Young w r ites , 'Play and a r t  both express a need fo r  surprise and 
fo r  change. This feature is  espec ia lly  important i f  we are looking
fo r  the emotional basis fo r  o r ig in a l i t y  ........  Aesthetic creation and
enjoyment are fundamental features o f human l i f e .  They are a c t iv i t ie s  
in which the brain is  operating in the same way as i t  does in d a i ly  
l i f e ,  but as i t  were at a higher level of in te n s i ty .  A ll human
perception is  a form of creative a c t iv i t y  ___ The a c t iv i t ie s  tha t
go to the creation and enjoyment of works o f a r t  are qu in tesse n tia l ly  
those by which the bra in, working every day as a creative  agent, syn­
thesizes input from the world to make a sa t is fa c to ry  l i f e .  This is  
why I say that fo r  human socie ties the creative aesthetic and a r t i s ­
t i c  a c t iv i t ie s  are among the most important things we can do The 
creations and sa tis fac t ions  o f  a r t  include and symbolize both our in d i ­
vidual acts o f perception and the expression to others o f  what we 
perceive. These are the very brain actions tha t give us the powers 
o f communication by which we obtain a l l  the re s t ,  food, sh e lte r ,  sex, 
and social l i f e  The a r t i s t  arouses needs and s a t is f ie s  them. His 
work is not an impractical luxury, but is  closer than tha t o f any 
other labourer to meeting the continuing long-term needs o f man. We
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are a l l  symbol-creating creatures by the very working o f our brains.
A rt assures us tha t our a c t iv i t ie s  are proceeding s a t is fa c to r i ly ,
44and symbolizes the fac t tha t l i f e  is  worth l i v i n g ' .  For Young, 
as fo r  Zamyatin, the l i f e  o f men and o f soc ie ties cannot proceed 
s a t is fa c to r i ly  i f  a r t  is  excluded.
While the three w rite rs  under review, Zamyatin, Huxley and 
Orwell, hold tha t a r t  must in e v ita b ly  perish in the to ta l  s ta te , 
they also believe that u lt im a te ly  science w i l l  fare l i t t l e  be tte r. 
However, science possesses some natural advantages w ith in  the t o t a l l y  
regulated society which a r t  lacks.
F i r s t ly ,  science, p a r t ic u la r ly  applied science and technology, 
has natural u t i l i t y .  The s c ie n t is t  has a p ractica l r51e to play in 
the promotion of the aims o f the s ta te . His special knowledge 
enables the state to refashion the environment in  accordance w ith the 
needs o f the p o l i t ic a l  programme. Thus the s c ie n t is t  serves the s ta te , 
whereas, the w r ite rs  maintain, the a r t i s t  may not d i re c t ly  serve the 
sta te , i f  he is  to remain an a r t i s t .  The a r t i s t  serves society only 
when he serves the t ru th ,  and t r ie s  to create the best a r t  o f which 
he is  capable. But th is  form of service is  precluded in  the to ta l  
s ta te .
Secondly, the work o f the s c ie n t is t  requires no popular audience. 
The s c ie n t is t  works in a small, h igh ly specialized domain, and he has 
l i t t l e  d ire c t  contact w ith the populace. But the a r t i s t  requires open 
access to the pub lic . His work, f re e ly  created, should be accessible 
to a l l  who are disposed to receive i t ,  In the to ta l  s ta te , the a r t i s t
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is  a dangerous and ind iscrim inate communicator. His work can be 
received, not only by the h igh ly  specia lized, r igorously  tra ined mind, 
but p o te n t ia l ly  by a l l  minds.
T h ird ly ,  fo llow ing P la to 's  conception o f  the nature o f the 
human soul, while a r t  is  engendered by man's lower fa c u lt ie s  - by 
his emotions and senses- science is  the product o f the higher elements 
in the soul, since i t  is  the product of human ra t io n a l i t y .  Thus i t
is  tha t science, o f a kind, survives in Zamyatin's One State, while
a r t  is  banished beyond the Green Wall.
Yet the mind o f the s c ie n t is t ,  as o f the a r t i s t ,  is  c re a t ive ,
and the s c ie n t is t ,  no less than the a r t i s t ,  needs imagination i f  he is
to bring fresh perspectives to his in te rp re ta t io n  o f the world about 
him. Science in utopia, l ik e  a r t ,  is  u lt im a te ly  s te r i le .  As Mustapha 
Mond, himself a former s c ie n t is t ,  explains to the Savage, in Huxley's 
Brave New World, 'We don 't want to change. Every change is  a menace 
to s t a b i l i t y ' .  This is  why, he adds, the con tro l le rs  of the World 
State are 'so chary o f applying new inventions. Every discovery in 
pure science is  p o te n t ia l ly  subversive; even science must sometimes 
be treated as a possible enemy ___ I t  i s n ' t  only a r t  th a t 's  incom­
pa tib le  with happiness, i t ' s  also science. Science is  dangerous; we 
have to keep i t  most c a re fu l ly  muzzled . . . .  T ru th 's  a menace, science
is a public danger. As dangerous as i t ' s  been beneficent ........  We
ca n 't  allow science to undo i t s  own good work. That's why we so 
c a re fu l ly  l im i t  the scope o f i t s  researches We don 't a llow i t  
to deal w ith any but the most immediate problems o f the moment. A ll
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other enquiries are most sedulously discouraged I t  hasn^t been 
very good fo r  t ru th ,  o f course. But 1 t ‘ s been very good fo r  happi­
ness, One can 't  have something fo r  nothing. Happiness has got to 
45be paid f o r * .
In the to ta l s ta te , science, l ik e  a r t ,  must act as the servant 
o f dogma. I t  is  merely another instrument fo r  social con tro l.  Sci­
e n t is ts  develop the condition ing techniques necessary fo r  the mainte­
nance o f cu ltu ra l un ifo rm ity , and the eugenic techniques required fo r  
the control o f breeding. In Huxley's Pala, as in the World State, the 
scope o f  science is  severely re s tr ic te d . Research is  l im ited  to the 
sphere o f the b io log ica l sciences in both cases, and is  p r im a ri ly  
d irected towards the perfecting o f eugenic procedures. There is  also 
research in the f ie ld s  o f ecology, psychology and ag r icu ltu re  in Pala. 
The c it izens  of Huxley's utopia have 'fo llowed the road o f applied 
bio logy, the road o f f e r t i l i t y  control and the l im ite d  production
and selective in d u s tr ia l iz a t io n  which f e r t i l i t y  control makes possible,
46the road tha t leads towards happiness ' The science o f Pala is
a science devoid o f c u r io s i ty .  I t  is  designed to support happiness, 
and, as Huxley says, 'happiness has got to be paid f o r ' .
Palanese science is  not, o f course, to  be equated w ith the 
science o f the World State. Moreover, i t  serves to support a social 
system very d i f fe re n t  from that found in Huxley's an ti-u top ian sta te . 
But in both soc ie t ies , sc ie n t is ts  fo llow  state-approved procedures to 
produce the l im ited  resu lts  required o f them by state po licy . Science, 
chained to the demands o f the s ta te , is  f i n a l l y  no fre e r  than a r t .
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Orwell, l ik e  Huxley, considered tha t s c ie n t i f ic  freedom could 
not long o u t l ive  the death o f a r t i s t i c  freedom. S c ie n t is ts ,  he 
believed, were too ready to condone attacks upon a r t i s t i c  freedom, 
be liev ing themselves to be immune from s im ila r  harrassment. I n i t i ­
a l l y ,  Orwell believed, th is  might be the case: s c ie n t is ts  might
escape repression since th e i r  work was useful to  the s ta te . 'Pro­
vided they steer c lear o f dangerous subjects such as psychology, s c i ­
en t is ts  are p r iv i leged persons.... For the moment, the to ta l i t a r ia n
47state to le ra tes  the s c ie n t is t  because i t  needs h im ', Orwell wrote.
But he believed tha t u lt im a te ly ,  once the to ta l  state had become f i rm ly
entrenched, the pos ition o f the s c ie n t is t  would become s im i la r  to tha t
o f the a r t i s t :  he would lose his in te l le c tu a l freedom. The s c ie n t is t ,
Orwell suggested, would do well to recognize tha t 'any attack on
in te l le c tu a l l ib e r ty ,  and on the concept o f ob jective t r u th ,  threa-
48tens in the long run every department o f thought'.
Science in Orwell's Oceania has ceased to e x is t except fo r  certa in  
branches o f research necessary to the Party in i t s  search fo r  improved 
methods of social con tro l.  There is  no longer any word to express 
the general concept o f science. Newspeak is  a tool fo r  the prevention 
o f  science as fo r  the prevention o f l i te ra tu r e .  Some psychological and 
physiological research pe rs is ts , to enhance the p ro fic iency o f the 
to r tu re rs .  There is  also work in the f ie ld  o f physical chemistry and 
biology fo r  the development o f new techniques o f mass extermination.
But there is  no in ten tion  tha t these new techniques shall ever be put 
in to  use: the sham warfare which f la re s  up con tinua lly  along the fro n ­
t ie r s  which d iv ide the three super-states must never be allowed to
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re s u lt  in conclusive v ic to ry .  None o f the superstates could, in  any 
case, achieve a v ic to ry ,  since a l l  are o f broadly s im ila r  s trength.
The purpose o f the warfare is  p a r t ly  to arouse n a t io n a l is t ic  fervour 
against an external enemy, and p a r t ly  to  use up the material products 
o f industry , so tha t l iv in g  standards can be kept a t an a r t i f i c i a l l y  
low le ve l.  War hysteria and needless poverty are promoted by the Party 
as a means fo r  holding the people in  subjection.
Orwell's a t t i tu d e  to war is  in te re s t in g  and unusual. He con­
sidered tha t war, or the p o s s ib i l i t y  o f war, was v i ta l  to the surv iva l 
o f science, and moreover o f r a t io n a l i t y  as a whole. ' In  the past . . .  
war was one o f the main instruments by which human soc ie ties  were kept 
in touch with physical r e a l i t y ' ,  Orwell wrote. 'So long as defeat 
meant the loss o f independence, or some other re su lt  generally held 
to be undesirable, the precautions against defeat had to be serious.
Physical fac ts  could not be ignored ___  War was a sure safeguard o f
san ity , and so fa r  as the ru lin g  classes were concerned i t  was pro­
bably the most important o f a l l  safeguards. While wars could be
49won or lo s t ,  no ru lin g  class could be completely i r re s p o n s ib le '.
Orwell believed tha t the lo g is t ic s  o f warfare made i t  imperative tha t 
a certa in  empirical habit o f thought should be maintained. This acted 
as a safeguard fo r  ra t io n a l i t y .  Where exact ca lcu la tions had to be 
made, r e a l i t y  could not be wholly ignored or d is to rted . The end o f 
serious warfare, on the other hand, would perhaps lead to the e x t in c ­
t ion  o f the habit o f mind which made s c ie n t i f ic  thought possible. 
'H i t le r  . . .  can 't  say tha t two and two are f iv e ,  because fo r  the 
purpose o f ,  say, b a l l i s t i c s ,  they have to  make fo u r ' ,  he wrote.
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’ But i f  the sort o f world I am a fra id  o f a rr ive s , a world o f two or 
three great superstates which are unable to  conquer one another, two 
and two could become f iv e ,  i f  the führer wished i t ’ .^^
O rwell’ s contention that there is  a necessary l in k  between the 
capacity o f  a nation to wage t ra d i t io n a l  warfare, and the ’ survival 
o f  the habit o f mind which makes s c ie n t i f ic  thought possib le ' is  hard 
to  defend. Orwell was well aware tha t both S ta l in is t  Russia and 
Nazi Germany were f u l l y  capable o f f ig h t in g  a genuine war, while 
fos te r ing  the most grotesque i r r a t io n a l i t ie s  in domestic po licy .
He seems to b lu r  the d is t in c t io n  between accurate computation and the 
broader concept o f ra t io n a l i t y .  I t  is  p e rfe c t ly  possible to ensure 
tha t 'two and two make fo u r ' in the weapons research establishment 
and in  the munitions fac to ry , while in s is t in g  tha t they make f iv e  in 
the f ie ld  o f  p o l i t ic a l  and social l i f e ,  and in the broader f ie ld  o f 
science. Perfec t ly  e f f ic ie n t  weapons were being created while the 
doctrines o f  Lysenko, and theories o f Aryan supremacy were being 
hailed as the u lt imate s c ie n t i f ic  t ru th .
While science in Orwell's  Oceania has p ra c t ic a l ly  ceased to 
e x is t ,  in Zamyatin's One State, science is  fostered, and mathematical 
precision governs a l l  conduct. Yet science serves only to confine the 
l iv e s  o f the c i t iz e n s ,  and a rres t social development. The design o f 
the ru le rs  o f  the One State is  to standardize the l ive s  o f  a l l .  
U lt im a te ly , they intend to colonize the en t ire  universe, and standar­
dize tha t also. Physical and mechanical science provides the means 
fo r  th is  end. Science provides the iden t ica l glass c e l ls  in which the 
members o f the state are housed; i t  provides th e i r  standardized food.
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a deriva tive  o f  naphtha; i t  equips the vast, impersonal nurseries, 
and furnishes the teachlng-machines, which serve to Indoctr inate the 
young fo r  l i f e  as homogeneous fra c t ions  o f  the social whole. F in a l ly ,  
i t  provides the medical and technological knowledge required fo r  the 
performance o f the operation o f fantiesectomy, a procedure by which 
a l l  human ingenuity is  quelled.
Zamyatin held tha t the great s c ie n t is t ,  l ik e  the great a r t i s t ,  
is  he who has the courage to break away from accepted patterns of 
th ink ing through a leap o f  the imagination. Science, l ik e  a r t ,  can 
overturn o f f i c ia l  t ru th ,  and can thus act as a force to dispel 
psychological entropy. In his essay on L ite ra tu re ,  Revolution and 
Entropy, Zamyatin associates, the names o f  G a lileo , Darwin and Einstein, 
w ith those o f Schopenhauer, Dostoievsky and Nietzsche. A ll  were, fo r  
Zamyatin, generators o f  new thought, creators o f fresh mental energy.
But the science o f Zamyatin's an ti-u top ian s ta te , uncontaminated by 
c re a t iv i ty  or o r ig in a l i t y ,  and wholly enslaved by state p o l ic y ,  has 
become a force fo r  entropy.
The anti-Utopians hold tha t ne ither the a r ts  nor the sciences can 
survive the death o f  in te l le c tu a l freedom. Both are properly the 
product o f the ind iv idua l mind, which can f in d  no expression in the 
to ta l  state. Orwell holds tha t the ex t in c t ion  o f the arts  and s c i­
ences w i l l  en ta il the e lim ina tion  o f t ru th  and ra t io n a l i t y ,  and there­
fore o f  the human mind, as i t  is  now apprehended, Zamyatin maintains 
that the arts  and sciences are above a l l  expressions o f creative energy 
in  an otherwise to rp id  world. The suppression o f th is  source o f  energy 
must re su lt  in the a rres t o f  human progress, and the stagnation of 
human thought. For both w r i te rs ,  loss o f creative  freedom e n ta i ls  the 
eclipse o f humanity.
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Conclusion
In th is  thesis I have argued tha t while the utopias o f  e a r l ie r  
centuries were, despite th e i r  d iv e rs i ty ,  the products o f confidence, 
the utopias o f the present century are la rg e ly  the product o f despair. 
The various assumptions which supported the utopian asp ira tions o f 
the past have lo s t  th e i r  c r e d ib i l i t y .  New images o f  the utopian 
state have ar isen, in which the old utopian ideals o f harmony, unani­
mity o f purpose and fa u lt le ss  re g u la r i ty  are extended and elaborated 
to the point o f parody. The new Utopians are without fa i th  in e i th e r  
the fe a s ib i l i t y  o r the d e s i ra b i l i t y  o f the goal o f the perfect s ta te . 
Utopia is  no longer considered to be the natural home o f enlightened 
man; thus 'p e r fe c t io n ' can only be in s t i tu te d  by force. In the bleak 
v is ions o f  the perfect state offered by the three w r ite rs  under review, 
the emphasis is  no longer upon the de ligh ts  which would accrue to man 
in the Good Society, but upon the machinery o f oppression which would 
be required to maintain such an in s t i tu t io n .
As I contended in the Introduction to Part I I  o f th is  the s is , 
the bones o f the an ti-u top ian case are a l l  to be discerned in the 
Areopagitica o f John M ilton : we l iv e  in  a world where Good and Evil
necessarily co -ex is t ,  and where the nature o f the one can only be d is ­
covered by reference to the nature o f the other. The quest fo r  Truth 
is  man's highest task, but i t  is  an unending quest, and no man may lay 
claim to have concluded his search, and to have taken possession o f  
permanent, unquestionable Truth. Others w i l l  always fo l lo w  who w i l l
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r e f1 ne and amplify his f ind ings . In order to pursue Truth, man must be 
free to choose, but in utopia, One Truth has replaced a l l  competing 
v is ions o f r e a l i t y .  A l l  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f free enquiry is  a t an end.
In utopia, awareness o f moral freedom is  h e re t ic a l ,  fo r  utopian happi­
ness is  born o f moral to rpor, and perfect harmony is  dependent upon the
perfect p a c if ica t io n  o f the populace. I t  e n ta i ls  the s a c r i f ic e  o f
w i l l ,  desire, uncerta in ty, and a l l  tha t has been held to be au then ti­
c a l ly  human. ’ Reason is  but choosing', and man be re ft o f  the power o f 
choice is  'a mere a r t i f i c i a l  Adam', doomed to l i v e  in ‘ a perpetual 
childhood o f p re s c r ip t io n '.^
The perfect state - the state which seeks to fashion the mora­
l i t y  o f i t s  c i t izen s  according to  a s ingle ideal o f  perfect ion  - is
f i n a l l y  no more than the to ta l  s ta te , fo r  M ilton as fo r  the twentie th -
century anti-Utopians. In the Areopagitica, M ilton o ffe rs  a p ic ture 
o f the extent and q u a l i ty  o f social control necessary to such a s ta te , 
which, in  i t s  mordancy and w i t ,  r iv a ls  any o f the v isions o f the w rite rs  
o f the present century: ' I f  we th ink  to regulate p r in t in g ,  thereby
to re c t i f y  manners, we must regulate a l l  recreations and pastimes, a l l  
tha t is  d e l ig h t fu l to man', he w rites . 'No music must be heard, no
song be set or sung, but what is  grave and Doric. There must be l ic e n ­
sing dancers, th a t no gesture, motion, or deportment be taught our 
youth but what by th e i r  allowance shall be thought honest; fo r  such 
Plato provided o f ;  i t  w i l l  ask more than the work o f  twenty licensers 
to examine a l l  the lu te s ,  the v io l in s ,  and the gu ita rs  in  every house; 
they must not be suffered to p ra t t le  as they do, but must be licensed
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what they may say. And who shall silence a l l  the a irs  and madrigals 
tha t whisper softness in  chambers? The windows a lso , and the balconies 
must be thought on, there are shrewd books, w ith dangerous f r o n t i s ­
pieces, set to sale; who shall be the rectors o f  our d a i ly  r io t in g ?
And what shall be done to  in h ib i t  the multitudes tha t frequent those 
houses where drunkenness is  sold and harboured? . . . .  Who shall regu­
la te  a l l  the mixed conversation o f our youth, male and female together, 
as is  the fashion o f th is  country, who shall appoint what shall be 
discoursed, what presumed, and no further? Lastly , who shall fo rb id  
and separate a l l  id le  resort,  a l l  e v i l  company? These things w i l l  
be, and must be; but how they shall be least h u r t fu l ,  how least 
en t ic ing , herein consists the grave and governing wisdom o f a 
s ta te '
For the an ti-u top ian w r i te rs ,  as fo r  M ilton , the ro le  o f the 
state is  to  encourage men to choose w isely, and not to make tha t 'wise 
choice' on th e i r  behalf. U lt im ate ly , choice is  w ith the ind iv idua l 
c i t iz e n ,  and he may choose to re je c t  the s ta te 's  advice. Without
th is  p o s s ib i l i t y ,  m ora lity  is  dead.
The an ti-u top ian w r ite rs  hold tha t in the perfect s ta te , a l l  tha t 
is  apprehensible to human consciousness - man's apprehensions o f  the 
nature o f  the world, and o f time, and o f  the human body and the human
mind, and a l l  the products o f  human c re a t iv i t y  - the arts  and sciences,
w i l l  be subjugated to the demands o f a single dogma. Utopia is  no more 
than the in s ta n t ia t io n  in  the real world o f a closed system o f thought. 
And they also hold tha t in the present century, the new orthodoxies, 
powered by the new technology, w i l l  be imposed fa r  more re ad ily  than 
the old orthodoxies. Utopia has become probable.
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But as I have attempted to  show, in  the course o f th is  review 
o f  the ideas o f  Zamyatin, Huxley and Orwell, while the three w r ite rs  
hold many be lie fs  in common, there are also s ig n if ic a n t  va r ia tions  
in th e i r  v is ions o f the nature o f man and o f socie ty. Zamyatin's 
is  the purest in te rp re ta t io n  o f the an ti-u top ian  thes is . In the work 
o f  Huxley there is  ambivalence, as there is ,  to a lesser extent, in 
the w rit ings  o f Orwell.
For Zamyatin, i t  is  c lear tha t to l iv e  on the earth , man has 
to accept his physical and mental nature, w ith i t s  capacities and 
also with i t s  l im i ta t io n s .  He has to accept tha t he is  morta l, tha t 
he ex is ts  in time, and time w i l l  bring death and corrup tion . He has 
to accept re s p o n s ib i l i ty  fo r  his own actions, and the burden o f  g u i l t  
tha t th is  acceptance brings, because he has to accept tha t he is  free 
to exercise choice. He also has to accept his own is o la t io n ,  his 
physical separateness from others. A l l  these factors  in human l i f e  are 
revealed through self-consciousness.
But utopia o ffe rs  an avenue o f escape from Zamyatin's comfort­
less world. I t  is  the eternal c i t y ,  in which man can abandon conscious­
ness o f  s e l f ,  in d iv id u a l i ty ,  loneliness, g u i l t ,  anguish, death, cor­
ruption and fears o f judgment. Utopia answers a psychological need.
I t  is  a bastion against personal a n n ih i la t io n . Man can choose - and 
th is  w i l l  be his la s t  act o f choice - to become dissolved in to  an 
impersonal, e te rn a lly  changeless organism. Thus he need no longer be 
aware o f himself as a perishable e n t i ty .  The defeat o f old age ia a 
common feature in f ic t io n a l  utopias and an ti-u top ias  a l ik e .  In Wells 's
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a n t i-u to p ia ,  The Sleeper Awakes, the hedonistic c i t ize n s  l iv e  in f u l l  
vigour and beauty u n t i l  they are ready to melt in to  voluptuous ex t in c ­
t io n  in the euthanasia parlours. S im ila r ly ,  in his u topia. Men Like 
Gods, no one is  o ld , enfeebled, ugly or diseased. The world o f beauti­
fu l  people continues - ungrieving, unaware and unchanged by the in f lu x  
and e f f lu x  o f ind iv idua l e n t i t ie s ,  A lack o f personal awareness 
numbs the mind against the fa c t o f personal a n n ih i la t io n .  The centre 
o f  g rav ity  o f utopia is  in  the s ta te , which is  e te rna l, and not in 
the t in y ,  temporal ind iv idua l being. There is  no sense o f past or
fu tu re , so no occasion to lament those who have gone, or an tic ipa te
those who are to come.
Aldous Huxley, sharing Wells 's te r ro r  o f personal ex t in c t ion  
and o f the Second Law of Thermodynamics, f i n a l l y  came to embrace the 
utopian so lu tion . At the time when he wrote Brave New World, Huxley 
was concerned to warn society o f the cost to humanity en ta iled  in  the 
establishment o f the p e rfe c t ly  harmonious s ta te , but at la s t  he seems 
to found the acceptance o f time and m o rta l i ty  and in d iv id u a l i ty  too 
painful to bear.
Huxley came to decide tha t consciousness o f  s e l f  is  mere i l l u ­
sion: a l l  that ex is ts  is  the Eternal Now o f the Void. Man must do
his best to get o f f  the Wheel o f  Time, and escape in to  the fea ture less, 
impersonal chasm of E te rn ity ,  which is  the true utopia. For Huxley, 
'Time Must Have a Stop ', I t  is  s ig n if ic a n t  tha t a death scene is
central both to Brave New World and to  Is land . In Brave New World,
Linda s l ip s  gracelessly and ignominiously from l i f e  in a haze o f soma.
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under the curious gaze o f a Bokanovsky group o f  cha tter ing  midgets.
In Is land , Lakshmi is  tutored in the techniques o f  the Yoga o f Dying, 
as she c a re fu l ly  charts her course from the world o f  time in to  the 
world o f Eternal Being. Death remained fo r  Huxley the Eternal Horror,
3
which threatened to rob l i f e  o f  a l l  meaning. And release from th is  
Horror cannot be found while consciousness o f ind iv idua l existence 
pe rs is ts .
With Orwell, the s itu a t io n  is  more complex. Utopianism 
is  fo r  him to be equated with a shameful hedonism. Like Zamyatin,
Orwell accepted a world o f contingency and change and corporeal f r a i l t y ,  
•where Good and Evil forever co -ex is t.  'Perhaps some degree o f s u f fe r ­
ing is  ineradicable from human l i f e ' ,  he wrote, 'perhaps the choice 
before man is  always a choice o f  e v i ls ,  perhaps even the aim of Socia­
lism is  not to make the world perfect but to make i t  be t te r .  A l l
4
revolutions are fa i lu re s  but they are not the same f a i l u r e ' .  Orwell 
here appears to share something o f Zamyatin's conception o f  the revo lu­
t ionary  nature o f social change, but there is  nonetheless an ambiguity 
in Orwell's w r it ings  which is  e n t i re ly  absent from the w r it in g s  o f 
Zamyatin. Within Orwell there appear to be two warring desires: the
desire to remain separate, self-conscious, moral, free and c re a t ive , 
and the desire to belong, to abandon the unequal struggle fo r  autonomy, 
and to become absorbed, to 'partake o f c o l le c t iv e  im m o rta l i ty ' .  (See 
Part I I (.11) notes 8 and 9),
This Is discussed by Alan Sandison, in his book. The Last Man 
in Europe. Sandison writes o f Orwell th a t 'alongside his empiricism
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and independence runs not only g u i l t  and a strong consciousness o f 
the burden o f his in d iv id u a l i ty ,  but also a fasc ination  w ith  the pros-
5
pect o f handing the re s p o n s ib i l i ty  over to  some corporate ca re '.
This ' fa s c in a t io n ' ,  u lt im a te ly  a fasc ination w ith  the nature o f domina­
t ion  and submission, is  especia lly  apparent in Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
in  O rwell’ s d isqu ie ting  exposition o f the developing re la t ionsh ip  
between O'Brien and Winston Smith, Reference has been made to the 
ambivalent q u a l i ty  o f  th is  re la t ionsh ip  in Part I l ( i v )  o f th is  thes is , 
at note 37. Sandison writes o f Orwell tha t he has 'committed himself 
to an empirical ind iv idualism  where man's moral and s p i r i tu a l  in teg ­
r i t y ,  h is to r ic a l ly  authenticated, depends on the basic freedom o f a 
d ire c t  confrontation between the ind iv idua l and the data o f  his experi­
ence, and on his sustaining his place in " the  stream of h is to ry " .
For his own good he is  clamped to "ob jective  r e a l i t y " .  But the strength 
th is  demands o f  the ind iv idua l is  enormous and the temptation is  strong 
to return at whatever price in to  tha t la rger id e n t i fy  from which, 
in the heresy of ind iv idua lism , he has alienated himself. This temp­
ta t io n  manifests i t s e l f  in most, i f  not a l l ,  o f  Orwell's  books but 
most powerfully in the unequal c o n f l ic t  between Winston Smith and the 
absolute and au tho r ita r ian  Party in Nineteen Eighty-Four, where the 
nosta lg ic mirage o f the Golden Country, as i t  is  ca lled there, ( 'A  
landscape I 'v e  seen sometimes in a dream'), is  the la s t  i l lu s o r y  
re f le c t io n  o f the Golden Gity'-,^
When Orwell f i r s t  alludes to Winston^s v is ion  o f the Golden 
Country, the s ign if icance o f the symbol is  unclear. The simple.
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pastoral landscape which Winston half-remembers from his ea r ly  youth 
seems perhaps to represent fo r  him the lo s t  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f  freedom and 
warmth and love. At th is  stage, the 'Golden Country' is  linked in 
Winston's mind with images o f J u l ia ,^  But towards the end o f the book, 
the equation which Sandison makes between Winston's (or O rw e ll 's ) 
yearning fo r  the 'Golden Country' and his desire fo r  absorption in to  
a ' larger id e n t i ty ' becomes quite e x p l ic i t .  Now i t  is  c lea r tha t the 
'Golden Country' is  a world o f easeful conformity. I t  represents a 
release from the anguish of autonomy and personal id e n t i ty .  Broken by 
to r tu re ,  Winston allows himself to experience the peace o f surrender 
to absolute power: 'How easy i t  a l l  was! Only surrender, and every­
th ing else followed. I t  was l ik e  swimming against a current tha t 
swept you backwards however hard you struggled, and then suddenly 
deciding to turn round and go with the current instead o f opposing 
i t .  Nothing had changed except your own a t t i tu d e :  the predestined
thing happened in  any case. He hardly knew why he had rebelled ___
Everything was se tt le d , smoothed out, reconciled. There were no more
doubts, no more arguments, no more pain, no more fear ___ He walked
e a s i ly ,  w ith a joy  o f movement and with a fee ling  o f  walking in sun­
l ig h t .  He was not any longer in the narrow white corr idors  in  the 
M in is try  o f Love, he was in the enormous s u n l i t  passage, a kilometre 
wide, down which he had seemed to walk in  the de lir ium  induced by drugs. 
He was in the Golden Country, fo llow ing the fo o t- t ra ck  across the old
o
rabbit-cropped pasture '. For as long as he can re ta in  his mind in ta c t ,  
Winston is  determined to preserve his ind iv idua l e n t i ty ,  and to re s is t
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d if fu s io n  in to  the immortal body o f the Party, Yet he is  at the same 
time tormented by the desire to submit to O'Brien, and to meet with 
him ’ in the place where there is  no darkness'.^
While i t  is  apparent tha t Orwell's  fears and asp irations fo r  
humanity are expressed through the thoughts and words o f his character, 
Winston Smith, the v ic t im  o f oppression, yet there is  more than a 
shadow of respect, perhaps even o f envy, fo r  the character o f the 
oppressor, O’ Brien, who is  a l l-p o w e r fu l,  courageous, omniscient and 
convinced o f the rec t itude  o f his actions in the service o f the Party. 
And O’ Brien is ,  above a l l ,  blessed with the g i f t  o f im m orta lity , which 
arises from his being wholly o f the Party, a 'c e l l  in an everlasting 
body'. (See Part I l ( i i )  note 8). Orwell shares with his creatures, 
O'Brien, a r igorously  d isc ip l in ed  in te l le c t ,  and a contempt fo r  hedo­
nism and fo r  a l l  physical and moral softness. And Orwell , despite 
his obvious horror o f oppression, and his humane concern fo r  the wel­
fare o f mankind, has, l ik e  O'Brien, the capacity to to le ra te  b r u ta l i t y  
when i t  is  set to serve some higher purpose. W riting in 1940 of the 
revo lu tion  which he believed to be both desirable and imminent, Orwell 
commented, ' I  dare say the London gutters w i l l  have to run with blood. 
A ll r ig h t ,  le t  them, i f  i t  is  necessary' (See Part I ( i i )  note 19). 
I t  is  obviously true tha t O’ Brien, un like Orwell, g lo r ies  in acts 
o f v iolence, ye t,  w ith in  O’ Brien 's contorted lo g ic ,  such acts are 
j u s t i f i e d ,  since they serve to promote the continuing and increasing 
power o f the immortal Party. I t  is  possible to detect in the 
c h a r a c te r  o f  O 'B r ie n ,  a f l e e t i n g  and d i s t o r t e d  r e f l e c t i o n  
o f  th e  d a rk e r  s id e  o f  O r w e l l ' s  n a tu re .  O’ B r ie n  o f f e r s .
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in an extreme form, a so lu tion to the problem o f loneliness and g u i l t  
and m o r ta l i ty ,  a so lu tion so te r r ib le  tha t I t  Is  to be In s ta n t ly  
re jected.
F in a l ly ,  fo r  Orwell, escapes in to  im m orta lity  through o b l i t e r ­
a tion o f  the Self are not to be contemplated, I t  i s ,  a f te r  a l l ,  the 
Se lf which he is  determined to preserve. Entry in to  the corporate 
im m orta lity  o f timeless utopia is  conditional upon the act o f abandon­
ment o f S e lf ,  and Orwell, un like Huxley, f inds th is  cost unthinkable. 
For him, the Se lf Is made real and preserved in the world o f  time; 
i t  achieves a kind o f immorta lity  in  the continuing course o f h is to ry , 
in memory and in w r it te n  reports. This is  the only so lu tion  possible.
Only in the work o f Zamyatin is  there no sense o f  the seductive
appeal o f utopian so lu tions. For Zamyatin, there is  no temptation
to abandon the pain o f heresy and seek absorption in  the timeless,
impersonal b l is s  o f  orthodoxy. 'Every today is  at the same time both
a cradle and a shroud', he w rites : 'a shroud fo r  yesterday, a cradle
fo r  tomorrow ___ Today is  doomed to die - because yesterday died,
and because tomorrow w i l l  be born. Such is  the wise and cruel law
  Today denies yesterday, but is  a denial o f denial tomorrow.
This is  the constant d ia le c t ic  path which in a grandiose parabola
sweeps the world in to  i n f i n i t y .  Yesterday, the the s is ; today, the
11a n t i th e s is ;  and tomorrow the synthes is '. For Zamyatin, the passage 
o f  time and the passing o f generations is  to be welcomed. He accepts 
the in e v i t a b i l i t y  o f  a never-ending cycle o f b i r th  and death, o f an 
in f i n i t e  series o f revo lu tions. Today dies tha t tomorrow may be
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born, and our ideas and asp irations must also d ie , so tha t those o f
our ch ildren may be born. Only in th is  way, Zamyatin holds, can the
world be recharged w ith energy, and thus avoid descent in to  entropy.
Zamyatin is  the true an ti-u top ian , the iconoclast, eager to destroy
received orthodoxies, so tha t new orthodoxies may a r ise , to be des^
troyed in th e i r  tu rn , and replaced by others. As Alex Shane comments,
Zamyatin's conception of the nature o f human progress is  fundamentally
Hegelian, and fo r  Zamyatin, 'the key f ig u re  o f the Hegelian d ia le c t ic a l
sp ira l is  the heretic  who re jec ts  the accepted canons, be they soc ia l,
p o l i t i c a l ,  s c ie n t i f i c ,  re l ig io u s ,  or a r t i s t i c ,  and looks ahead to the
12fu tu re . Without him, progress would be impossib le '. Within Zamya-
13t in 's  conceptual framework, 'The world is  kept a l ive  only by h e re t ic s '.
Zamyatin wrote th a t i t  is  only in d ifferences that l i f e  l ie s .
(See Part I l ( i i )  note 35). He was, l ik e  M ilton , appalled a t the 
b lind  conformity and narrowness o f v is ion  which pass fo r  perfection 
in  the c lose ly  regulated sta te . Like M ilton , Zamyatin scorned the 
' fa n ta s t ic  te r ro rs  o f sect and schism', which he perceived in his 
s o c i e t y . F o r  the an ti-u top ian , 'p e rfe c t io n ' consists, paradoxi­
c a l ly ,  in dissension and innovation and honest scepticism. I t  is  not 
the product o f u n c r i t ic a l  minds, united in  pursu it o f a s ing le , common 
goal. M ilton wrote, 'Where there is  much desire to learn , there o f 
necessity w i l l  be much arguing, much w r i t in g ,  many opinions; fo r  
opinion in good men is  but knowledge in the making , , , , ,  There must 
be many schisms and many dissections made in the quarry and in the 
timber, ere the house o f  God can be b u i l t .  And when every stone is
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la id  a r t f u l l y  together, i t  cannot be united in to  a c o n t in u i ty ,  i t
can but be contiguous in th is  world; ne ither can every piece o f
the bu ild ing be o f  one form; nay ra ther the perfection consists in
th is ,  tha t out o f many moderate v a r ie t ie s  and bro therly  d iss im il i tu d e s
tha t are not vas tly  d isp rop o rt io na l, arises the goodly and the grace-
15fu l  symmetry tha t commends the whole p i le  and s t ru c tu re '.
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